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Abstract 
One of the cornerstones of our society of which we are rightly proud is the criminal 
justice system. However, as with any system it is not without its flaws. Over the last 
30-40 years there have been a number of miscarriages of justice involving flawed or 
misused expert evidence. This thesis attempts to answer the question “Does the 
situation with regard to the admissibility and presentation of expert evidence inhibit 
the courts from assessing such evidence in a rational manner, and does the system 
prevent the use and admission of expert evidence within the criminal justice system 
that could properly support the jury in reaching a just outcome?” 
 
The selected approach is a mixed methodology utilising doctrinal analysis, socio-legal, 
and comparative law approaches within a case study framework. 
 
The thesis reviews the Law Commission consultation paper and report on expert 
evidence, concluding that despite the failure to legislate the recommended statutory 
reliability test, the move to better control expert testimony by way of the criminal 
procedure rules (CrimPR) is a significant step forward, while noting that the failure to 
consider other aspects of admissibility represents something of a missed opportunity. 
 
Consideration is given as to how the jury analyses evidence to reach a verdict, with 
discussion as to possible external influences and the effect of bias on the part of both 
the jury and the presenting experts. Consideration is also given to approaches which 
may better enable the jury and the court to both comprehend expert evidence and 
reach a rational verdict. The thesis posits that concurrent evidence and judge-only 
trials may provide mechanisms to better manage expert evidence before the courts. 
 
In respect of eyewitness and earwitness evidence, it is argued that juries are in some 
cases being deprived of expert testimony as to the wide disparity between ‘common-
sense perception’ and current science. As such, the jury is deprived of expert opinion 
that may better enable its decision-making. The recommendation is made that both 
the Turnbull direction given in visual identification cases, and the modified Turnbull 
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direction given in the case of voice identification, need a more nuanced approach to 
better reflect the current situation. It is also recommended that with regard to 
earwitness testimony, not only does lay identification evidence require expert input, 
but the courts should follow the lead of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal and 
mandate the use of more robust techniques for voice identification. 
 
The penultimate chapter considers the possibility of polygraph evidence being used in 
criminal trials. There is evidence that a properly conducted polygraph is between 70% 
and 90% accurate. Evidence from the field of human psychology is that, in the absence 
of corroborating information, human beings do little better than chance when 
determining truth from lies. The thesis argues that it is illogical to ignore the possibility 
of using the more reliable form of evidence in favour of the less reliable, and that there 
is little English case law to prevent the use of polygraph evidence. It is argued that 
there is a route by which polygraph evidence could be bought before the courts and 
considers the possibility of legislation to this effect. 
 
The thesis closes by making a number of recommendations for further study/reform. 
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Chapter 1 
1.0 Introduction 
In criminal cases, trial by jury, the often mentioned ‘twelve good men and true’, is a 
cornerstone of the English legal system. For a jury of one’s peers to consider and weigh 
the evidence presented and then reach a rational – and hopefully correct – outcome 
must be the objective of any jury trial.  
 
In making the determination as to guilt or otherwise, the court, and thus the jury, rely 
upon evidence of fact such as testimony, documents, and other exhibits. It is the place 
of the jury (where there is one) to interpret this evidence and, in the case of 
circumstantial evidence, to draw inferences from it. 
 
Lay witnesses must generally give accounts only of facts that they have directly 
witnessed. Anything else is either hearsay or non-expert opinion, and neither form of 
evidence is generally admissible in criminal proceedings. It is the place of the jury to 
make judgments and draw inferences from such evidence and thus reach a conclusion. 
 
Expert witnesses, on the other hand, may (where it is deemed necessary) express 
opinions, draw inferences, and explain the significance of evidence to judges and juries 
who might not otherwise understand it. The jury still ultimately decides, but the 
influence of the experts can be immense, as are the dangers posed by fake, 
incompetent, or biased experts, or experts who give evidence outside their areas of 
expertise. Such experts can trigger, or help to trigger, a miscarriage of justice, with 
immeasurable harm both to any wrongly convicted individual and to any genuine 
victim who does not receive justice. Damage may also be done to the public 
perception of, and confidence in, the justice system when the innocent are convicted 
or the guilty go free. 
 
Broadly speaking, the interests of justice demand that expert evidence should be 
available where needed, be properly explained, be based on sound and impartial 
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principles, and, thus, be reliable. The same interest of justice may also mean that 
although expert evidence is available, it may not necessarily be admissible 
 
Miscarriages of justice related to flawed expert evidence have occurred, and both the 
common law and the recent amendments to criminal procedure rules (CrimPR) and 
associated practice directions aim to ensure that only credible and helpful expert 
evidence is placed before the jury. 
 
This chapter will review the landscape around the admissibility and presentation of 
expert evidence to ascertain if it inhibits the courts, and thus the jury, from assessing 
such evidence in a rational way, potentially limiting the ability of the courts to deliver 
rational or just outcomes. 
 
1.1 Expert Evidence and Miscarriages of Justice 
Although a guilty verdict generally requires proof of guilt ‘beyond reasonable doubt’1 
(that the jury is ‘sure’ of it), miscarriages of justice can and do occur, and while expert 
evidence is only adduced in a minority of cases, there have been a number of relatively 
recent examples of miscarriages of justice where the expert evidence was central to 
that miscarriage. 
 
A miscarriage of justice may be defined in a number of ways. The simple definition is 
that a miscarriage of justice occurs where a factually innocent person is wrongly 
convicted (and perhaps also where a guilty one is wrongly acquitted). 
 
However, the reality, as ever, is more nuanced. As per the Supreme Court in R (on the 
application of Adams)(FC) v Secretary of State for Justice2 there are four categories in 
which convictions could be quashed on the basis of fresh evidence. These were: 
 
(1) Where the fresh evidence shows clearly that the defendant is 
innocent of the crime of which he has been convicted. 
 
1 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, per Lord Sankey 480-482. 
2 R (on the application of Adams)(FC) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] UKSC 18 
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(2) Where the fresh evidence is such that, had it been available at the 
time of the trial, no reasonable jury could properly have convicted the 
defendant. 
(3) Where the fresh evidence renders the conviction unsafe in that, 
had it been available at the time of the trial, a reasonable jury might or 
might not have convicted the defendant. 
(4) Where something has gone seriously wrong in the investigation of 
the offence or the conduct of the trial, resulting in the conviction of 
someone who should not have been convicted.3 
 
Lord Phillips described these categories as a useful framework for discussion. By a 
majority, the Supreme Court held that the term ‘miscarriage of justice’ covered cases 
within category 1 and 2 only. For this thesis, that is the accepted definition of 
miscarriage of justice.  
 
Arguably, there is a further category; namely, where a guilty person is wrongly 
acquitted. This is clearly still a form of miscarriage of justice, and with the amendments 
to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Part 10, a person who has previously been acquitted 
may (in a few exceptional circumstances) be retried. A relatively recent example is that 
of the 2012 conviction of two individuals for the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993. 
There had been a previous unsuccessful private prosecution bought by Lawrence’s 
parents in 1996.4 
 
It is argued that while this permits a clear identification and classification of the type of 
miscarriage of justice which has occurred, an additional way of viewing the 
miscarriages of justice may be: 
 
 
3 ibid [9] 
4 BBC News ‘Stephen Lawrence murder: A timeline of how the story unfolded’ 13/04/18 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26465916 accessed 20/04/19 
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1. That there are miscarriages where the legal system is unable to recognise or 
manage problems or misrepresentation of the expert evidence, so failures of 
system 
 
2. That there are miscarriages which result from inaccuracies in the conclusions 
the expert has drawn from the evidence. This may be seen as an individual or 
internal issue 
 
As will become apparent throughout the thesis, the demarcation between these two 
views are often not clear-cut, with the justice system failing to pick up and recognise 
the individual inaccuracies. This thesis focuses primarily on issues of system and, 
considering the CrimPR, looks for system solutions to the issues raised.  
 
To give the context to this thesis, it is helpful to consider the effects of two apparent 
miscarriages of justice. The first I argue is an example of failure within the system to 
manage and control expert evidence. The second case is one where the 
misinterpretation of such evidence leads to a miscarriage of justice.  
 
In perhaps one of the most widely known cases, solicitor Sally Clark5 was convicted of 
the murder of two of her children. Following referral from the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (CCRC), at a second appeal the conviction was quashed primarily because 
of the failure of the prosecution expert to disclose test results. The Court of Appeal 
also heavily criticised statistical evidence presented by Professor Roy Meadow, a 
paediatrician called by the prosecution. The conclusion was that there was no 
indication of unnatural causes for the deaths, therefore no evidence that a crime had 
occurred. Sally Clark served three years of a life sentence before being released after 
the quashing of her conviction. She died four years after being released6 with family 
and friends attesting to the fact that the experience of losing her children, the court 
 
5 R v Clark (Sally) (No2) [2003] Crim1020 
6 The Guardian ‘Sally Clark, mother wrongly convicted of killing her sons, found dead at home’ 
(17/03/07) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/mar/17/childrensservices.uknews 
accessed 29/03/18 
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case and subsequent imprisonment had resulted in her being unable to resume her 
life. At her inquest, the coroner determined she had died accidentally of acute alcohol 
intoxication.7 
 
The consequences of this miscarriage of justice also impacted the experts in the case, 
specifically Professor Meadow and Dr Williams, the Home Office pathologist. Both 
were referred to their regulatory body, the General Medical Council (GMC), with 
Meadow being struck off the medical register and Williams being barred from 
undertaking any Home Office pathology or coroners cases for a period of three years. 
Meadow appealed the decision and was re-instated onto the register8 but Williams 
failed to have his restrictions lifted.9 At the time, concerns were expressed within 
medical and legal journals that this was likely to lead to an increasing reluctance of 
paediatricians to act as expert witnesses in such cases.10 
 
In the case of Sally Clark, it is not possible to be sure of her innocence with the 
miscarriage aligning more closely with categories three and four of Adams. I would 
also argue this miscarriage clearly illustrates system failure. On even cursory 
examination the system failures which are apparent are: 
• A failure of disclosure of pathology results which indicated possible infection 
and thus potential natural cause of death, at the time of Sally Clarks conviction 
the common law duty of disclosure applied.11  
• Although this trial occurred before the introduction of the CrimPR there was 
still the common law requirement of ‘relevant expertise’ which will be 
examined in 3.1.3. Thus the failure within the trial was to detect that Professor 
Meadow was testifying outside his area of expertise. 
 
 
7 BBC News ‘Alcohol killed mother Sally Clark’ (7/11/07) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/essex/7082411.stm accessed 29/03/18 
8 Meadow v GMC [2006] EWHC 146 (Admin) 
9 Williams v GMC [2007] EWHC 2603 (Admin) 
10 C Dyer ‘Professor Roy Meadow struck off‘ (2005) 331 British Medical Journal 177; T Magner 
‘To err is human…?’ (2006) 156 Expert Witness Supplement New Law Journal 293 
11 R v Ward (1993) 96 Cr App R 1 
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The second case looks very much like a miscarriage as per the first category in Adams, 
and illustrates issues with inaccurate interpretation of evidence at the level of the 
individual expert. In R v Dallagher12 Mark Dallagher was convicted of murder based on 
expert testimony regarding an earprint found at the scene of the offence. Experts 
testified that the print could only have been left by the defendant and that earprint 
evidence was a unique identifier.13 At a second trial, Dallagher was exonerated as DNA 
from the earprint indicated another individual. So unlike Sally Clark’s case, where there 
may never have been any offence, in this case not only did Dallagher spend 6 years in 
prison for a crime he did not commit, another individual remained free to offend 
again. At the time of Dallagher’s release, police indicated they had no other leads.14 
 
A wrongful conviction and imprisonment can have wide-ranging consequences, the 
campaign group JUSTICE notes that possible consequences include the loss of 
livelihood, family breakup, and loss of reputation.15 In the event a conviction is 
quashed, compensation for the miscarriage is not a forgone conclusion. Under 
s133(1ZA) of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1988 it is possible to be eligible to receive 
compensation only if: 
 
…the new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that 
the person did not commit the offence…  
 
 
12 R v Dallagher [2002] EWCA Crim 1903 
13 C Champod, IW Evett and B Kuchler ‘Earmarks as Evidence: A Critical Review’ (2001) 46 
Journal of Forensic Science 1275 highlighted the weakness of the, then current, knowledge 
with regard to earmark evidence. More recently efforts to semi-automate earprint 
identification as part of an EU financed study was described and evaluated positively in I 
Alberink and A Ruifrok ‘Performance of the FearID earprint identification system’ (2007) 166 
Forensic Science International 145 
14 S O’Neil ‘Expert evidence flaws clear ‘earprint killer’ The Telegraph (23/01/2004) 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1452346/Expert-evidence-flaws-clear-earprint-
killer.html accessed 30/03/18 
15 JUSTICE ‘Supporting Exonerees Ensuring accessible, consistent and continuing support’ 
(2018) para 2 
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In the recent Supreme Court case R (on the application of Hallam & Nealon) v Secretary 
of State for Justice16, limits were set on the compensation for miscarriage of justice, 
affirming the earlier ruling in Adams v Secretary of State for Justice, wherein the court 
held there were two categories of case which could be said to constitute a 
compensable miscarriage of justice they were the first two formulations of miscarriage 
as per Adams. 
 
However s133 (1ZA), sets in statute that the first category is the only category of 
compensable miscarriage. As Blackstock17 notes, this requires that the individual is 
able to demonstrate their innocence to be eligible for compensation. It is unclear if 
Dallagher did receive any compensation for the six years spent in prison, but JUSTICE 
concluded that under the test applied by 1ZA, it is unlikely Sally Clark would have 
received compensation as the new evidence did not conclusively show she did not 
murder her children.18 
 
These miscarriages, which were largely caused by errors on the part of expert 
witnesses, are by no means unique, but illustrate that the issue of 
misapplied/incorrect expert evidence has consequences that go far beyond that of 
mere academic conjecture. It is useful to remember that expert evidence almost 
invariably involves circumstantial rather than direct evidence. The conclusions that 
may be drawn from direct evidence are either true or false/mistaken, but expert 
testimony can, as with any other form of circumstantial evidence, lead the court astray 
in other ways as well. It is possible that the expert has miscalculated, mixed up 
samples, or failed to disclose evidence. 
 
 
 
 
16 R (on the application of Nealon) v Secretary of State for Justice and R (on the application of 
Hallam) v Secretary of State for Justice [2019] UKSC 2 
17 J Blackstock ‘Compensating Miscarriages of Justice – what price for wrongful imprisonment?’ 
(2019) 3 Archbold Review 6  
18 JUSTICE ‘Supporting Exonerees: Ensuring accessible, consistent and continuing support’ 
(2018), 46 
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1.2 Defining terms: Evidence, Truth, and Justice 
Evidence can be defined in a number of ways, with Twining describing what he terms 
the orthodox view. This is that evidence is the means of proving or disproving facts, or 
of testing the truth of allegations of fact, in situations in which the triers of fact have 
no first-hand knowledge of the events or situations about which they have to decide 
what happened.19 More recently, Dennis simply described evidence as ‘information 
that provides grounds for belief that a particular fact or set of facts is true’.20 
 
However, Twining argues that evidence is actually broader than this and is more 
accurately described as ‘information from which further information is derived or 
inferred… for a variety of purposes’.21 He notes that traditionally the study of evidence 
has centred on the rules of evidence, focussing narrowly on questions such as the 
rationale for the rules, and the slightly wider debate as to reform or codification of the 
rules. Twining was writing in 1984 and, at the time, he described the current 
treatments as ‘narrow, fragmented, artificially isolated from contiguous fields, 
unempirical ... and incoherent’ 22  suggesting an alternative would need to be 
‘comprehensive, coherent, realistic, empirical, contextual and sufficiently well 
integrated that the relations between different lines of enquiry are clearly mapped’.23 
Writing more recently, he noted that the first three concerns have been addressed, 
but that there is still an open question with regard to coherence.24 
 
While it is outwith this thesis to assess the competing models of evidence theory, the 
fundamental underpinning argument set out by Twining is that the law should be 
considered in context with other areas of study, such as forensic science and 
psychology, and that these should be assimilated into the study of law.  
 
 
19 W Twining ‘Evidence and Legal Theory’ (1984) 47 The Modern Law Review 261, 269 
20 I Dennis The Law of Evidence (sixth edition Sweet and Maxwell 2017), 1-001 
21 W Twining ‘Evidence and Legal Theory’ (1984) 47 The Modern Law Review 261, 267 
22 ibid 267 
23 ibid 269 
24 W Twining Rethinking Evidence Exploratory Essays (second Edition, Cambridge University 
Press 2006), 245 
26 
 
This thesis seeks to explore the role of expert evidence in the search for truth. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines truth as ‘the quality or state of being true’,25 with 
true being defined as being ‘in accordance with fact or reality’.26 
 
There is a substantial body of literature questioning the philosophical and 
jurisprudential nature of truth. Examination of this question is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, which sits within the rationalist tradition originally espoused by Jeremy 
Bentham and then widely discussed by Twining.27 With regard to truth, this approach 
assumes that the primary aim of fact finding is truth about the facts, and the means to 
establish that truth is reason. In this approach, truth is conceptualised as being 
objective truth which corresponds to reality and, as such, the definition of truth largely 
accords with the dictionary definition. 
 
While the focus of the thesis is the search for truth, it is impossible to exclude the 
notion of justice from any such consideration. Rawls28 sets out the idea of justice as 
fairness, defining a well-ordered society as one that is ‘regulated by a public 
conception of justice’. Rawls explains that such a public conception of justice has three 
core requirements; firstly, that it is a society in which all citizens mutually accept the 
same political conception of justice; secondly that the political and social institutions 
work together to satisfy the principles of justice, and thirdly that citizens have ‘a 
normally effective sense of justice’ which enables them to understand and apply those 
publically recognised principles.  
 
This Rawlsian conception of justice seems to accord with the ‘everyday’ definition of 
justice as defined in the OED: 
 
 
25 Oxford Dictionary https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/truth accessed 19/03/19 
26 Oxford Dictionary https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/true accessed 19/03/19 
27 W Twining Rethinking Evidence Exploratory Essays (second Edition, Cambridge University 
Press 2006)  
28 J Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
London (2001) 3.1 
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Maintenance of what is just or right by the exercise of authority or 
power; assignment of deserved reward or punishment; giving of due 
desserts.29 
 
Consequently, for this thesis justice as fairness is the accepted definition.  
 
1.3 Thesis: Aims and Narrative  
Although the primary focus of this thesis is the use (or otherwise) of expert testimony 
in criminal trials, it is important to be aware that expert evidence and guidance is often 
accessed in the earlier parts of the criminal justice process. In some cases to underpin 
a technique in widespread use – as with identification parades – or in the support or 
management of individuals who have already gone through the courts process, such as 
the use of the polygraph in the management of serious sexual offenders and 
potentially the perpetrators of domestic abuse. These techniques will be considered in 
Chapter 6 and 7. 
 
This research has been undertaken using a mixed methods approach consisting of 
doctrinal, social-legal and comparative approaches, within a case study format. 
Chapter 2 considers each of these approaches and also potential limitations and 
restrictions. The way in which these approaches complement one another to address 
the research question are also outlined. 
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the key cases and principles which underpin expert 
evidence and its use within the courts. The rationale for setting out these principles at 
the start of the thesis is that these both underpin, and run throughout the thesis. 
 
It was on the back of the miscarriages noted above (among others)30 that the Law 
Commission undertook a consultation,31 and then published a report regarding expert 
 
29 Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition Dec 2013) 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/102198 
30 R v Ward (Judith)[1993] 1 WLR 619 CA; R v Maguire (1992) 94 Cr App R133 CA; R v Cannings 
[2004] EWCA Crim 1; R v Harris and others [2005] EWCA Crim 1980 
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evidence in criminal proceedings32 in which it recommended the introduction of a 
statutory reliability test for such evidence.33 While the proposed legislation was not 
taken forward by the Government, many of the suggestions within the report were 
incorporated into the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR) 2015. Chapter 4 will consider 
in some detail both consultation and the subsequent recommendations. 
 
A question which needs to be addressed is whether the recommendations contained 
within Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (LC 325), and the 
subsequent, (arguably unorthodox) implementation of the recommendations 
regarding the reliability test via the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee (CPRC) 
provide the English courts, as claimed by Hodgkinson and James, with the ‘best 
guidance in the common-law world,’34 or whether it represents a missed opportunity. 
 
A number of suggestions were put forward which never made it into the Draft Bill, 
including the notions of appellate review35 and court appointed experts36, each of 
which will be considered in some detail.  
 
It will be argued within chapter 4 that a substantial oversight was the decision to leave 
the Turner Principle outside the remit of the review. The Turner Principle stipulates 
that expert opinion is only admissible if the evidence to be considered is ‘outside the 
experience and knowledge of the jury’.37 In an editorial at the time, the Criminal Law 
Review described the decision as facile.38 The potential difficulties raised by a strict 
application of the Turner Principle is subject to analysis in relation to eyewitness 
 
31 Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability – a 
Consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009)  
32 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 
325, 2011)  
33 ibid 1.36 
34 T Hodgkinson and M James Expert Evidence: Law & Practice (Fourth Edition Sweet and 
Maxwell London 2015) 
35 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 
325, 2011), 5.90  
36 Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary reliability – a 
consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009), 6.65-6.66  
37 R v Turner [1975] QB 834 
38 Editorial ‘Examining Expert Evidence’ (2009) 6 Criminal Law Review 387 
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testimony in Chapter 6. The need for training and education within the judiciary was 
also noted.  
 
Chapter 5 examines ways in which jurors, and the courts, are enabled to understand 
expert testimony, and considers alternate ways in which the courts might better 
understand that evidence to enable them to arrive at a just verdict. These include a 
consideration of concurrent and consecutive evidence within the criminal courts. 
Although there is little reported authority of such an approach within the criminal 
courts in this jurisdiction, the use of concurrent evidence in the civil courts is well 
established. The admittedly limited use of concurrent evidence in Australian criminal 
trials is examined, with the relevance that Australia is also a common law jurisdiction, 
where the divergence from the English common law is relatively recent.39 The use of 
consecutive evidence in this jurisdiction is largely absent from the reported case law, 
but is often a reality, focussing more on expert availability than consideration of 
alternate ways to manage expert evidence. 
 
Another approach to expert testimony in a number of Australian states is that of 
criminal trial by judge alone. The notion of the judge alone trial is considered because 
of the oft expressed concerns that jurors can struggle to fully understand elements of 
expert testimony.40 
 
Within this jurisdiction consideration will be given to the controversy that surrounded 
s42 and s43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which, when enacted, provided for judge 
alone trials in the case of either jury tampering or for complex fraud cases.  The latter 
of these can be seen to be heavily dependent on expert testimony41 and as such the 
question that arises is whether the reluctance on the part of the legislature and 
elements of the judiciary to consider such an option is the result of rational 
consideration or whether the jury trial is such a sacred cow that no rational 
 
39 Australia became independent from Britain in 1901 https://www.australia.gov.au/about-
government/how-government-works/federation accessed 20/03/19 
40 Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary reliability – a 
consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009), 2.8 
41 e.g. R v Pabon [2018] EWCA Crim 420 
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consideration can be undertaken. Would a judge alone be better able to understand 
and analyse complex expert evidence, or would such a consideration be a case of 
releasing experts from their obligation to make complex evidence intelligible to ‘the 
man in the street’ if specific provision were made? Has such a change fundamentally 
undermined the jury system where it is in use? 
 
Given the range of topics which are potentially subject to expert testimony, the 
selected case study approach permits focus on a limited range of areas. These are eye- 
and earwitness testimony which are subject to analysis in Chapter 6 and the use of the 
polygraph which is examined in chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the use of both eye and earwitness identification evidence,  
analysing both the science and the case law relating to such evidence. The wide 
disparity between the psychological research which notes the difference between the 
‘commonsense’ and ‘scientific’ understanding of the effectiveness of such evidence is 
explored. The notion is developed that the use of expert evidence in relation to both 
eye and earwitness identification requires a more consistent and nuanced approach 
with recommendations being made as to review of the Turner principle, but also in 
respect of the Turnbull guidelines. 
 
In chapter 7 the potential use of expert testimony relating to the polygraph takes as its 
starting point the oft-asserted determination from Jerome v Fennell Property 
maintenance Ltd 42 that 
 
Evidence produced by the administration of a mechanically or chemically or 
hypnotically induced test on a witness so as to show the veracity or 
otherwise of that witness is not admissible in English law.  
The argument is made that while this may still be the case with two of those elements 
a cogent case can be made that polygraph evidence, which is already seeing increasing 
 
42 Fennell v Jerome Property Maintenance Ltd, The Times (26 November 1986) QBD.  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use in certain areas of the criminal justice system43, could be a suitable subject for 
expert testimony and could in limited circumstances aid the court and the jury in 
reaching a just outcome.  
 
Chapter 8 closes the thesis by making recommendations for further research and 
potential reform on the basis of the analysis set out within the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 see chapter 7 at 7.2 
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Chapter 2 
2.0 Methodology  
This is a library based study utilising a mixed methodology consisting of doctrinal 
analysis, socio-legal, and comparative research all within a case study approach.  
 
The rationale for the selected approach is that, given the substantial range of potential 
subjects for expert testimony, it would not be possible to carry out any meaningful 
analysis unless a tightly defined range of areas/subjects was clearly identified.  
 
Whilst doctrinal analysis forms the predominate thread, both socio-legal and 
comparative research are core to this analysis. This chapter provides a brief review of 
each approach, identifying its relevance in addressing the set question. 
 
2.1 Doctrinal Analysis 
Doctrinal research or ‘black letter’ law considers the law as a self contained system, 
and black letter research ‘aims to systematise, rectify and clarify the law on any 
particular topic by a distinctive mode of analysis of authoritive texts that consist of 
primary and secondary sources’44 with the assumption that ‘the character of legal 
scholarship is derived from law itself’.45 Central to this model is that it is free from 
‘political or personal contamination.’46 
 
The relevance of this methodology is that as this thesis considers how the law may 
accommodate developments in expert evidence, the starting point must logically be to 
fully understand the ratio for the relevant case law, as only then can such case law be 
meaningfully subject to analysis.  
 
 
 
44  M McConville and WH Chui Research Methods for Law (Eds) (Edinburgh University Press 
2017), 4 
45 E L Rubin (1997) Law and the Methodology of Law (1997) Wisconsin Law Review  521 
46 EH Tiller and FB Cross What is Legal Doctrine? (2005) Northwestern Public Law Research 
Paper No 05-06 517, 518 
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2.2 Socio-legal Studies 
While doctrinal analysis will form a central thread in the thesis, it is arguable that 
information relating to the reception of expert evidence/possible bias in expert 
evidence is largely context dependent and, thus, socio-legal in nature. The 
fundamental research underpinning the expert evidence, which is then applied in a 
legal context is it is also argued strongly interdisciplinary in nature. As becomes 
apparent throughout the thesis science both informs and drives the evidence coming 
before the courts,47 and as will be demonstrated, the same may be said of some 
evidence which it will be argued should come before the courts. 
 
There are a wide range of theories concerning the relationship of law and society, and 
while an in-depth analysis of these theories is outwith this work, a brief examination is 
deemed useful. One approach is the ‘mirror thesis’ currently accepted by the majority 
of western legal theories and which is clearly set forth by Vago: 
 
Every legal system stands in close relationship to the ideas, aims and 
purposes of society. Law reflects the intellectual, social, and economic and 
the political climate of its time…. But law is not only conditioned by social 
forces; it also plays a crucial role in shaping the social environment.48 
 
It is also worth noting Cotterrell’s comment on the place of socio-legal studies: 
 
All the centuries of purely doctrinal writing on law have produced less 
valuable knowledge about what law is, as a social phenomenon, and what it 
does than the relatively few decades of work in sophisticated modern 
empirical socio-legal studies.49 
 
 
47 e.g see 4.2, 5.2.1, 6.1.1, 6.1.3, 6.5, 7.4.1 
48 S Vago, Law and Society (Englewood Cliffs 1981), 3 
49 R Cotterrell , Law’s Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Oxford University 
Press 1995), 296 
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While it may be arguable that such a sweeping statement could be seen as overstating 
the case for the non-doctrinal approach, it is fair to say that the merits and relevance 
of utilising other disciplines are now widely recognised.50 The possible merits of well-
perfomed socio-legal research was acknowledged by (the then) Hale LJ speaking extra-
judicially, who noted a number of socio-legal studies which had been cited in court.51 
 
2.3 Comparative Law 
The third methodological strand is that of comparative law. In this approach, law from 
jurisdictions other than the researcher’s own is studied to review how issues are 
addressed and often to ascertain if the solutions from these other jurisdictions could 
inform law reform in the researcher’s home jurisdiction. The Law Commission uses this 
approach widely within its programme of law reform52 and within the thesis the 
approach is utilised in relation to both identication evidence in chapter 6 and the 
polygraph in chapter 7. 
 
Reimann notes that the methods within comparative law: 
 
… essentially consists of the juxtaposition of blackletter rules or doctrines 
from a functional perspective, or at best, of potential case solutions.53 
 
The functional method is a mainstream approach to comparative law. The selected 
method, within this thesis, from within the comparative law canon is that of functional 
equivalence, or functionalist comparative law. It is important to be aware that whilst 
this approach may be viewed as mainstream it is not without its critics with one view 
 
50 M McConville and WH Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2017), 6 
51 B Hale, ‘Should judges be socio-legal scholars?’ Socio-Legal Studies Association 2013 
Conference, 26 March 2013 www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-130326.pdf accessed 4/01/15 
52 Law Commission Examples of reviews including comparative research Murder, Manslaughter 
and Infanticide  (LC report 304, 2006); Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination 
of Evidentiary reliability – a consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009)  
; Insanity and Automatism - Supplementary Material to the Scoping Paper July 2012. 
53 M Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth Century’ (2002)  50 American Journal of Comparative Law 671, 693 
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being that this approach aviods serious consideration of methodology. Brand54 arguing 
that ‘the methodological malaise of comparative law seems to be incoherence rather 
than lack of effort’55, going on to present a detailed crique of the approach and 
suggest alternatives.  
 
Within this thesis, the notion of functional equivalence is particularly noted with 
regard to jury research, for example, why a jury made the decision they did, thus juror 
reasoning. As will be noted in Chapter 5, such research is severely restricted in England 
and Wales under section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.56 Material from both 
the United States (US) and Australia has been accessed, as such a rigid bar does not 
exist within those jurisdictions, and while caution is always required when applying the 
findings from one country to the systems of another, it is argued that functional 
equivalence can be applied.  
 
2.4 Case Study 
The approach within which this mixed methodology was applied is that of a case study. 
There is academic debate as to whether case study research is a methodology in its 
own right, a choice of what is to be studied,57 or a comprehensive research strategy.58 
It is argued that the finer definitional points of the term ‘case study’ are outwith this 
thesis as the model remains the same.  
 
Creswell defines case study research as: 
 
…a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a real-life, 
contemporary bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems 
 
54 O Brand, ‘Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal 
Studies’ (2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2, 405 
55 ibid 408 
56 …it is a contempt of court to obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made, 
opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of 
their deliberations in any legal proceedings. 
57 RE Stake ‘Qualitative Case Studies’ in NK Denzin and YS Lincoln (Eds) The Sage Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (third edition Thousand Oaks, CA Sage 2005), 443  
58 RK Yin Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Fifth Edition Sage London 2014), 17 
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(cases) over time, through detailed, in depth data collection involving 
multiple sources of information…, and reports a case description and case 
themes.59  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, this approach allows the researcher to define the area of 
expert evidence under consideration, to draw data from both the scientific and legal 
literature relating to each of those defined areas and draw conclusions as to 
suggestions for reform. 
 
Arguably, although each of the methodological approaches identified has its own very 
distinct characteristics, for the purpose of this thesis the case study approach 
effectively acts as the ‘wrapper’ within which each of the other approaches allows data 
sources to be collated and analysed. 
 
One of the key strengths of properly conducted case study analysis is that it presents 
an in-depth understanding of the case.60 In terms of this thesis, this translates into an 
understanding of both the law pertaining to the subject and the science underpinning 
the area under consideration.  
 
Cresswell identifies one of the key challenges with this approach being that of both 
identifying the scope of the case to be studied and the range of information to be 
analysed. 61 Yin notes that poorly planned case study research can take excessive time 
to complete and may result in unreadable documents.62 In the case of this thesis, it is 
argued that the limits and data sources are readily identified by the other elements of 
the methodological approach already identified.  
 
The case studies selected for this thesis, as previously noted are identification  
evidence and the polygraph. The rationale for selecting these two topics were that in 
 
59 JW Cresswell Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design (Third Edition Sage London 2013), 97 
60 ibid 98 
61 ibid 101 
62 RK Yin Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Fifth Edition Sage London 2014), 21 
37 
 
the case of identification evidence there is a clear history of miscarriages of justice 
relating to this area and it was felt that the underpinning science would enable the 
development of a case study highlighting potential issues with the Turner principle.  
 
The decision to make the polygraph the second case study followed discussion with my 
supervisor regarding issues of establishing if a witness is truthful. Although 
inadmissible and controversial the polygraph appeared fertile ground for closer 
analysis with only limited primary legal comment from this jurisdiction being available. 
 
2.5 Rationale for the Selected Approach 
It is perhaps useful to indicate how this approach works by outlining the example of 
the methods being applied in relation to eyewitness identification evidence in chapter 
6. The analysis in chapter 6 is far more detailed, this is simply to indicate how the 
methods complement and strengthen the overall argument. 
 
The doctrinal element is the close analysis of Gage v HM Advocate.63 Gage rejects the 
notion that expert evidence has a role to play in determining the limits of the ability of 
the witness to provide accurate identification. The socio-legal element then gives the 
context by exploring the psychological evidence about the effectiveness and 
understanding of eyewitness testimony, which clearly indicates that there are 
elements of eyewitness identification where the everyday understanding and the 
science are widely at variance. The comparative element takes an analysis undertaken 
in the US in State v Henderson64 that resulted in revised jury instructions, which better 
reflected the current science. These were consequently adopted within that 
jurisdiction.65 It will be argued that this is an equivalent issue, in that both in this 
jurisdiction and the US there is wide judicial and non-judicial recognition that 
eyewitness testimony has been implicated in numerous miscarriages of justice/ 
wrongful convictions.66  
 
63 Gage v HM Advocate [2011] HCAJC 40 
64 State v Henderson 27 A3d 872 (NJ 2011) 
65 see 6.4 
66 see 6.1.1 
38 
 
Within chapter 6 I argue that the principles within the model jury instructions 
formulated in response to the analysis in Henderson should form a basis for a revised 
and more nuanced Turnbull direction in this jurisdiction. 
 
2.6 Potential Concerns and Limitations  
This thesis requires that the researcher has a sound grasp of both legal and non-legal 
information, the non-legal element being predominately health sciences/psychology-
related. Roberts 67 highlights the difficulties that can present when a scholar or 
researcher has to operate across two or more disciplinary boundaries, noting that 
there will often be greater proficiency with one area than the other. 
 
For this thesis, the concern is addressed by the both the background of the researcher 
and the approach taken to such evidence. The researcher has a strong health sciences 
background being educated to Masters level in the area and also working as a senior 
registered nurse within the healthcare sector.  
 
As the health and life sciences/psychology component underpins, but does not drive, 
the research, the selected approach has been that, as far as possible, the research 
related to these areas has been sourced using existing published meta-analyses from 
peer-reviewed publications. This somewhat limits the requirement for this researcher 
to undertake high level analysis of primary data which is outwith, but nonetheless 
informs, this study. It is argued that such an approach means this thesis can focus on 
how the scientific evidence works with the law, thus being a law thesis rather than 
attempting to undertake primary analysis of subject matter that is outside the 
expertise of the author. The integration of such ‘non-legal’ topics is well recognised in 
the legal literature if one considers the examples of peer-reviewed journals addressing 
such areas of study.68 
 
 
67 P Roberts Interdisciplinarity in Legal Research in Research Methods for Law edited by M 
McConville and WH Chui (Edinburgh University Press 2017), 97  
68 e.g. Journal of Law and Biosciences is an open access peer-reviewed journal focusing on the 
advances at the intersection between law and neuroscience, publisher OUP; Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law is a quarterly peer-reviewed journal, publisher John Wiley and Sons 
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With regard to the comparative law element, some authors express concern that 
comparative methodology has not yet matured into a well-defined and coherent 
discipline.69 At a more practical level, perhaps the most obvious limitation is the 
availability of translated material when the researcher is not fluent in any language 
other than English. It is also important to note that the limitations of language are not 
just those of conversation, but the ability to master foreign legal linguistics, both 
written and spoken.70  
 
A less obvious, but possibly more critical concern, is that of the need to have a more 
than superficial understanding of the social, legal, and cultural context in which the 
relevant laws were made and operate.71 Husa notes the concern that if one is 
considering European civil law then English may not even have the proper terminology 
to fully capture the meaning of some concepts.72 Whilst that is not an issue in this 
thesis as there is little consideration of such law, the point is well made regarding the 
level of understanding and appreciation of the language and culture of the other 
jurisdictions that is required for effective analysis. 
 
It is argued that this particular concern will at least be partially compensated for, as 
the selected jurisdictions are common law jurisdictions where much of the law has its 
roots in the English common law. Additionally, exposure to material both legal and 
non-legal from other jurisdictions is now far less problematic than pre-internet, thus 
increasing access to material, which whilst by no means fully bridging the divide will 
allow greater cultural context to material from such areas. 
 
 
69 M Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth Century’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 671, 685 
70 J Husa,‘Comparative Law, Language and Doctrine’ in Methodologies of Legal Research: 
Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? Edited by M Van Hoecke (Hart Publishing 
Oxford 2011) 
71 J Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in Methodologies of Legal 
Research Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? Edited by M Van Hoecke  (Hart 
Publishing Oxford 2011) 
72 J Husa,‘Comparative Law, Language and Doctrine’ in Methodologies of Legal Research: 
Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? Edited by M Van Hoecke (Hart Publishing 
Oxford 2011), 220 
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The primary jurisdictions considered within this strand are the USA, Canada and 
Australia. The rationale for selecting these jurisdictions include elements of practicality 
(English as main language) and also that ongoing research indicated substantial 
amounts of case law/ academic commentary relevant to the areas under consideration 
within the thesis. It is also noted that these jurisdictions have been moving away from 
the English common law long enough to have developed initiatives/ approaches 
offering new perspectives. 
 
The situation remains more problematic with material from civil law jurisdictions 
where English is typically not the primary language and the availability of translated 
material – both legal and non-legal – is more restricted and, as such, only minimal use 
has been made of material from non-English speaking/non-common law jurisdictions. 
 
Having noted the relative proficiency of the researcher with regard to the relevant 
areas of science and psychology, it should be noted that this study, among other 
elements, reviews the then current science relating to the potential areas of expert 
evidence within the case studies, focussing where possible on meta-analysis. Scientific 
research in some areas is rapidly moving and advancing; as such, although the 
researcher has a solid foundation in the health and life sciences, this does not equate 
to being equipped to undertake primary analysis of specialist emerging scientific data. 
It is possible that emerging cutting edge primary research exists that may alter the 
existing scientific paradigm, but which will not be addressed within this thesis. 
 
It should also be noted that the researcher neither has a qualifying law degree nor 
works within the criminal justice system, and understanding of, and exposure to, the 
realities and practicalities of the criminal justice system and evidence presentation is 
limited. 
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Chapter 3 
3.0 Expert Evidence: Principles and Key Cases 
Expert opinion evidence is admissible in both civil and criminal cases, with procedural 
rules73 applicable to both. In civil cases, Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 
controls the use of expert testimony; in criminal cases, the comparable rules are set 
out under rule 19 of the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR). While there are areas such 
as the overriding duty of the expert being to the court74 that are common to both sets 
of procedures, there are also fundamental differences in the form and emphasis of the 
two sets of rules. It is argued that the differences in those rules reflect the impact of 
the two systems on both the individual and the wider system. 
 
Although this is something of a generalisation, in a civil case the decision typically 
relates to a loss that has occurred, and the decision to be made is where that loss, and 
thus liability, should fall. The standard of proof is the ‘balance of probabilities’, and the 
losses for the losing party can be considerable. 
 
While the financial and reputational losses from a civil case can be considerable, this 
has to be set against the outcomes in a criminal case. Being found guilty of a criminal 
offence results not just in financial or reputational damage, but potentially the loss of 
liberty, sometimes for many years and a criminal record that may potentially impact 
for the rest of the individual’s life. The greater penalties inherent in the criminal justice 
system mean that the drive to avoid convicting the innocent is regarded as the priority. 
This is summed up in the adage ‘it is better that 10 guilty persons escape than one 
 
73 Civil Procedure Rules were first introduced in 1998 following Lord Woolf‘s report Access to 
Justice (1996) and had the aim of ensuring the cases were managed in a way which was just, 
fair, and responsive and also controlled the costs of litigation – for detail see Access to Justice 
Report 1996 section 1 overview para 1. The Criminal Procedure Rules were not introduced 
until 2005 following Lord Justice Auld’s Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales 
and the first version of the CrimPR were described as ‘a modest but at the same time 
significant step towards the creation of a comprehensive criminal procedure code.’ 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/notes 
74 CPR 35.3 (1) It is the duty of experts to help the court on matters within their expertise. 
(2) This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom experts have received 
instructions or by whom they are paid; CrimPR 19.2.—(1) An expert must help the court to 
achieve the overriding objective — (2) This duty overrides any obligation to the person from 
whom the expert receives instructions or by whom the expert is paid.  
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innocent suffer punishment’.75 The standard of proof required is, therefore, the higher 
criminal standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.  
 
It is important to note that ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ generally applies to the case as 
a whole, not to the individual components of both expert and non-expert testimony.76 
In the event that a particular component is individually critical to the outcome of the 
case, the judge would then so direct the jury. 
 
The focus of this thesis is on expert evidence in criminal cases, but there is inevitably 
some overlap where relevant research or case law reflects the civil system. 
 
Before moving into the body of the thesis, it is important to understand the basic 
principles underpinning the admissibility of expert evidence, and to be aware of 
certain key cases that will be frequently referenced.  
 
Expert evidence is admissible at common law, but subject to the CrimPR 2015 r19 and 
the associated practice directions.77  
 
3.1 Admissibility of Expert Evidence: Bonython 
The test for the admissibility of expert evidence was set out by King CJ in the South 
Australian case R v Bonython.78 As a case from a Commonwealth jurisdiction, this 
might not ordinarily have been considered authoritative with regard to the English and 
Welsh courts, but has been frequently cited with approval as the leading case with 
 
75 Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769), vol 4, 27 cited by the New 
Zealand Supreme Court in R v Hansen [2008] 1 LRC 26 [132] 
76 B Robertson and GA Vignaux Interpreting Evidence Evaluation Forensic Science in the 
Courtroom (John Wiley and Sons 1995), 79 
77 It should be noted that the CrimPR were revised and renumbered in 2015, so for cases pre-
2015 expert evidence was covered by r33. 
78 R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 
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regard to the admissibility of expert opinion,79 notably by the Supreme Court in 
Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP.80  
 
Setting out the three limbs of the test, King CJ stated: 
 
The first is whether the subject matter of the opinion falls within the class 
of subjects upon which expert testimony is permissible. This may be 
divided into two parts (a) whether the subject of the opinion is such that a 
person without instruction or experience in the area of knowledge or 
human experience would be able to form a sound judgment on the matter 
without the assistance of witnesses possessing special knowledge or 
experience in the area, and (b) whether the subject matter of the opinion 
forms part of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently 
organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or 
experience, a special acquaintance with which by the witness would 
render his opinion of assistance to the court. The second question is 
whether the witness has acquired by study or experience sufficient 
knowledge of the subject to render his opinion of value in resolving the 
issues before the court.81 
 
3.1.1 Assistance (The Turner Principle) 
The first limb is that of assistance. The duty of the expert witness was set out in the 
Scottish case Davie v Edinburgh Corp as being to: 
 
…furnish the judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing 
the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the judge or jury to form 
 
79 R. v Ahmed (Rangzieb) [2011] Crim LR 734; R v Crowdy [2009] EWCA Crim 1219; R v Hodges 
[2003] EWCA Crim 290 
80 Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] UKSC 6 [43]; the most recent citation with approval in 
the criminal courts is R v Hosie (Lee) [2017] NICA 9. Review of Westlaw database shows 24 
citations with approval in criminal cases, with the first being R v Meads [1996] Crim LR 519, 
this appears to be the earliest reported use of King CJ criteria by the English courts – this was 
the situation on 2 December 2017. 
81 R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 [46] 
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their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to 
the facts proved in evidence.82 
 
The question of what subjects are suitable areas for expert evidence has been clarified 
on a number of occasions over the years. Steyn LJ in R v Clarke notably said: 
 
There are no closed categories where such evidence may be placed before 
a jury. It would be entirely wrong to deny to the law of evidence the 
advantages to be gained from new techniques and new advances in 
science.83 
 
This suggests that, providing the rules governing its admissibility are met, there are no 
areas of expert evidence that must automatically be deemed to be ‘off limits’. As will 
be explored within this thesis, however, the actual situation is less clear-cut than this 
statement may make it appear. 
 
The fact that an expert has an opinion on a subject does not automatically make that 
subject or opinion admissible in court. The question is whether the evidence would be 
of assistance to the court. One of the core cases with regard to this principle is R v 
Turner, from which the Turner Principle emerged. An understanding of this principle is 
central to any consideration of expert evidence and warrants closer examination. 
 
Mark Turner was convicted of murdering his girlfriend by repeatedly striking her with a 
hammer while they were sitting in a car. The defence argued provocation as his 
girlfriend had just told him that she had become pregnant by another man while he 
was in prison. Turner claimed he never meant to kill her with the hammer that was 
kept in the car. 
 
 
82 Davie v Edinburgh Corp [1953] SC 34 [40] – this case has been cited in a number of English 
decisions e.g. R v Lutterall [2004] EWCA Crim 1344 [36]; R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 5 at 67; 
Re B (A minor) [1995] 9 WLUK 184 and is also cited in Hodgkinson and James at 1-006 
regarding the value of expert witness evidence 
83 R v Clarke (1995) 2 Cr App R425 at 430 
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The defence had sought to introduce a psychiatric report which, while concluding that 
Turner did not suffer from any mental illness, made the following observation: 
 
His homicidal behaviour would appear to be understandable in terms of 
his relationship with [the victim]… such as to make him particularly 
vulnerable to be overwhelmed by anger if she confirmed the accusation 
that had been made about her. If his statements are true that he was 
taken completely by surprise by her confession he would have 
appeared to have killed her in an explosive release of blind rage. His 
personality structure is consistent with someone who could behave in 
this way.84 
 
The defence argued that the psychiatrist’s opinion was relevant as it helped to 
establish how Turner could be easily provoked and, therefore, lent credibility to his 
explanation of events. Ruling Lawton LJ noted the evidence was relevant, but that the 
points raised were within ordinary human experience and, as such, inadmissible. The 
judgment contained the oft cited passage which underpins the Turner Principle: 
 
An expert’s opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific 
information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge 
of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their 
own conclusions…, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary. In 
such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it may make 
judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert witness has impressive 
scientific qualifications does not by that fact alone make his opinion on 
matters of human nature and behaviour within the limits of normality 
any more helpful than that of the jurors themselves; but there is a 
danger that they may think it does. 85 
 
 
84 R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 840 
85 ibid 841 
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Although well established and frequently cited, this principle is not without its critics, 
with concern being raised among other areas that it is not always clear what is, and is 
not, within the experience and knowledge of the court (this will be considered in more 
detailed at 6.1.1); however the Law Commission did not recommend changes to this 
element of the common law test, arguing it was fundamentally sound.86 This notion of 
assistance and the Turner Principle will be revisited throughout the thesis as proposals 
for change in admissibility are subject to the test. The more fundamental question of 
the suitability of the Turner Principle will also be considered. 
 
The first limb within Bonython is, in effect, a restatement of the Turner Principle; it 
should, however, be noted that even where expert evidence meets the requirement of 
being relevant and outside the experience of the jury, it may still be excluded if in the 
opinion of the court its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.87  
 
3.1.2 Reliability 
The issue of evidentiary reliability forms the second limb of Bonython and is also the 
primary focus of the Law Commission consultation (CP190) and subsequent 
recommendations.88 It will be considered in some detail in Chapter 4.  
 
The accepted position in this jurisdiction was that there was no enhanced test of 
admissibility for expert evidence, following the position in both R v Dallagher89 and R v 
Lutterall90 and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v Reed.91  
 
 
86 Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary reliability – a 
consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009), 1.8 
87 T Hodgkinson and M James Expert Evidence: Law & Practice (Fourth Edition Sweet and 
Maxwell London 2015), 1-014 
88 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 
325, 2011) 
89 R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 12 at 207 
90 R v Luttrell [2004] EWCA Crim 1344 [37]. 
91 R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 [111] quoting passage from Cross and Tapper: The Law of 
Evidence, 11th Edition, 580-581.  
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The notion that there should be no enhanced test in such cases warrants further 
examination. The standard position is succinctly stated by Blackstones Criminal 
Practice: 
 
The cardinal rule of the law of evidence is that, subject to the 
exclusionary rules, all evidence which is sufficiently relevant to the facts 
in issue is admissible, and all evidence which is irrelevant or 
insufficiently relevant to the facts in issue should be excluded.92  
 
The factor of relevance was set out in DPP v Kilbourne before the House of Lords 
wherein Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated that: 
 
Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some 
matter which requires proof.93  
 
Thus, as with other forms of evidence, expert testimony was only admissible if deemed 
relevant.94  
 
Within Bonython this limb notes the ‘recognised body of opinion’ which it may be 
argued is aligned to the notion of general acceptance set out in the US case 
Frye95which will be considered shortly. Considering this particular point, the Law 
Commission determined that if this aspect of the Bonython test was indeed part of 
English law, then the question would be whether the ‘body of knowledge or 
experience is accepted as reliable by the courts rather than by a relevant community 
 
92 Blackstones Criminal Practice 2019, F1.11 
93 DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 756 
94 The English courts did appear to move, briefly, from the position of ‘no enhanced test’ in R v 
Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 5, wherein the Court declined to admit expert testimony regarding 
psychological autopsy, part of the rationale for the rejection of such evidence was that …the 
present academic status of psychological autopsies is not, in our judgment, such as to permit 
them to be admitted as a basis for expert opinion before a jury.[25] 
95 Frye v United States 293 Fed 1013 (1923) – Court rejected the scientific validity of the early 
polygraph because the technology at the time was insufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the relevant field. 
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of experts’,96 as such, this is substantially different to the view of the courts in the US 
states which still operate this standard, rather than the newer Daubert standard which 
will also be considered shortly. 
 
However, although the Court of Appeal in R v Reed affirmed there was no enhanced 
test of admissibility, they also said: 
 
…expert evidence of a scientific nature is not admissible where the 
scientific basis on which it is advanced is insufficiently reliable for it to be 
put before the jury. … If the reliability of the scientific basis for the 
evidence is challenged, the court will consider whether there is a 
sufficiently reliable scientific basis for that evidence to be admitted,…, 
then it will leave the opposing views to be tested in the trial.97 
 
It seems difficult to argue that this does not represent an enhanced test of admissibility 
for expert testimony. The Law Commission in LC325 noted the presence of this common 
law test.98 
 
The critical nature of evidential reliability, and its application to developing areas of 
expert evidence, will be subject to further analysis throughout this thesis. 
 
3.1.3 Relevant Expertise 
The third limb of the test relates to relevant expertise. There is no statutory definition 
of what constitutes an ‘expert’ in English law. The Crown Prosecution Service states 
that: 
 
 
96 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 
325, 2011), 2.13 
97 R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 [111] 
98 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 
325, 2011), 2.14 
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An expert witness is a witness who provides to the court a statement of 
opinion on any admissible matter calling for expertise by the witness and 
is qualified to give such an opinion.99 
 
This is somewhat circular, and essentially reflects the judgment in the leading case R v 
Silverlock that in order to give evidence as an expert ‘the witness….must be expert; he 
must be skilled’.100 While acknowledging this apparent circularity, Redmayne argues 
that the range of subjects which may be covered, and the different routes to gaining 
this knowledge, make this largely pragmatic approach appropriate.101 Silverlock does 
not require that knowledge be gained via formal training, or that the expert is a 
professional in the relevant field. In a majority of areas relating to science, medicine, 
psychiatry, accountancy and such, any expert witnesses must, in practice, have gone 
through formal courses of study and training, but in others this may not always be the 
case. In R v Hodges,102 for example, a police officer gave expert evidence as to the price 
and supply of heroin: knowledge gained by experience rather than via academic study. 
 
Once the court is satisfied that the individual in question can give expert evidence, it 
will be for the court and the jury to determine the weight of that evidence.  
 
3.1.4 Impartiality 
The fourth point that of impartiality is addressed by rule 19.2 of the CrimPR (2015) 
noting the requirement to give opinion evidence, which is both objective and unbiased. 
The overriding duty to the court, coupled with the requirement to produce objective 
and unbiased opinion also exists in earlier iterations of the CrimPR.103  
 
The elements of relevant expertise and impartiality will be considered in Chapter 3. 
 
99 Crown Prosecution Service (2015) ‘Expert Evidence First edition – 2014 revised February 
2015’, 5 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/legal_guidance/expert_evidence_first_
edition_2014.pdf accessed 23/12/17 
100 R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 
101 M Redmayne Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2001) 95 
102 R v Hodges [2003] EWCA Crim 290 
103 Rule 33.2 of the CrimPR 2010 
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It should be noted that a jury is not bound by the opinion of an expert as was made 
clear by the Court of Appeal in R v Ugoh.104 
 
3.2 Frye and Daubert 
Two key cases with regard to expert evidence, which need to be part of any 
consideration, is the previously noted US case Frye and the later case Daubert.  
 
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc.,105 the applicable standard for admissibility of expert opinion in 
the US was the ‘general acceptance standard’ as set out in Frye v United States. This 
standard requires simply that the proffered expert opinion be sufficiently established 
to have been accepted within the field to which it belongs, with the court stating: 
 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between 
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. 
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle 
must be recognised, and while the courts will go a long way in 
admitting experimental testimony deduced from a well-recognized 
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is 
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 106 
 
However, this was deemed to run contrary to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which serves as the model for most States Rules of Evidence and states: 
 
If scientific, technical, or other specialised knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
 
104 R v Ugoh [2001] EWCA Crim 1381 [23] 
105 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993) 
106 Frye v United States 293 Fed 1013 (1923) 
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witness qualified as expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion or otherwise.107 
 
It is clear that this rule makes no stipulation that such evidence must first reach a 
standard of general acceptance such that it is the prevailing or dominant theory within 
the scientific community. It is also necessary to remain aware that even if a theory did 
reach a level where it was the predominant, or even the only, theory relating to an 
area of scientific enquiry, such a standard of acceptance would still be no absolute 
guarantee of accuracy, or that the theory or opinion is correct.108  
 
The decision in Daubert related to a claim that an antiemetic medication had caused 
birth defects. There was no published evidence to this effect. The expert tendering 
evidence on behalf of the defendant organisation had reviewed all the published 
literature on the medication and birth defects; this amounted to more than 30 studies 
and 130,000 patients, and none of these studies found the medication to present a risk 
of causing birth defects.  
 
The plaintiffs did not contest the findings in relation to published studies, but instead 
put forward expert evidence relating to both laboratory and animal studies, along with 
reanalysis of the previously published studies. 
 
The US Supreme Court held that: 
 
In order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge’ an inference or assertion must 
be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be 
 
107 Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 702 
108 An example of a dominant theory being wrong is the orthodoxy in the twentieth century 
that the main predisposing causative agents for stomach cancer and peptic ulcers were stress 
and diet. In 2005 Marshall and Warren won the Nobel Prize for Medicine for the discovery that 
the bacterium Helicobacter pylori was the main causative agent. Press Release: The 2005 
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine to Barry J. Marshall and J. Robin Warren". 
Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014. 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2005/press.html accessed 30 
Dec 2017. 
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supported by appropriate validation – i.e. ‘good grounds’, based on what 
is known. In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to 
‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.109 
 
In reaching their decision, the court identified the following as factors that must be 
established in order for expert evidence to be admissible. 
 
(1) whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested;  
(2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication;  
(3) its known or potential error rate;  
(4) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific 
community.110 
 
The court was at pains to note that these were guidelines and as such were flexible 
and not to be regarded as exhaustive. The applicability of Daubert was extended in 
two further judgments that confirmed its general application included expert evidence 
relating to matters that do not rely on the scientific method.111 
 
With the recommendation in LC325 that a Daubert style test should form the core of a 
new statutory reliability test and with its subsequent incorporation into the CrimPR, it 
is now for practical purposes established as law in England and Wales. It should, 
however, be noted that even after 24 years the Daubert standard is not without its 
critics in the US, with a number of states still retaining the Frye standard for 
admissibility of expert evidence.112  
 
 
 
 
109 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993) 590 
110 ibid 594 
111 Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael (1999) 119 SCt 1167; General Electric v Joiner (1997) 118 S Ct 
512 
112 J Rosica ‘Supreme Court rejects evidence standard supported by Rick Scott, lawmakers’ 
Florida Politics (6/02/17) http://floridapolitics.com/archives/232254-supreme-court-rejects-
daubert accessed 21/05/17 
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Chapter 4 
Expert Evidence in Criminal Law and the Law Commission – A step in the 
right direction or missed opportunity? 
 
4.0 Introduction  
The Law Commission Consultation Paper 190 113 (CP190), the subsequent report 
(LC325),114 and its associated draft bill were formulated following a number of actual 
or probable miscarriages of justice in which expert opinion evidence had been a core 
component. The recommendation of the Law Commission was to place the 
admissibility of expert evidence on to a statutory footing in accordance with the Draft 
Criminal Evidence (Experts) Bill appended to LC325.  
 
The draft bill was not taken forward by the Ministry of Justice, primarily on the 
grounds of cost, but it was recommended that key features of the draft bill be taken 
forward by the CPRC for incorporation into the revised Criminal Procedure Rules 
(CrimPR)115 and this was done. 
 
In this chapter, the focus will be initially on the Law Commission consultation, CP190, 
and LC325. Both the background and the key recommendations will be reviewed, 
followed by an analysis of the key recommendations within the draft bill, focussing 
primarily on the proposed statutory reliability test and the associated implications, but 
also on some elements which were not then taken forward into the CrimPR. 
Consideration will also be given to the implications of the failure to legislate. The thesis 
will consider whether the changes to the CrimPR mean (as suggested by Hodgkinson 
and James) that English courts now have ‘the most comprehensive guidance in the 
 
113 Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability – a 
consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009)  
114 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011) 
115 Ministry of Justice The Government’s response to the Law Commission report: “Expert 
Evidence in Criminal proceedings in England and Wales” (Law Com No 325, 2013) para 8-12 
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common law world’116 as to assessing the reliability of expert opinion evidence, or 
whether the failure to implement some of the proposed changes and the failure to 
legislate represents a lost opportunity and thus ‘no change’. 
 
4.1 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No 190 and Law Com No. 325  
4.1.1 Background and Key Recommendations 
Prior to the Law Commission review, the  House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee had expressed disquiet at the state of expert evidence. The committee was 
considering plans put forward by the then Home Secretary to develop the Forensic 
Science Service as a public-private partnership.117 The aim of the committee was to 
investigate the likely impact of such a change on both the competitiveness of the 
service, but also the likely impact on the criminal justice system. 118  They 
recommended the creation of a Forensic Science Advisory Council to regulate scientific 
evidence in the UK, noting: 
 
The absence of an agreed protocol for the validation of scientific 
techniques prior to their being admitted in court is entirely 
unsatisfactory. Judges are not well-placed to determine scientific 
validity without input from scientists. We recommend that one of the 
first tasks of the Forensic Science Advisory Council be to develop a 
“gate-keeping” test for expert evidence. This should be done in 
partnership with judges, scientists and other key players in the criminal 
justice system, and should build on the US Daubert test.119 
 
The committee also made an assertion which will be key to this thesis with regard to 
the notion of system, rather than individual failure:  
 
 
116 T Hodgkinson and M James (2015) Expert Evidence: Law and Practice (Fourth Edition Sweet 
and Maxwell 2015) at 3-010(5) 
117 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee: Forensic Science on Trial Seventh 
Report of Session 2004-05 at [1] 
118 ibid  [2] 
119 ibid [173] 
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Expert witnesses have been penalised far more publicly than the judge 
or lawyers in cases where expert evidence has been called into 
question. These cases represent a systems failure. Focussing criticism 
on the expert has a detrimental effect on the willingness of other 
experts to serve as witnesses and detracts attention from the flaws in 
the court process and legal system, which, if addressed, could help to 
prevent future miscarriages of justice.120 
 
In 2009, the Law Commission published CP190, a narrowly focused consultation121 
looking at the admissibility of expert opinion evidence in the English and Welsh 
criminal courts with a focus primarily on the reliability element as per the second limb 
of Bonython. The review noted recent examples of wrongful convictions based on 
what they regarded as flawed expert opinion evidence,122 and noting this may be the 
tip of the iceberg with significant risk that much more unreliable expert opinion 
evidence was being adduced.123 The consultation paper opined that: 
 
The criminal courts have adopted a policy of laissez-faire. In effect the 
courts permit the adduction of expert evidence so long as it is not patently 
unreliable, so that juries are not denied access to evidence that might be 
helpful.124 
The Law Commission considered the approach to reliability in a number of 
jurisdictions, and on this basis CP190 set out four possible options concerning the 
admissibility of expert evidence, before provisionally recommending, as per option 4, 
that a new statutory test should be introduced to determine both the admissibility and 
reliability of expert evidence. This option proposed:  
 
120 Ibid at [170] 
121 Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary reliability – a 
consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009)  
122 R v Dallagher [2002] EWCA Crim1903; R v Clarke (No 2) [2003] EWCA Crim 1020; R v 
Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1; R v Harris [2005] EWCA Crim 1980. 
123 Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary reliability – a 
consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009), 2.26 
124 ibid 3.14 
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(4) An admissibility rule requiring the trial judge to assess the evidentiary 
reliability of the tendered evidence. In line with the recommendation of 
the House of Commons’ Science and Technology Committee, this option 
would introduce a test to determine the validity of the methodology and 
any hypothesis underpinning the expert’s evidence (that is a Daubert-type 
test similar to rule 702 of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence).125 
Following the consultation exercise, the Law Commission report made further 
recommendations as to the new statutory test. The four key recommendations were: 
 
(1) that there should be a new test in primary legislation which would prevent the 
admission of expert opinion evidence which is not sufficiently reliable to be 
admitted;  
(2) that the legislation should permit the trial judge to presume evidentiary 
reliability (as a matter bearing on admissibility) if there is no appearance of 
unreliability;  
(3) that the legislation should set out the factors the court should take into 
consideration when applying the reliability test; and  
(4) that the legislation should be a new statutory code for the admissibility of 
expert evidence in criminal proceedings generally, supplanting the various 
common law admissibility limbs.126  
It is clear the first three elements relate to reliability and the fourth concerns the 
codification of the existing common law. The report concludes with a draft Criminal 
Evidence (Experts) Bill127 which, had it been taken forward, would have formed this 
primary legislation.  
 
125 ibid 4.3 
126 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 1.48 
127 ibid p146 
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The Government response to the recommendations contained within LC325 was 
muted. While acknowledging concerns regarding the management and admissibility of 
expert evidence, the cost of such a change was considered insupportable: 
The impact assessment published with the Law Commission’s 
recommendations indicates that application of the new test would involve 
additional pre-trial hearings, with the concomitant additional costs, but 
without sufficient reliably predictable savings to compensate for those 
costs. Without certainty … it is not feasible to implement the proposals in 
full at this time.128  
Although the Government response clearly identified resource issues as the reason for 
rejecting the proposals, Child and Rogers129 argue that what they describe as ‘The 
Political Red Line’ and the political need for ‘simple headlines’ as two of the major 
obstacles to criminal law reform. They made the case that as these are driven by 
politics rather than logic, the need to (at risk of another simple headline) be tough on 
crime may explain the lack of interest in the changes proposed by this project among 
others. 
 
The alternative suggested in the government response was that the Criminal 
Procedure Rules Committee (CPRC) consider amending the CrimPR to go some way to 
reducing the risks presented by the inappropriate use of unreliable expert evidence.130 
This was indeed the route adopted and the revised CrimPR incorporate most, but not 
all, of the elements set out in the Law Commission recommendations. Senior judges 
took a positive view. Even before the revised rules came into force, the Court of 
Appeal in R v H,131 warned: 
 
128 Ministry of Justice The Government’s response to the Law Commission report: “Expert 
evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales” (Law Com 325) 21 November 2013, 
para 3 
129 J Child and J Rogers ‘Criminal Law Reform Now: A New Reform Network’ (2017) 81 Journal 
of Criminal Law 282 
130 Ministry of Justice The Government’s response to the Law Commission report: “Expert 
evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales” (Law Com 325) 21 November 2013, 
para 4 
131 R v H [2014] EWCA Crim 1555 
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When these changes occur, a new and more rigorous approach on the 
part of advocates and the courts to the handling of expert evidence must 
be adopted. That should avoid misunderstandings about what is (and 
what is not) appropriately included in an expert’s report and so either 
avoid, or at least render far more straightforward, submissions on 
admissibility…132  
 
Commenting on R (Wright) v CPS,133 which was heard on Appeal in February 2015, 
therefore prior to the revisions coming into effect, Stockdale and Jackson134 noted that 
the approach of the court already seemed to reflect the more rigorous approach 
outlined in R v H.  
 
Commenting on that approach, Ward135 noted that, even prior to CP190, the Court of 
Appeal had been paying closer attention to the quality of expert opinion and had been 
setting guidance as to content; as such, the Law Commission’s preferred approach has 
converged with this tendency from the courts. 
 
While reliability has been afforded an increasingly high profile, this does not appear 
consistent across the common law jurisdictions. A recent Australian case, Honeysett v 
The Queen, 136  considering the admissibility of identification evidence based on 
‘anatomical identification’, cited with apparent approval the earlier case of Tang v R, 
wherein Spiegelman CJ ‘cautioned against introducing an extraneous idea such as 
‘reliability’ into the determination of admissibility.’137 
 
132 ibid, per Sir Brian Leveson P [44] 
133 R(on the application of Wright) v CPS [2015] EWHC 628 (Admin)  
134 M Stockdale and A Jackson ‘Admissibility of Expert Evidence and Criminal Practice Direction 
Part 33A: R (on the application of Wright) v Crown Prosecution Service [2015] EWHC 628 
(Admin)’ (2015) 79 Journal of Criminal Law 246 
135 T Ward ‘Expert Evidence and the Law Commission: Implementation Without Legislation’ 
(2013) 7 Criminal Law Review 561 
136 Honeysett v The Queen [2014] HCA 29 [27] 
137 Tang v R [2006] NSWCCA 167 [137] 
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This is clearly not the view of the English and Welsh judiciary nor the Law Commission, 
which have each put reliability at the core of the proposed changes. It is also worth 
noting that the draft bill largely restated the existing common law rules regarding 
assistance, expertise, and impartiality. The Law Commission noted that this appears 
uncontroversial; however the decision to exclude a wider consideration of the law 
relating to these matters was described by Ian Dennis as ‘facile’ in a Criminal Law 
Review editorial138 at the time the review launched. 
Having adopted the route of formal reliability testing, it is hoped this will ensure that 
any expert testimony that comes before a jury is fit for purpose. While it is always 
possible for a judge to rule that an element of testimony, expert or otherwise, is 
inadmissible after or while it is being presented to the jury, there is both research and 
case law which indicates that so-called ‘directed forgetting’ when the jury are directed 
to ignore the presented testimony may not happen consistently. Steblay et al.139 
undertook a meta-analysis of 48 studies with 8,474 participants considering the effect 
on juror verdicts of judicial instruction to ignore inadmissible evidence. The key finding 
was that a direction to ignore the inadmissible evidence does not eliminate its effect. 
The authors did note that if the jurors were given a rationale for the inadmissibility 
then compliance was increased. 
 
The courts, it seems, operate under a pragmatic view that juries do as the judge 
directs. This is well summarised in the US case Richardson v Marsh: 
 
…the rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a 
pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption 
is true than in a belief that it represents a reasonable practical 
accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the 
criminal justice process.140 
 
138 Editorial ‘Examining Expert Evidence’ (2009) 6 Criminal Law Review 387 
139 N Steblay, HM Hosch, SE Culhane and A McWethy ‘The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial 
Instruction To Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis’ (2006) 30 Law and Human 
Behavior 469  
140 Richardson v Marsh 481 US 200 (1987) 211 
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Although this may be a pragmatic view of the situation, a very practical example of the 
difficulty is illustrated by the case R v Boyes.141 During the judge’s summing up, the 
complainant’s mother shouted from the public gallery that there had been other 
similar complaints of rape against the accused. Although the judge noted he was 
uncertain as to what had been said he directed the jury to ignore the outburst. On 
appeal the conviction was quashed with Watkins LJ noting: 
 
…one can hardly think of more damaging and prejudicial information being 
taken in to the jury room, which obviously should not have been there.142 
 
While this case did not relate to expert evidence, it clearly illustrates the difficulty when 
inadmissible material is placed before a jury (even if the means were unorthodox), and 
thus the importance of prior screening by the judge. 
4.1.2 Failure to Legislate: Art.6 Implications? 
Before examining the proposal more closely, it is important to note at the outset that 
while the government recognised the concerns about the issues raised by the use of 
unreliable expert evidence, it rejected the recommendations of the LC325 and the 
draft bill.  
Arguably, the acknowledgment by the government that there was an ‘issue’ with the 
reliability of expert evidence and then a decision not to pursue the recommended 
course of action to address this may raise questions with regard to Art 6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) – the Right to a Fair Trial.  
 
From the pragmatic viewpoint, the decision of the government to ask the CPRC to 
amend the CrimPR would seem to evidence recognition of the concern and steps to 
address the issue. 
 
 
141 R v Boyes [1991] Lexis Citation 2948 
142 ibid 4 
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Looking to the case law from the ECHR, Art. 6(3) sets out the minimum rights143 of 
anyone charged with a criminal offence. While there is no specific mention within this 
section regarding assessment of reliability of expert testimony, guidance from the 
European Court of Human Rights144 notes that the determination of reliability of 
expert evidence sits with the domestic courts,145 this was recently affirmed in the case 
Matytsina v Russia.146 The clearly stated position of the court was that: 
 
…under Article 6 it is normally not the Court’s role to determine whether 
a particular expert report available to the domestic judge was reliable or 
not… the general rule is that the domestic judge has a wide discretion in 
choosing amongst conflicting expert opinions and picking one which he 
or she deems consistent and credible.147 
 
As such, it is argued that raising concerns with regard to Art. 6 are unlikely to be 
fruitful, both pragmatically and on the basis of European case law, with regard to the 
decision not to legislate. 
 
4.1.3 The Proposal  
As set out in the draft Bill: 
 
1(2) …expert opinion evidence is admissible in criminal proceedings only if it is 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted 
 
143 (a)to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b)to have adequate time and facilities 
for the preparation of his defence; (c)to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal 
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d)to examine or 
have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e)to have 
the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language 
used in court. 
144 European Court of Human Rights Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights Right to a Fair Trial (Updated 30/04/19) 
145 ibid para 147 
146 Matytsina v Russia [2014] Application no 58428/10  
147 ibid [169] 
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The statutory test is that expert opinion evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted 
if: 
 
4(1)(a)the opinion is soundly based, and 
 (b)the strength of the opinion is warranted having regards to the grounds  
on which it is based.148 
 
The bill does not differentiate scientific from non-scientific evidence, but the 2016 
report of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) in the 
US usefully sets out the facets required for scientific reliability. 
 
For scientific validity and reliability, the procedures leading to the evidence, based on 
empirical studies, must be shown to be repeatable, reproducible, and accurate. 
Repeatable means that, with known probability, an examiner obtains the same result, 
when analysing samples from the same sources. Reproducible means that, with known 
probability, different examiners obtain the same result, when analysing the same 
samples. By ‘accurate,’ we mean that, with known probabilities, an examiner obtains 
correct results both (1) for samples from the same source (true positives) and (2) for 
samples from different sources (true negatives). Thus for scientific reliability there will 
ideally be repeatability, reproducibility, and accuracy.149 
 
The PCAST report clearly identifies that it is using the term reliability in the scientific 
rather than the legal sense,150 and it may be that the tension between the two forms 
of use gives rise to uncertainty in some cases. This reason for this tension according to 
 
148 Draft Criminal Evidence (Experts) Bill, in LC 325, 2011: Appendix A, Clause 4(1) 
149 Executive Office of the President President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
Forensic Science in the Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature Comparison 
Methods September 2016 
150 ibid fn 107 
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Faigman and Lesikar151 is that there is a fundamental disconnect between how 
scientists and lawyers view the world: 
 
Whereas scientists typically collect data in order to make general 
statements about phenomena, these general phenomena are employed 
in the courtroom to make statements about individuals.152 
 
The authors go on to give the example from Daubert, where the challenge was to 
prove that the general phenomena that some women who took Benedictin developed 
birth defects, was then translated into whether Jason Daubert’s birth defects were the 
result of the Benedictin his mother took. 
 
Nance,153 commenting on the construction of Rule 702154 of the US Federal Rules of 
Evidence, notes the apparently binary mode of expression being used in relation to 
reliability: Either something is considered reliable or it is not. Nance further notes that 
in Daubert, reliability in the majority opinion is allied to the notion of ‘trustworthiness’, 
although noting that this is only a brief mention in the footnotes, as such it does not 
seem unreasonable to speculate that the US Supreme Court did not feel the need to 
give clear definition to the meaning of reliability beyond its everyday use as 
trustworthiness.  
 
Considering the term sufficient reliability Nance argues that this construction may have 
to be avoided because as a requirement it is largely meaningless in the absence of 
‘some reasonably determinate algorithm based on appropriate legal norms’155 which 
would guide as to the degree of reliability that is sufficient. 
 
151 DL Faigman and C Lesikar ‘Organised Commonsense: Some Lessons From Judge Jack 
Weinstein’s Uncommonly Sensible Approach to Expert Evidence’ (2014) 64 DePaul Law Review 
421 
152 ibid 422 
153 D Nance ‘Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts’ (2003) 34 Seton Hall Law Review 191 
154 Rule 702 (c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the 
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
155 D Nance ‘Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts’ (2003) 34 Seton Hall Law Review 191, 
197 
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This, it is argued, potentially gives rise to a situation wherein expert evidence at a 
criminal trial might involve prosecution experts saying X and defence experts saying 
not X but Y – and yet no expert’s evidence is admissible unless it is ‘sufficiently reliable’ 
so it must follow that expert evidence may be ‘sufficiently reliable’ but still wrong. This 
is illustrated by one of the elements of the expert evidence in R v Cannings156 wherein 
multiple experts gave conflicting testimony. Angela Cannings was initially found guilty 
of murdering two of her infant sons, but these convictions were quashed on appeal.  
 
Two experts, Professors Berry and Rushton, took different views of the significance of 
haemosiderin found at post mortem in the lungs of one of the children. Haemosiderin 
is the iron left from the breakdown of haemoglobin following a bleed, and was one of 
the elements considered in the case. To Professor Rushton, the level of haemosiderin 
was not inconsistent with a natural event or the efforts at resuscitation; on the other 
hand Professor Berry while ‘not for the moment suggesting the finding was diagnostic 
of imposed upper airway obstruction’ did regard it as a ‘warning’ and ‘extremely 
worrying’. 157  Thus two experts, given the same data, reached quite different 
conclusions, with Professor Berry’s interpretation ultimately seemingly incorrect, but 
both opinions were regarded as sufficiently reliable to be admitted at the time of the 
trial.158 
 
Noting how heavily dependent on expert evidence the Cannings case was, Judge LJ 
suggested that: 
 
 
156 R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1 
157 ibid [68]-[71] 
158 More recent academic research continues to question the use of this marker. G Kernbach-
Wighton, Y Albalooshi and B Madea ‘The Evidential Value of Intra-Alveolar Haemosiderin-
Macrophages in Cases of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome’ (2012) 222 Forensic Science 
International 27 
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…if the outcome of the trial depends exclusively or almost exclusively on 
a serious disagreement between distinguished and reputable experts, it 
will often be unwise, and therefore unsafe, to proceed.159 
 
In the subsequent case R v Kai-Whitewind160 this position was described by Judge LJ as 
the ‘overblown Cannings’ argument and placed back in a very tightly constrained 
context.161 
 
It is further arguable that the notion that reliability is a binary choice is actually 
unsupportable in view of how other evidence is considered. Very few forms of 
evidence (if any) are considered 100% certain, 162  indeed such certainty, while 
desirable, is not demanded of any other form of evidence before it is adduced.  
 
Indeed one could even argue that the formulation of the verdict in criminal trials 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’163 precludes any requirement of absolute certainty. In R v 
JL164 the jury asked whether the standard of proof was ‘100% certainty’ or ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ asking what the latter actually means. The trial judge said: 
 
You do not need to be 100% certain. You can decide beyond reasonable 
doubt. Another way of expressing the words reasonable doubt is sure,... 
Another way, turning it back, of expressing the word sure is beyond 
reasonable doubt. What does that mean? A reasonable doubt is the sort 
of doubt that might affect your minds if you were making decisions in 
matters of importance in your own affairs, your own lives165 
 
159 R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1 [178] 
160 R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA Crim 1092 
161 ibid [84]-[90] 
162 In Chapter 5 examination of eye and ear witness identification evidence will demonstrate 
how evidence which is admissible is still capable of being incorrect. 
163 Crown Court Compendium Part 1 notes that no particular form of words as to the standard 
of proof is essential, but that what is required is a clear instruction to the jury that they have 
the be satisfied so that they are sure. At 5-1 
164 R v JL [2017] EWCA Crim 621; P McKeown ‘Case Comment R v JL’ (2018) 2 Criminal Law 
Review 184  
165 ibid at [16] 
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The Court of Appeal endorsed the judge’s statement.166 This formulation follows the 
earlier authority of R v Stephens wherein the Court of Appeal noted that it was 
unhelpful ‘to a jury to seek to draw distinctions between being certain of guilt and 
being sure of guilt’, noting that ‘[m]ost people would find it difficult to discern any real 
difference between the two.’167 
 
There is also the need to note that while much of the discussion relates to scientific 
evidence, there is much evidence which is not strictly scientific in the sense described 
within the PCAST Report of being testable and reproducible, for example much of 
psychology or psychiatry. 
 
Returning to the Law Commission, the proposed statutory test appears to provide that 
guidance based on legal norms.  
 
There is a debate as to whether reliability is now a fourth limb of the common law test 
for admissibility. Practice direction 19 A.4 cites this dictum from R v Dlugosz:168  
 
…the court must be satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific 
basis for the evidence to be admitted. If there is then the court leaves the 
opposing views to be tested before the jury.169  
 
Stockdale and Jackson170 note that the Law Commission does not make explicit 
whether this is intended to be a fourth limb of the common law admissibility test, or if 
it is intended to be a condition that should be satisfied once the other three limbs of 
the traditional test have been satisfied. Citing the Lord Chief Justice’s 2014 Kalisher 
Lecture to the Criminal Bar Association, they suggest that the case law would support 
 
166 ibid 
167 R v Stephens [2002] EWCA Crim 1529 [15] 
168 R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2 
169 ibid [11] 
170 M Stockdale and A Jackson ‘Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Current Challenges 
and Opportunities’ (2016) 80 Journal of Criminal Law 344 
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the notion that there is a distinct common law reliability test, and that this was 
actually already developing prior to LC325.171 
The draft bill included a guide to what may indicate that expert opinion is possibly 
insufficiently reliable, these characteristics being incorporated into the Crim PD  
19A.6 In addition, in considering reliability, and especially the reliability of 
expert scientific opinion, the court should be astute to identify potential flaws 
in such opinion which detract from its reliability, such as:  
(a) being based on a hypothesis which has not been subjected to 
sufficient scrutiny (including, where appropriate, experimental or other 
testing), or which has failed to stand up to scrutiny;  
(b) being based on an unjustifiable assumption;  
(c) being based on flawed data;  
(d) relying on an examination, technique, method or process which was 
not properly carried out or applied, or was not appropriate for use in 
the particular case; or  
(e) relying on an inference or conclusion which has not been properly 
reached.  
The draft bill also noted a number of generic factors in Schedule 1 relating to the 
general reliability of expert and especially scientific expert opinion, these factors have 
subsequently been incorporated into the criminal practice directions at 19A.5.  
4.2 Analysis 
4.2.1 Establishing Sufficient Reliability? 
The Law Commission sets out its aim as being to ensure that the law is fair, modern, 
simple, and cost effective.172 The review of expert evidence is the first major review of 
the law relating to expert evidence, so did the Law Commission use this opportunity to 
meet that objective? 
 
171 R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 [111]; Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 325, 2011), 2.14 
172 Law Commission Home page https://www.lawcom.gov.uk accessed 01/03/18 
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Edmond,173 while welcoming the Law Commission’s recommendations, argues that 
one of the limitations of the report is that it failed to make a persuasive case for 
reform, further arguing that for the reforms to work, cultural change is required with 
lawyers and judges being both willing and able to change. A point forcefully made is 
that the English legal system purports to be part of a rational tradition, and as such it 
cannot be appropriate for the state to place unreliable expert opinion before a lay 
jury.174 
 
The Law Commission itself identified that the focus of its work was narrow, and given 
its assertion that the issues it identified may just be the tip of the iceberg, it seems 
difficult to argue that there was not a persuasive case for reform. However, the case 
for cultural change within the review is less clear, although it could be argued that 
cultural change is implicit as the changes required cannot occur without such change. 
 
Edmond also argues that despite the report recommending change, there is a lack of 
engagement with legal principle noting that there are ‘few direct references to any 
overarching criminal justice or evidentiary principles, besides the interests of 
justice.’175 Edmond and Roach176 highlight the Canadian Supreme Court as an example 
of how that jurisdiction has shown recognition of legal principle in its management of 
expert evidence, placing fairness alongside reliability as a core component of 
admissibility. Justice Deschamps noting its import in her majority reason in R v 
Trochym:177 
 
173 G Edmond ‘Is Reliability Sufficient? The Law Commission and Expert Evidence in 
international and Interdisciplinary Perspective (Part 1)’ (2012) 16 The International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 30 
174 The counter argument is that the courts do not prevent an unreliable or biased lay witness 
from testifying merely because one cannot necessarily trust what they are saying. That was an 
argument for ruling defendants incompetent as witnesses in their own defence – an argument 
that was rejected in the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 
175 G Edmond ‘Is Reliability Sufficient? The Law Commission and Expert Evidence in 
international and Interdisciplinary Perspective (Part 1)’ (2012) 16 The International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 30, 41 
176 G Edmond and K Roach ‘A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic 
Science and Medical Evidence’(2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 343 
177 R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239 
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[R]eliability is an essential component of admissibility. Whereas the degree of 
reliability required by courts may vary depending on the circumstances, 
evidence that is not sufficiently reliable is likely to undermine the 
fundamental fairness of the criminal process.178 
 
It is arguable that overarching principles, such as a notion of fairness, fall foul of the 
content of the impact assessment. The Law Commission, as noted previously, was 
unable to identify what savings, if any, would result from the changes.179 At a time of 
supposed austerity, expenditure of un-determined scale is going to be problematic for 
the legislature. That does not, however, negate the argument that the Law 
Commission should have engaged with principle to accept that most fundamental of 
criminal justice values; the presumption of innocence and the obligation on the Crown 
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  
 
Arguably, the lack of overarching principles underpinning the recommendations are 
further illustrated by the notion in recommendations that: 
(2) the legislation should permit the trial judge to presume evidentiary reliability 
(as a matter bearing on admissibility) if there is no appearance of unreliability;  
Such an argument allows the admission of evidence which has not been proved to 
have evidentiary reliability if it has been previously adduced and is unchallenged. 
Edwards180 argues that the courts will continue to admit forensic evidence without 
consideration of its scientific validity and reliability, simply because this is what they 
have always done. Noting that the application of the common law seeks constancy and 
predictability, and a determination that like cases are treated alike, therefore even if 
the judges recognise that methods used by experts have not been scientifically verified 
 
178 ibid at [1] 
179 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011) Appendix C page 200  
180 HT Edwards Reflections on the findings of the Committee on Identifying the Needs of the 
Forensic Science Community  (First Meeting of the National Commission on Forensic Science 
Washington DC Feb 3 2014) 
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they will continue to accept such evidence on the basis it has been relied on for many 
years. Cuttingly states that ‘each ill-informed decision becomes a precedent binding on 
future cases.’181 it is worth noting that this is, strictly speaking, not entirely accurate as 
only appellate court decisions can be binding, however the apparent disquiet 
underpinning the claim is clear. 
 
Arguably the changes to the CrimPR may begin to address some elements of this if one 
considers the robust challenge to proposed expert evidence, highlighting the then 
pending changes, within the judgment in R v H,182 however it is possible that such 
robust challenge may not be universal. 
 
Edwards goes on to illustrate this point, which he describes as a ‘stunning non sequiter, 
with the 2009 decision US v Baines183 regarding fingerprint evidence. The court noted 
that: 
 
the record [did] not show that the [fingerprinting] technique has been 
subject to testing that would meet all the standards of science. 
 
But then went on to rule that: 
 
fingerprint identification has been used extensively by law enforcement 
agencies all over the world for almost a century.184 
It is argued that such reasoning creates a presumption of admissibility, with no 
requirement to prove that a technique is scientifically valid despite the ruling in 
Daubert, that a ‘trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or 
evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable,’185 further noting ‘evidentiary 
 
181 ibid 3 
182 R v H [2014] EWCA Crim 1555 [43]-[44] 
183 US v Baines 573 F3d 979 (2009) 
184 ibid at 990 
185 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993), 589 
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reliability will be based upon scientific validity’.186 However, the US Supreme Court 
under rule 702 noted that the obligation of the court with respect to these inquiries 
was ‘flexible’ 187  and expressed confidence that the ‘vigorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are 
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence’.188  
This confidence in fingerprint identification evidence would seem to be echoed in 
LC325, wherein the Law Commission noted that ‘it would not be necessary to question 
assumptions or well established theories about which there was no meaningful 
dispute’,189 further citing the unlikelihood of two individuals sharing a complete 
fingerprint and that judicial notice has been taken of the uniqueness and permanence 
of fingerprints.190 
There are, however, two relatively recent reports which starkly illustrate the effect of 
lack of robust challenge/overstatement of the reliability of expert evidence. While 
fingerprint identification evidence has been used successfully for many years, the 
potential limits of the practice were well highlighted in the findings from the Scottish 
Fingerprint Inquiry191 which followed the misidentification of a fingerprint at a crime 
scene, wrongly attributing the fingerprint to a serving police officer Detective 
Constable McKie. While accepting that there was no reason to suggest fingerprint 
comparison was inherently unreliable, two of the key findings were that: 
9. Fingerprint examiners are presently ill-equipped to reason their 
conclusions as they are accustomed to regarding their conclusions as a 
matter of certainty and seldom challenged. 
 
186 ibid 590 
187 ibid 594 
188 ibid 596 
189 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011) para 3.65 
190 ibid fn65 
191 The Fingerprint Inquiry Report Scotland (2011) A fingerprint from a Scottish detective 
constable (McKie) was identified at a murder scene in 1997. McKie denied having been in the 
house where the print was detected. She was prosecuted for perjury following the murder trial 
as she denied having entered the house. Ms McKie was acquitted and following a high profile 
campaign the Fingerprint Inquiry was established and concluded that the mis-identified print 
was because of human error. 
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10. There is no reason to suggest that fingerprint comparison in general 
is an inherently unreliable form of evidence but practitioners and fact-
finders alike require to give due consideration to the limits of the 
discipline.192 
If one considers the practical implications of revisiting areas of expert evidence, such 
as fingerprint analysis, it seems highly unlikely that a law enforcement agency or a 
university would look to fund research to establish the scientific base required to fully 
address the concerns highlighted by Edwards. As such, it seems probable that 
established fields such as this will continue as they are, with ongoing low level 
academic and legal commentary, until or unless a result as per McKie comes to light 
where there is no human error and duplicate prints are detected. 
Also of concern is where the scientific weight of evidence is over-stated to the courts. 
A recent example is the 2015 review193 of FBI expert testimony relating to microscopic 
hair analysis, which found that there were errors in 90% of the trial transcripts that 
investigators reviewed. The review notes that in the 268 cases where examiners 
provided testimony used to inculpate a defendant at trial, erroneous statements were 
made in 257 (96%) of the cases. Defendants in at least 35 of these cases received the 
death penalty and errors were identified in 33 (94%) of those cases. Nine of these 
defendants have already been executed and five died of other causes while on Death 
Row. 
 
The review was damning, concluding that: 
These findings confirm that FBI microscopic hair analysts committed 
widespread, systematic error, grossly exaggerating the significance of 
 
192 Fingerprint Inquiry chapter 42 Key findings 9 and 10 
193 FBI Press Release ‘FBI Testimony on Microscopic Hair Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 
90 Percent of Cases in Ongoing Review’(20 April 2015) 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-
analysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review accessed 
09/06/19 
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their data under oath with the consequence of unfairly bolstering the 
prosecutions’ case194  
Cole and Duster195 talk about the danger of overselling science, noting that the FBI 
trained analysts then trained state level examiners. Cole and Duster observed:  
 
FBI analysts without sufficient data to estimate the weight of their hair 
comparison evidence resorted to vague but overstated verbal 
formulations of certainty.196 
 
Going on to discuss how a change in the definition of accuracy caused the FBI to re-
designate reports formally deemed accurate into ‘inaccurate’, Cole and Duster 
describe this as an example of the way in which ‘scientific knowledge changes through 
the social consensus of its practitioners’. In this case the science did not change, it was 
the agreement and understanding which changed such that the emerging paradigm 
became that it was not scientifically acceptable to attribute such weight to results 
without having a reliable estimation of the donor population 
 
The final outcome of this was the director of the FBI writing to all states advising them 
that FBI examiners had gone beyond the range of the science when testifying, prior to 
the addition of mitochondrial DNA testing of hairs in 1999.197 
 
This issue of reliability of forensic sciences in expert evidence was directly addressed 
by the American National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in the 2009 paper, Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A path forward.198 It is important to note that 
unlike the Law Commission this review focussed on expert evidence adduced by the 
 
194 ibid 
195 SA Cole and T Duster ‘Microscopic Hair Comparison and the Sociology of Science’ (2016) 15 
Contexts 28 
196 ibid 33 
197 J Comey ‘Director Comey Letter to Additional Governors on State Reviews’ (June 10, 2016) 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/second-governor-letter-061016.pdf/view accessed 
10/06/19 
198 National Research Council of the National Academies Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: a path forward (The National Academies Press Washington DC 2009) 
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state and that evidence was either medical or institutional forensic science. 
Consequently, subjects not being regarded as part of ‘hard science’ – such as 
psychiatric and psychological expert evidence – were excluded. 
 
The report highlighted and focussed on a wide range of forensic science disciplines 
including hair and fibre evidence, analysis of explosives and fire debris evidence, 
forensic odontology, and biological evidence.199 
 
The seemingly damning conclusion was that: 
 
[W]ith the exception of nuclear DNA analysis….no forensic method has 
been shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of 
certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific 
individual or source.200 
 
Taken at face value, this statement would seem to devalue all forms of scientific non-
DNA evidence currently placed before the courts. However, the NAS report 
acknowledges that areas of evidence which do not meet the standards set by nuclear 
DNA analysis are still potentially of use for investigatory and exclusionary purposes.201 
It should also be noted that despite the concerns raised by this report, a wide range of 
techniques are regularly admitted as expert evidence despite not meeting the highest 
scientific standard. It can be argued that the reality of the situation is that many forms 
of expert scientific evidence have evolved and been presented successfully for many 
years before the advent of the NAS report providing useful circumstantial evidence to 
the courts to provide the threads which build the case.  
 
 
199 Full list of disciplines reviewed biological evidence/controlled substances/fraction ridge 
analysis/shoe prints and tyre tracks/toolmarks and firearms identification/hair and fibre 
evidence/questioned document examination/analysis of paint and coating 
evidence/explosives and fire debris/digital and multimedia analysis 
200 National Research Council of the National Academies Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: a path forward (The National Academies Press Washington DC 2009), 7 
201 ibid 127 Fn 1 
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Edmonds notes of the NAS report that its ramifications are international, in that if 
there is no research supporting the reliability and validity of a techniques in the US, it 
is highly likely there is no research elsewhere.202 Given the international state of much 
research, this seems, intuitively, a reasonable conclusion. 
 
Both the Law Commission and US Supreme Court expressed confidence that the 
‘vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction 
on the burden of proof are traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence’ 203 and thus an appropriate mechanism for challenging the 
reliability of evidence. 
 
However, this view is not universally held. The Honorable HT Edwards, a Senior Circuit 
Judge in the US Court of Appeals for the DC circuit, and co-chair of the NAS report 
reflecting on the findings noted that: 
  
Judicial review, by itself, will not cure the infirmities of the forensic 
community.204 
 
He argues strongly that it is an erroneous assumption that once lawyers begin to 
introduce the finding of the report into the courts, judges would begin to limit the 
admissibility of elements of forensic evidence and thus deliver decisions which would 
then lead to reform of the relevant disciplines.  
 
Perhaps disturbingly, given the reliance on Daubert by the Law Commission, the 
National Academy finds that the application of Daubert within the federal appellate 
courts in criminal cases: 
 
 
202 G Edmond ‘Is Reliability Sufficient? The Law Commission and Expert Evidence in 
international and Interdisciplinary Perspective (Part 1)’ (2012) 16 The International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 30, 44 
203 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993) 596 
204 HT Edwards (2014) Reflections on the findings of the National Academy of Sciences 
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community at the First Meeting of 
the National Commission on forensic science Feb 3, 2014 
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…have not with any consistency or clarity imposed standards ensuring 
the application of scientifically valid reasoning and reliable methodology 
in criminal cases involving Daubert questions.205 
 
These findings are well illustrated by a 2002 study in which Groscup et al.206 undertook 
a study of 693 federal and state criminal appellate decisions between 1988 and 1998 
where expert evidence was involved, so ‘before’ and ‘after’ Daubert. The outcome was 
that there had been no change in the levels of expert testimony being admitted, and 
that while, perhaps unsurprisingly, there was increased discussion regarding Daubert, 
there was little discussion of the four Daubert criteria. Groscup et al. concluded that ‘if 
judges lack a true understanding of the criteria, they will likely be applied only 
infrequently, as observed.’207 
 
The revised rules have at their core the requirement that the judge plays an active role 
in gate-keeping the evidence coming before the court. One of the possible approaches 
which has seen use in the civil courts in a number of jurisdictions including England 
and Wales is ‘hot tubbing’ or concurrent evidence. While not specifically referenced 
within LC325, the relevance of this approach is that it is one possible way to manage 
expert testimony, such that areas of agreement and disagreement are highlighted thus 
enabling the court to focus on the areas where differences in expert opinion exist. 
Genn208 reports on an evaluation undertaken of the concurrent evidence (hot tubbing) 
pilot undertaken in the Manchester Technology and Construction Court. Although 
concurrent evidence is not a feature of criminal trials,209 arguably the evaluation of the 
 
205 National Research Council of the National Academies Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: a path forward (The National Academies Press Washington DC 2009), 96 
206 J Groscup, S Penrod, C Studebaker, M Huss and K O’Neil ‘The Effects of Daubert on the 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases' (2002) 8 Psychology, 
Public Policy & Law 339 
207 ibid 371 
208 H Genn ‘Getting to the Truth: Experts and Judges in the “Hot Tub”’ (2013) 32 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 275 
209 It should be noted that CrimPR 19.6(2) allows that the court may direct a meeting of 
experts to allow preparation of a statement of areas of agreement and disagreement. Such 
preparation was highlighted in R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269 [210]. The potential use 
of concurrent evidence within criminal cases will be examined in chapter 5. 
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pilot is of relevance because, in a similar way to concurrent evidence, gatekeeping will 
require greater preparation and familiarity with the material.  
 
It is important to note that the evaluation discussed in the Genn paper relates to 20 
questionnaires returned by judges, solicitors and barristers, and experts involved in 
the four cases that went to trial within the pilot, as such it is a small scale study. The 
paper identifies the need for greater preparation on the part of judges, quoting one 
judge who reported: 
 
I needed to pre-read in more detail for this procedure. I needed to 
understand the issues and raise questions to try and get the experts to 
flesh out why they came to a different view. 
 
Solicitor and barrister respondents both noted that for such a procedure to work 
effectively it was dependent on the judge being well-prepared and expressing concerns 
about more junior or poorly prepared judges. Arguably this reflected the comment in 
LC325 that the effectiveness of the proposed changes: 
 
…depends on legal practitioners and trial judges having an understanding 
of the factors bearing on evidentiary reliability and on their being willing 
to adopt a more critical, enquiring approach to expert evidence.210 
 
The need for an enquiring approach must surely run in parallel with the need for 
evidence to be demonstrably reliable when that assurance is sought. The application of 
hot tubbing is considered in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2.2 Sufficient Reliability and Non-Scientific Expert Opinion Evidence 
While some evidence is scientific and, as such, amenable to scientific levels of proof, 
much evidence that comes before the courts is not, and arguably raises a different set 
of questions. The Law Commission appears to take a fairly pragmatic view of such non-
 
210 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 8.4 
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scientific evidence observing that their new reliability test is not limited to scientific 
evidence and that the test will occasionally need to be applied, giving the example of 
lip reading.211  
 
The issue of testing the methodologies of experts in non-scientific fields was addressed 
in Kumho TIre Co wherein the court noted of the gatekeeper function that: 
 
It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon 
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the 
same level of intellectual rigour that characterises the practice of an 
expert in the relevant field.212 
 
More recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that there was no closed list of the 
factors relevant to the reliability of a non-scientifically based opinion, the case R v 
Abbey213 related to Canadian gang culture. The issue in this case was the meaning of a 
tattoo worn by the accused. The expert in this case, Dr Totten, had gained his 
knowledge from years spent studying and publishing about gang culture. At the trial of 
first instance, the judge characterised Dr Totten’s knowledge as a novel scientific 
theory and attempted to apply the Daubert criteria, consequently ruling the evidence 
inadmissible. The Court of Appeal asserted this was a mischaracterisation and that the 
correct question to ask was not whether the opinion was scientifically valid, but rather  
 
…whether his research and experiences had permitted him to develop a 
specialised knowledge about gang culture, and specifically gang 
symbology, that was sufficiently reliable to justify placing his opinion as to 
the potential meanings of the teardrop tattoo within that culture before 
the jury…214 
 
 
211 ibid 5.71 
212 Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael (1999) 119 SCt 1167, 152 
213 R v Abbey 2009 ONCA 624  
214 ibid [117] 
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The court as part of a detailed and lengthy examination of Dr Totten’s methodology 
went on to list the possible factors appropriate to the type of opinion advanced.215 The 
similarity between the factors put forward by the Ontario Court of Appeal and those 
listed by the Law Commission (as listed in footnote 219 below) was striking and the Law 
Commission note this case as an example of such an occasional need to assure itself of 
the evidential reliability of non-scientific evidence.216  
 
LC325 also clarifies that the situation with regard to some professional, non-scientific 
disciplines is that practices which are well-established do not require further 
assessment or testing as to their reliability.217 This, it seems, is a pragmatic position and 
perhaps a recognition of the impossibility of having the situation where routine cases 
could for example demand proof of the validity of fingerprint evidence. 
 
It is arguably of some concern that the Law Commission notes that ‘clearly it would not 
always be necessary to apply the reliability test to evidence of this sort. Indeed,…, the 
only real issue for the court in most cases is likely to be whether or not the witness has 
the skill to provide such evidence’.218 This could be viewed as a return to the situation 
in Bonython wherein it is about the expert proving they are indeed an expert, rather 
than evidencing the reliability of their opinion. However, the generic factors listed 
which were listed in the draft Bill and are now incorporated in to the Crim PD 19A 5219 
 
215 ibid [119] 
216 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011) fn 79 
217 ibid 5.76 
218 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 5.72 
219(a) the extent and quality of the data on which the expert’s opinion is based, and the validity 
of the methods by which they were obtained; (b) if the expert’s opinion relies on an inference 
from any findings, whether the opinion properly explains how safe or unsafe the inference is 
(whether by reference to statistical significance or in other appropriate terms); (c) if the 
expert’s opinion relies on the results of the use of any method (for instance, a test, 
measurement or survey), whether the opinion takes proper account of matters, such as the 
degree of precision or margin of uncertainty, affecting the accuracy or reliability of those 
results; (d) the extent to which any material upon which the expert’s opinion is based has been 
reviewed by others with relevant expertise (for instance, in peer-reviewed publications), and 
the views of those others on that material; (e) the extent to which the expert’s opinion is 
based on material falling outside the expert’s own field of expertise; (f) the completeness of 
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can be applied to non-scientific as well as scientific disciplines. The Law Commission 
notes how the reliability test could be applied to non-scientific disciplines, giving the 
example of the elements which could potentially be applied in the context of forensic 
accountancy.220 It should also be noted that although the Law Commission identifies 
the separation of scientific from non-scientific expert opinion, in the revised CrimPR 
and practice directions no such distinction is made. 
4.2.3 Education and Training for Legal Professionals 
It is important that any consideration of training and education recognises that 
although both judiciary and lawyers are part of the same criminal justice system, they 
serve very different functions within that structure with regard to the presentation 
and management of expert evidence. 
 
Although solicitors and barristers are officers of the court, their responsibility to their 
clients are clearly set out in the relevant professional guidance, with the need for 
effective advocacy skills being highlighted for barristers.221 As such, while their role in 
relation to expert testimony is to ensure that expert reports meet the requirements of 
the CrimPR and to work with the experts retained to gain the necessary base line 
knowledge and understanding to be able to cross examine, there is also the 
requirement to present that evidence in such a way as to support their client’s case. 
 
To do this effectively, they need to have sufficient understanding of the evidence to be 
able to ensure it is presented in such a way that a jury will follow and understand. 
 
the information which was available to the expert, and whether the expert took account of all 
relevant information in arriving at the opinion (including information as to the context of any 
facts to which the opinion relates); (g) if there is a range of expert opinion on the matter in 
question, where in the range the expert’s own opinion lies and whether the expert’s 
preference has been properly explained; and (h) whether the expert’s methods followed 
established practice in the field and, if they did not, whether the reason for the divergence has 
been properly explained.  
220 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 5.78 notes that a forensic accountant form the SFO indicated that factors (a), (f) 
and (g) could be material to determining the reliability of expert evidence within that field. 
221 Bar Standards Board ‘Future Bar Training Professional Statement for Barristers (September 
2016)’ Solicitors Regulation Authority Handbook Part 1: SRA Principles 2011 
https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/handbookprinciples/part2/content.page 
accessed 27/05/19 
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While the expert will be doing the actual presentation, the advocate needs to have the 
understanding to ensure the key points are pulled out, and also to be aware if the 
presentation is not being understood by the jury, although it should be noted that in 
some cases that such lack of clarity or understanding may be exploited by the advocate 
to bolster their case. 
 
For such legal professionals, the report notes they or their employers would be 
expected to bear the cost, with the expectation that this training would become part 
of the training already authorised by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Bar 
Standards Board. An interesting point within this recommendation is that this applies 
to those ‘who choose to undertake training to assist their work in this regard’.222 While 
this may simply mean that practitioners who do not deal with expert testimony need 
not undertake this training, it also makes clear that such training is not mandatory, 
which arguably may be a weakness. 
 
It should be noted that the Solicitors Regulation Authority requirements with respect 
to Continuing Professional Development (CPD) since November 2016 has been that 
there is no minimum requirement for CPD hours, rather the requirement is that: 
…you should now reflect on the quality of your practice and identify any 
learning and development needs. You can then address these needs to 
make sure your knowledge and skills are up to date and that you are 
competent to practice.223 
A clear concern with such guidance may be that relying on the individual to identify 
they have the learning need, may not lead to those who actually have the learning 
need accessing the relevant learning.  
 
 
222 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), p182 
223 Solicitors Regulation Authority Continuing Competence 
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/cpd/tool-kit/continuing-competence-toolkit.page accessed 
29/04/19 
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Such a programme of self-certification without robust checking, it is argued, leaves the 
way open for ‘tick box’ personal development. It can be argued that the effect of lack 
of robust checking of self-certification was seen in the context of the changes made by 
the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) following the Report of the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry which lead to wholesale changes in 
the way CPD is registered by that regulatory body.224 
 
There is clear evidence that the relevant authorities are developing 
guidance/education as to the use of expert evidence.225 It should, however, be noted 
that there is emerging academic concern as to the robustness of this approach. 
Wortley and Ward, 226  in reviewing the recently published Guidance on the 
Preparation, Admission and Examination of Expert Evidence from the Inns of Court 
College of Advocacy, describe the advice contained within the document as ‘so generic 
and superficial as to afford little real guidance to the criminal practitioner.’227 
For judges, a central component of the CrimPR is establishing their function as 
gatekeeper. The impact assessment within LC325 notes that training for judges is 
required to inform them ‘about the new law and procedure; and to guide judges in the 
 
224 The Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, led by Sir Robert 
Francis QC looked into serious failings at the Mid Staffordshire Hospital and made many wide 
ranging recommendations. These included recommendations around professional regulation. 
With regard to nursing regulation recommendation No 194 was that each registered nurse’s 
appraisal and portfolio of professional evidence should be countersigned by an appraising 
manager to confirm its accuracy. Also, that the portfolio should be available to the NMC, if 
requested as part of a nurse’s revalidation process, with the NMC selecting a sample of 
revalidation applications for verification.  Guidance can be found via NMC on-line 
https://www.nmc.org.uk/globalassets/sitedocuments/revalidation/verification-guidance-
sheet.pdf accessed 29/04/19 
225 The Inns of Court College of Advocacy Guidance on the Preparation, Admission and 
Examination of Expert Evidence (2017) The Council of the Inns of Court; The Judicial College 
prospectus for Courts’ Judiciary April 2019-March 2020 includes a seminar on admissibility of 
evidence, including forensic evidence, while there is no specific mention of the CrimPR r19 in 
the prospectus this appears to give an overview of the topics to be delivered rather than a 
detailed syllabus. 
226 N Wortley and T Ward ‘Promoting Reliability in Expert Evidence?’ (2019) Criminal Bar 
Quarterly May, 10 
227 ibid 11 
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practical application of the reliability test’.228 The assessment recommends that the 
training is delivered via the Judicial Studies Board (now the Judicial College).  
 
While the Law Commission does not foresee the challenges of educating the judiciary 
to exercise this function as being insurmountable, some authors disagree.229 Dennis230 
notes that nothing in the CrimPR compels judges to enquire into the listed factors, 
adding that although judges are ‘actively encouraged’ to do so, it is possible that some 
may still prefer to take the more traditional route of leaving the matter to the jury in 
the case of complex contested evidence. 
 
The Judicial College is directly responsible for training judges in the courts of England 
and Wales and is also responsible for overseeing the training of magistrates.231 The 
current Judicial Skills and Abilities Framework232 makes no specific reference to expert 
evidence, and the accompanying articles and documents include a small number of 
fairly generic articles on the management of expert evidence.233 Although this is only 
the publically available material, and members of the judiciary will remain free to work 
within the framework identifying areas where development is required, it is not 
apparent that there is substantial targeted education and training relating to expert 
evidence readily available via the college. 
 
 
228 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 181 
229 L Heffernan and M Coen ‘The Reliability of Expert Evidence: Reflections on the Law 
Commission’s Proposal for Reform’ (2009) 73 Journal of Criminal Law 488; A Roberts ‘Rejecting 
General Acceptance, Confounding the Gate-Keeper: the Law Commission and Expert Evidence’ 
(2009) 8 Criminal Law Review 551 
230 I Dennis ‘Tightening the Law on Expert Evidence’ (Editorial 2015) 1 Criminal Law Review 1 
231 Courts and Tribunals Judiciary How the Judiciary are trained. 
https://www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/training-support/judiciary-trained/ accessed 
22/09/19 
232 Courts and Tribunals Judiciary Judicial Skills and Abilities Framework 2014 – this is the only 
framework shown on the website relating to the judicial college https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/judicial-skills-and-abilities-framework-2014.pdf accessed 22/09/19 
233 M Hinchliffe ‘Experts in our own little Niches’ part one and part two’ 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/hinchliffe_role-of-expert-members-
pt1-winter2013.pdf and https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/hinchliffe_role-of-expert-members-pt1-winter2013.pdf accessed 
22/09/19 
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4.2.4 The Judiciary as Gatekeepers 
The first concerns regarding the gatekeeper role were eloquently expressed by Chief 
Justice Renquist’s dissenting opinion in Daubert, in which he argued that this approach 
would require judges to deal with material far removed from the type of material 
customarily placed before the court, urging caution with regard to the application of 
Rule 702 and noting the concern that ‘our reach can so easily exceed our grasp’.234 The 
Chief Justice further noted that while Rule 702: 
 
…confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility … I do not think it 
imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become 
amateur scientists in order to perform that role.235 
 
The issue of the competence of judges to assume this role must be considered. 
Although judges are by reason of both education and training intellectually able, they 
are not and can never be experts on every topic that may come before them. This is 
highlighted in the English civil case of XYZ v Schering Healthcare Ltd236 wherein the judge 
said of some particularly complex statistical evidence: 
 
I concluded I did not understand the evidence… 
 
While noting and acknowledging the concerns regarding the Daubert style gatekeeping 
role, it is important to note that even before the modifications to the CrimPR judges 
have been taking on the role of ‘gatekeeper’ with some success. If one considers R v 
Henderson237 the court stressed the requirement for effective pre-trial marshaling and 
preparation, with the court having access to a core literature file to enable them to 
weigh the literature upon which controversial evidence was based. Moses LJ, 
delivering the judgment of the court, noted: 
 
 
234 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993) – CJ Renquist dissenting 
opinion at 599 
235 ibid 601 
236 XYZ v Schering Healthcare Ltd [2002] EWHC 1420(QB) [149] 
237 R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269 
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… we must emphasise the importance of the pre-trial process. First, we 
suggest that the judge who is to hear a particular case should deal with all 
pre-trial hearings, save for those in which no issue of substance is to be 
considered. Second, it is desirable that any judge hearing cases such as 
these, which depend entirely on expert evidence, should have experience 
of the complex issues and understanding of the medical learning. This is 
easy enough to achieve in the Family Division, more difficult in a criminal 
jurisdiction.238  
 
Although the reception of the Law Commission proposals was broadly positive, 
concerns were raised by both the Forensic Science Service and the British 
Psychological Society, who ‘doubted whether it would be practicable for judges to 
acquire sufficient knowledge to make informed rulings on the reliability of expert 
opinion evidence’.239 Concerns were also expressed by the UK Accreditation Service240 
who, while supporting the proposals, argued that judges should take account of ‘the 
increased confidence that can be derived from the fact that an expert works within the 
context of an accredited organisation’. 241 It is of course arguable that such an 
objection says as much about supporting a business model as it does about the 
reliability of the expert evidence. 
 
In the US, the NAS recommended that Congress should establish an independent 
National Institute for Forensic Science to establish standards for mandatory 
accreditation of forensic science laboratories and also the mandatory certification of 
 
238 ibid [204] 
239 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 3.2 
240 ‘The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) is the sole national accreditation body 
for the United Kingdom. UKAS is recognised by government, to assess against internationally 
agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspection, and calibration 
services. Accreditation by UKAS demonstrates the competence, impartiality and performance 
capability of these evaluators. In short, UKAS ‘checks the checkers’... UKAS accreditation 
provides an assurance of the competence, impartiality and integrity of conformity assessment 
bodies.’ https://www.ukas.com/about/our-role/ accessed 29/04/19 
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forensic scientists. This was taken forward with the establishment of the National 
Commission on Forensic Science. However, this Obama-era initiative has since been 
suspended, 242 resulting in academic concern as to the future of forensic reform in the 
US.243 
 
A similar route was recommended in Canada following the recommendations of the 
Goudge Report.244 The Goudge Commission investigated concerns over miscarriages of 
justice related to the reliability of forensic pathology findings in child death cases in 
Canada. As with the NAS report, the recommendations focused on education, training, 
standardisation, and certification of practice. In a sense, both the NAS and the Goudge 
Report looked at ‘front loading’ the system, in effect building in reliability, such that 
when evidence reached the courts there could be greater assurance that it was 
reliable. 
 
It is arguable that the closure of the UK Forensic Science Service in 2012245 and the 
consequent outsourcing of work to non-accredited laboratories runs contrary to the 
recommendations for increasing standardisation and accreditation in the US and 
Canada. The UK Forensic Science regulator, in her 2018 report,246 highlighted concerns 
with the state of forensic sciences in the UK, noting that some forensic science 
providers are electing not to move towards accreditation, further noting the adverse 
 
242 S Hsu ‘Sessions orders Justice Dept. to end forensic science commission, suspend review 
policy’ The Washington Post (April 10, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/sessions-orders-justice-dept-to-end-forensic-science-commission-suspend-review-
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accessed 31/08/19 
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Goudge (2008) Report is a systematic review and assessment of paediatric forensic pathology 
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245 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee: The Forensic Science Service 
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impact of the malpractice identified at Randox Testing Services,247 which has already 
led to a number of appeals248 (not all successful), and it seems likely more will follow. 
 
While the Law Commission did not perceive the issue of education as being excessively 
concerning or onerous, research undertaken by the Northumbria Centre for Evidence 
and Criminal Justice Studies (NCECJS) would seem to indicate a potentially alarming 
lacunae in legal knowledge. 249 In a study undertaken a year after the introduction of 
the changes to the CrimPR, the NCECJS undertook a national survey of criminal 
barristers. More than half of respondents indicated that they had dealt with 10 or 
more cases involving expert opinion evidence since the changes. Thirty per cent of the 
respondents lacked knowledge of the rules or the practice direction and, of the 70% 
that were aware of the changes, three-quarters said they had little or no effect on how 
the evidence was dealt with. As noted by Davies and Piasecki, ‘at the most basic level, 
the Rules and Practice Direction can have no effect if practitioners are unaware of 
them’.250 They go on to note training which was at the time being developed by the 
Inns of Court College of Advocacy (ICCA) and also the primers, discussed below, which 
have been launched. 
 
The primers produced jointly by The Royal Society and Royal Society of Edinburgh in 
conjunction with the Judicial College, the Judicial Institute, and the Judicial Studies 
Board for Northern Ireland will cover topics as diverse as DNA profiling, statistics, gait 
analysis and non-accidental injury (NAI). Hughes LJ said of the primers: 
 
 
247 L Dearden ‘Convictions in Doubt as more than 10,000 cases could be affected by data 
manipulation at forensics lab’ The Independent (21 Nov 2017) 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/forensic-labs-data-manipulation-criminal-
convictions-doubt-randox-testing-services-investigation-a8066966.html accessed 05/03/18 
Randox testing services allegations were made of data tampering at the forensic lab which 
analysed samples in criminal investigations for 42 UK police forces  
248 R v Ward [2018] EWCA Crim 872; R v Bravender [2018] EWCA Crim 723; R v Senior [2018] 
EWCA Crim 837 
249 G Davies and E Piasecki ‘No more Laissez Faire? Expert Evidence, Rule Changes and 
Reliability: Can More Effective Training for the Bar and Judiciary Prevent Miscarriages of 
Justice?’ (2016) 80 Journal of Criminal Law 327 
250 ibid 333 
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I would like to hope that on some occasions the primer has equipped 
the judge to see better whether the argument that is being advanced 
on both sides has a proper basis in science or not.251 
The first two primers launched addressed the issues of forensic DNA analysis252 and 
forensic gait analysis.253 It should be noted that while the forensic DNA analysis primer 
relates to an established and widely used form of evidence, the forensic gait analysis 
primer considering a less mature form of science advises that ‘the scientific evidence 
supporting forensic gait analysis, as currently practised, is … extremely limited.’254  
The launch of such aids for the courts may be seen as either illustrating a 
determination on the part of the courts to more fully grasp and address the difficulties 
of expert evidence, or more cynically as a ‘quick fix’ which negates the need for the 
court to fully engage with the difficulties. However, it should be noted that this 
approach seems in some respects to follow that adopted seven years previously in 
Henderson, and as such appears to be a serious attempt to engage the issue.  
 
It should be noted that while these primers will presumably present the best available 
evidence at that point in time, for evidence which may come before the courts of new 
or cutting edge developments this could well be outside the material covered. There 
may also be a theoretical risk that courts may be reluctant to admit evidence which 
falls outside that covered by the primers. It may be that an analogous situation could 
be the situation with Dr Squier and the two competing theories around the triad of 
injuries in NAHI which is discussed in 4.2.7.3. 
 
 
251 P Ghosh ‘UK judges to get scientific guides’ BBC News (22/11/17) 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-42057009 accessed 1/12/17 
252 The Royal Society & Royal Society Edinburgh (2017) Forensic DNA analysis: A primer for 
courts 
253 The Royal Society & Royal Society Edinburgh (2017) Forensic gait analysis: A primer for 
courts 
254 ibid 6 
89 
 
It is worth noting that academic consideration of how more marginal sciences may be 
considered for use in the courts has long been a feature of legal publishing;255 will such 
papers perhaps be considered alongside these Royal Society documents as some more 
marginal technologies move into the mainstream? 
 
4.2.5 Court-appointed Experts  
Clause 9(2) of the draft bill allows the court to appoint another expert if they believe it 
would be in the interests of justice to do so, and was one of the elements not 
introduced within the rules. English judges already have a very limited ability to call 
expert witnesses in criminal cases,256 but the proposal by the Law Commission was 
that they should be given the power to appoint an independent expert in ‘exceptional’ 
cases where this may assist the court as to the issue of reliability. 
 
The expert would have been selected by a selection panel established by the Lord 
Chancellor.257 While the principle of an externally selected independent expert is 
instinctively appealing, a concern would have to exist around the timeliness of such 
appointments. Although it may be possible to build a panel of known experts on widely 
known issues/areas of expertise, it may be doubtful whether an independent expert 
could be found and selected for cutting edge opinions. Aside from the time and 
expense such a procedure would entail, the issue as ever would be whether an 
independent expert would be any more likely to be ‘right’ that the experts approached 
by the parties, given that they also have an overriding duty to the court rather than to 
the side retaining their services. 
 
255 e.g. AS Balmer and R Sandland ‘Making Monsters: The Polygraph, the Plethysmograph, and 
Other Practices for the Performance of Abnormal Sexuality’(2012) 39 Journal of Law and 
Society 593 
256 Crim PR 19.7(2) allows the Court to appoint a single joint expert if co-defendants who wish 
to introduce expert evidence at trial cannot agree who the expert should be. In civil cases 
under the CPR the court has the power under s35.7 (1). Where two or more parties wish to 
submit expert evidence on a particular issue, the court may direct that the evidence on that 
issue is to be given by a single joint expert. (2) Where the parties who wish to submit the 
evidence (‘the relevant parties’) cannot agree who should be the single joint expert, the court 
may – 
(a) select the expert from a list prepared or identified by the relevant parties; or 
(b) direct that the expert be selected in such other manner as the court may direct. 
257 Draft Bill 9(3)(a) 
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A concern which may then logically arise is around the selection of the experts who 
choose the panel, and what expertise would be required. It may be that a learned 
organisation such as the Royal Society could be approached to assist, noting that they 
have already worked with the Supreme Court on the expert evidence primers (4.2.4). 
The question also remains as to who will advise the courts when the expert opinion is 
truly on the cutting edge, or relates to a highly specialised area where perhaps there 
are only one or two ‘experts’? These are however moot points given that this option 
was not taken forward. 
 
An alternative, although not entirely dissimilar, idea was proposed by Hartshorne and 
Miola258 who expressed support for the introduction of the proposed statutory gate-
keeping test, and put forward the case that in respect of new theories this function 
should be undertaken by a new gate-keeping panel consisting of three Lords Justices of 
Appeal.  
 
Their argument is that such a panel could be selected on the basis of both their 
professional and judicial background, and then if required be given additional training 
in regards to methodology and other relevant techniques. Hartshorne and Miola argue 
that such an approach to new theories would ensure greater consistency in the 
application of the statutory test. New or novel theories would be considered by this 
panel before being presented at trial, and because of the binding nature of a decision 
by the Court of Appeal clarifying the issues of admissibility for the lower courts, while 
not inappropriately excluding new or novel theories.  
 
4.2.6 Reliability: Reconsideration on Appeal 
Before considering the recommendation with LC325, it is perhaps helpful to first 
consider how the Court of Appeal currently approaches claims of fresh evidence as 
grounds for appeal, as it will be argued such an approach could usefully have informed 
the approach had this recommendation been taken forward.  
 
258 J Hartshorne and J Miola ‘Expert Evidence: Difficulties and Solutions in Prosecutions for 
Infant Harm (2010) 30 Legal Studies 279 
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Guidance as to whether or not an appeal based on fresh evidence will be permitted is 
given under s.23(1) (c) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, which states that the court has 
a general discretion to admit evidence if the court thinks ‘it is necessary or expedient 
in the interests of justice’ so to do. In deciding how to exercise this discretion, the 
court has to comply with s.23(2). That provides: 
 
(2) The Court of Appeal shall, in considering whether to receive any evidence, 
have regard in particular to — 
 
(a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief; 
(b) whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any 
ground for allowing the appeal; 
(c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the 
proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject 
of the appeal; and 
(d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce 
the evidence in those proceedings. 
The situation with regard to fresh medical evidence was considered in some detail by 
the Court of Appeal in R v Pinfold259 wherein the CCRC had referred the convictions for 
murder to the Court of Appeal on ‘the ground that there was a real possibility that the 
convictions would not be upheld.’260 
The notion of ‘real possibility’ is given statutory definition under s13 of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1995, noting the conditions under which the CCRC can make a referral to 
the Court of Appeal: 
(1)(a) the Commission consider that there is a real possibility that the 
conviction, verdict, finding or sentence would not be upheld were the 
reference to be made, 
 
259 R v Pinfold [2003] EWCA Crim 3643 
260 ibid [H4] 
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(b) the Commission so consider— 
(i) in the case of a conviction, verdict or finding, because of an 
argument, or evidence, not raised in the proceedings which led 
to it or on any appeal or application for leave to appeal against it 
The ‘real possibility’ test was subsequently addressed by Lord Bingham CJ in R v CCRC 
ex parte Pearson261 where his Lordship stated that: 
‘The “real possibility” test prescribed in section 13(1)(a) of the 1995 Act 
as the threshold which the Commission must judge to be crossed before 
a conviction may be referred to the Court of Appeal is imprecise but 
plainly denotes a contingency which, in the Commission’s judgment, is 
more than an outside chance or a bare possibility but which may be less 
than a probability or a likelihood or a racing certainty. The Commission 
must judge that there is at least a reasonable prospect of a conviction, if 
referred, not being upheld. 262 
Thus in Pinfold the CCRC deemed that the new medical evidence relating to the 
credibility of the key witness gave rise to a real possibility of the conviction being 
unsafe. This proved to be the case with the convictions being quashed. 
Referring to LC325, the recommendation was that, on appeal: 
… the judge’s ruling on the evidentiary reliability test, in relation to 
matters which are not case-specific, should be approached by the 
appellate court as the application of a rule, a legal judgment, rather 
than the exercise of a judicial discretion [author italics]. This would 
allow the appellate court itself to investigate underlying scientific 
propositions and properly police the application of the reliability test, 
so the court would not simply decide whether the judge had acted 
 
261 R v CCRC ex parte Pearson [2000] 1 Cr App R 141 
262 ibid at 150 
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within the parameters of what any reasonable judge could have 
done.263 
The question that the appellate court will have to address is whether or not the 
evidence was sufficiently reliable to have been admitted. In the event the appellate 
court finding is at variance with the court of first instance, then the explanatory notes 
state ‘the court will act accordingly to rectify the error’.264  
If one considers the previously noted ‘real possibility’ test, it may be that this would 
have been an appropriate threshold to apply to enable the Court of Appeal to rectify 
the error, without running the risks of re-examining elements of expert testimony 
which were perhaps of marginal relevance or where errors were unlikely to have any 
effect on the safety of the conviction. 
The notion is that the decision to review submitted opinion evidence should be a 
matter of legal judgment rather than an exercise in judicial discretion. The rationale 
given in LC325 for this amendment is that it will allow the Court of Appeal to properly 
police how the reliability test has been applied in the trial of first instance, ensuring 
that admissibility has not been on the basis of the broad discretion afforded by 
Wednesbury principles, but rather that it is correct. The Law Commission expresses the 
view that this will encourage a more critical approach to expert evidence at first 
instance.265 Such a proposition arguably rests on an assumption that ‘fear’ of oversight 
on appeal will make judges apply the law more rigorously. This point will be revisited in 
the conclusion. 
 
Edmond266 notes this was one of the innovative recommendations within the report 
and speculates that the advantages of being able to observe demeanour would be less 
 
263 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 5.90 
264 Draft Bill Explanatory notes A.17 
265 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 5.113 
266 G Edmond ‘Is Reliability Sufficient? The Law Commission and Expert Evidence in 
international and Interdisciplinary Perspective (Part 1)’ (2012) 16 The International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 30, 39 
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relevant when it comes to assessing the reliability of expert evidence. It could also be 
argued that given the concerns expressed over juries responding to the expert rather 
than their evidence, there could actually be advantages to not being able to see the 
expert presenting their evidence.  
 
Given the breadth of the discretion already permitted the Court of Appeal to admit 
evidence if it is in the interests of justice to do so, it can be argued that appellate 
review already exists, but perhaps the recommendation would have made this more 
effective and the outcome more predictable. 
 
In light of that thought, it is instructive to consider the case of Sally Clark. Her 
conviction for murder was quashed by the Court of Appeal only after a second appeal 
hearing following a referral by the CCRC.267 Although the conviction was quashed on 
the basis of failure to disclose exculpatory medical evidence, the Court of Appeal 
stated that the flawed statistical evidence submitted by Roy Meadow would also have 
been a ground for appeal. LC325 notes of the statistical evidence: 
With regard to the reliability of the statistical evidence – insofar as the 
expert paediatrician was competent to provide it and would have wished 
to proffer it for admission (given the existence of the statutory test), and 
assuming that the figure would have been disclosed before the trial in his 
written report – the defence or court would presumably have raised the 
matter as a preliminary issue in the pre-trial proceedings and the judge 
would no doubt have directed that the parties and their experts attend a 
pre-trial hearing to assess the reliability of the figure of one in 73 
million.268  
Had appellate review been in effect at the point of the first appeal hearing, it seems 
likely that such a fundamental statistical error would have been identified. Although it 
would, of course, be hoped that had the revised CrimPR/statutory reliability test been 
 
267 R v Clark (Sally)(No 2)[2003] EWCA Crim 1020 
268 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 8.16 
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in effect at the time that this error would have been detected by the trial of first 
instance. It is, however, worth noting that common law provision in effect at the time 
of the original trial should have not have permitted the witness to give testimony 
outside his area of expertise, and the statistical error made was so fundamental it is 
still difficult to understand how it was not picked up by the defence at the time.  
 
4.2.7 Impartiality and Expert Bias 
It is in respect of impartiality and expert bias that the notion of internal or individual 
factors affecting expert evidence perhaps sees the most obvious manifestation. 
 
The Law Commission in LC325 regarded the current common law test of impartiality as 
fundamentally sound, while noting the lack of criminal authorities in regard of this.269 
Stockdale and Jackson270 argue that there are, in fact, no reported criminal cases 
supporting the notion that impartiality forms one of the limbs of the common law 
admissibility test. The position with regard to criminal proceedings is set out in R v 
Stubbs, wherein Richards LJ stated: 
 
[e]xpertise and independence are separate issues [it being] a matter for 
the jury to determine whether there [is] any conscious or unconscious 
bias or lack of objectivity that might render [an expert’s] evidence 
unreliable [this being] a matter going to weight rather than 
admissibility.271 
 
While the need for impartiality is (arguably) not part of the current common law 
admissibility test, it is contained within the current CrimPR wherein the duty of the 
expert to give ‘objective and unbiased’272 evidence is clearly stated. 
 
 
269 ibid 3.126 and 4.7 
270 M Stockdale and A Jackson ‘Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Current Challenges 
and Opportunities’ (2016) 80 Journal of Criminal Law 344 
271 R v Stubbs [2006] EWCA Crim 2312 [59] 
272 CrimPR 19.2(1)(a),(2) 
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Although the need for expert evidence to be objective and unbiased is clearly stated, 
the ability of the courts to exclude expert testimony where bias is a concern is arguably 
somewhat restricted. Stockdale and Jackson argue that there are two potential routes 
to exclude expert evidence as a consequence of bias on the part of the expert. The first 
of these is under s 78 of PACE273, although not concerning impartiality or bias, in 
Dlugosz the court determined that if ‘…a jury might attach false or misleading 
significance to it [expert evidence]’274 then although otherwise admissible the court 
should decline to admit the evidence under s78, but it should be noted this would only 
apply to expert evidence on the part of the prosecution. 
 
The other possible route highlighted is to assert that the bias is such that the scientific 
basis for the material is insufficiently reliable for it to be admissible under that limb of 
the common law test. This solution would have the advantage that it could apply 
equally to evidence tendered by the prosecution or the defence. 
 
Although argument can be made for these possible solutions to biased expert 
evidence, Stockdale and Jackson note that, currently, the main option where counsel 
have concern as to potential bias is an appropriate and challenging cross examination 
strategy. However, as noted in the previous chapter, there is not universal acceptance 
that this is always an effective strategy.275 
 
While the CrimPR contain the clear requirement for impartiality at r19.2, it is argued 
that this is not as simple as it may appear. There is a substantial body of literature 
which sets out a number of areas of potential bias on the part of the expert. Dwyer has 
written extensively on the subject, although largely in relation to civil cases. It is 
argued that much of the argument Dwyer makes is equally as applicable in the criminal 
courts. 
 
 
273 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984), s78 
274 R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2 [27] 
275 See fn204 
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Dwyer276 addresses identifies three causes of expert bias, these are: 
• Personal interest 
• Financial interest 
• Intellectual interest 
 
Du277 classifies expert witness bias into four categories: 
• Cognitive bias 
• Bias in the analytic process 
• Bias resulting from the position of the expert at trial 
• Social bias arising from social or economic pressure 
 
Du’s work considers control of bias in terms of the Chinese legal system. As such, there 
is perhaps limited applicability to this work, beyond noting that the categories 
themselves – even on cursory examination – show considerable commonality with 
those identified by Dwyer. 
 
4.2.7.1 Personal Interest 
Dwyer further divides this into bias which can arise from an individual’s personal pre-
disposition, and bias which can arise from an individual’s involvement with the case. If 
this is considered in light of individual or internal inaccuracies affecting expert 
evidence it would seem that personal predisposition is clearly an individual issue, 
whereas involvement with the case would fall within a system issue. 
 
Personal Predisposition – this relates to the individual’s moral opinions and personal 
relationships. One example is that of the civil case Liverpool RC Archdiocese (No3)278 
wherein the expert was a long-time friend and colleague of the defendant. Evans-
 
276 D Dwyer ‘The Causes and Manifestations of Bias in Civil Expert Evidence’(2007) 26 Civil 
justice Quarterly 425 
277 M Du ‘Legal Control of Expert Witness Bias’ (2017) 21 International Journal of Evidence and 
Proof 69 
278 Liverpool Roman Catholic Archdiocesan Trust v Goldberg (No.3) [2001] 1 WLR 2337 
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Lombe J ruled the expert evidence was inadmissible on the public policy ground that 
‘justice must be seen to be done as well as done’.279 He noted: 
 
…where it is demonstrated that there exists a relationship between the 
proposed expert and the party calling him which a reasonable observer 
might think was capable of affecting the views of the expert so as to make 
them unduly favourable to that party, his evidence should not be 
admitted however unbiased the conclusions of the expert might probably 
be.280 
 
The reasoning in this judgment was however rejected by the Court of Appeal in R(on 
the application of Factortame Ltd) v Transport Secretary (No 8),281on the grounds that 
such a test would ‘inevitably exclude any employee from giving evidence on behalf of 
an employer.’282 This is of particular relevance when one considers that, until recently, 
agencies such as the Forensic Science Service were government-owned agencies. 
 
It is also arguable that individuals working for agencies such as the Forensic Science 
Service may perceive themselves to be aligned with ‘the forces of law and order’ 
leading on occasion to possible unconscious (or in some cases conscious) bias in favour 
of the state’s case. This is illustrated by the notorious miscarriages of justice 
concerning the Birmingham Six.283 Following the quashing of the convictions, it was 
alleged in a House of Commons debate that the forensic scientist whose evidence 
helped secure the convictions ‘conspired with police officers to pervert the course of 
justice’. 284  There does not appear to have been any further investigation or 
prosecutions emanating from that allegation which would have been subject to 
Parliamentary privilege. 
 
279 ibid [12] 
280 ibid [13] 
281 R(on the application of Factortame Ltd) v Transport Secretary (No 8) QB 381 
282 ibid [70] 
283 J Robins ‘Nightmare on Disclosure Street’ 168 New Law Journal 7785, 22 
284 HC Deb 16 February 1988, vol 127, col 950 it should be noted that the Minister of State for 
the Home Office refuted the allegations during the same debate vol 127, cols 954- 957 
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Involvement with the case – such involvement is illustrated by the case Vernon v 
Bosley285 (which Dwyer identifies as an example of conscious bias). In this case, the 
plaintiff took action for damages for psychiatric injury following the death of two of 
her children in an accident. Expert opinion for the plaintiff in the damages action 
indicated marked psychiatric injury had occurred and substantial damages were 
awarded. Shortly thereafter, the privileged document was disclosed in error, 
thereafter the same reports were used in an action in the family court regarding 
custody of the remaining children, and the expert reports indicated a far more positive 
outcome.  
 
In his judgement Thorpe LJ commented: 
 
The danger that an expert witness who has a well-established patient 
relationship with the plaintiff might develop there from a sympathy for or 
identification with the plaintiff that jeopardised objectivity.286 
 
Noting that concern, the current CrimPR r19.2 stipulates that the expert’s opinion 
must be ‘objective and unbiased’, thus the need for impartiality is clearly articulated.  
 
4.2.7.2 Financial Interest 
Once again this category is further divided, Dwyer identifies that financial interest can 
arise from either pre-disposition or involvement.  
 
This may arise if, for example, the expert was a shareholder in one of the instructing 
parties, possibly an employee of one of the parties or potentially looking towards a 
career as an expert witness. Noting the last of the three options, Dwyer cites Janasoff: 
 
The legal system’s preference for proven winners encourages such repeat 
witnessing, although it substantially narrows the range of  expertise that 
finds its way into court.287 
 
285 Vernon v Bosley (No 2) [1999] QB 18 
286 ibid at 57 
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It could be argued that ‘hired guns’ are, or were, more a feature of civil cases, but it is 
argued that if one looks at criminal cases, a limited number of names can been seen 
repeatedly. If one considers Sir Roy Meadow in the child death cases which dominated 
the headlines in the late 1990s and early 2000s, this could be seen as a case of a 
‘winner’ whose evidence helped secure convictions consistently and who presumably 
had a solid ‘sideline’ as an expert witness until the Clark and Cannings miscarriages 
came to light.  
 
Understandably, the income to be made as an expert witness is not something widely 
discussed, but a cursory examination of employment websites locates jobs offering 
£450 a day, and some posts up to £160,000pa.288 It is arguable that if such substantial 
earnings can result, that individual is likely to be heavily invested in maintaining a 
reputation and thus ongoing employment.  
 
Noting the issues that arose in connection with Meadow, it is argued that ‘one bad 
apple’ does not necessarily mean that the system is beyond repair. The ‘flawed’ 
experts are the ones that come to public notice, but there are many other experts who 
presumably comply with the requirements of the CrimPR and contribute to the 
continuing functions of the courts. Policing of the guidance set out in the CPD should 
go some way to ensuring that fewer flawed experts present testimony as the courts 
exert greater control on the quality of the opinion evidence placed before them. 
 
4.2.7.3 Intellectual Interest 
Dwyer notes that intellectual interest is particularly relevant in the adversarial system, 
in that a potential litigant can identify an expert who will give an opinion favourable to 
their case, so-called expert shopping. 
 
 
287 S Jasanoff Science at the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Cambridge MA 
Harvard University Press 1995), 46 
288 Indeed recruitment website. Search term ‘Expert witness’ 
https://www.indeed.co.uk/jobs?q=Expert%20Witness&start=10&vjk=14b45672b3d6a3af 
accessed 15/07/18 
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Redmayne289 relates expert bias in terms of a ‘bell curve’ effect. If a group of experts 
were to be asked their opinion on a specific point within their expertise there would be 
a range of opinions, with the majority of opinions clustered around a particular point 
and with fewer opinions on the periphery, thus potentially giving a distribution shaped 
much like a bell curve. The adversarial system allows litigants to select their expert, 
thus the potential difficulty of ‘expert shopping’ whereby the individual finds an expert 
with a view which best supports their position. 
 
Redmayne notes this as meaning potentially each party finds the experts best 
supporting their position, thus in its most extreme form this could mean the expert 
evidence presented is from the extreme ends of the curve, and possibly not part of 
mainstream opinion. If one relates this to criminal cases, arguably the Crown is less 
likely to be adducing extreme or ‘fringe’ theories, but as the defence has only to 
introduce an element of doubt, it is possible that, provided the test of admissibility is 
met, evidence could be bought forward which sits on the edge of the curve. It is 
important to remember, however that whether a theory sits in the mainstream or on 
the fringes this is no guarantee that it is actually correct. 
 
The position of the courts with respect to ‘expert shopping’ was made clear in Beck v 
Ministry of Defence290 wherein Ward LJ noted ‘expert shopping is to be discouraged’, 
291 this authority being reinforced in Hajigeorgiou v Vasiliou,292 wherein Dyson LJ 
noted: 
 
The principle established in Beck is important. It is an example of the way 
in which the court will control the conduct of litigation in general and the 
giving of expert evidence in particular. Expert shopping is undesirable and, 
wherever possible, the court will use its powers to prevent it 293  
 
 
289 M Redmayne Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2001) 201 
290 Beck v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 1043; [2005] 1 WLR 2206 
291 ibid [30] 
292 Hajigeorgiou v Vasiliou [2005] EWCA Civ 236 
293 ibid at 427 
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In criminal cases it is likely that expert shopping would be a feature of the defence 
rather than the Crown. A defendant not reliant on Legal Aid, and with access to 
independent means may seek to adduce expert evidence in their defence which would 
not usually be accessible, in effect ‘expert shopping’. Providing the expert and the 
expert evidence meet the requirements of the CrimPR and practice directions, and 
with respect to both reliability and impartiality there is little the courts could do to 
prevent it. 
 
The previously noted case of Sally Clark is a prime example of an expert witness with 
intellectual interest in a particular field of enquiry where a miscarriage of justice 
resulted. Sir Roy Meadow, the expert for the Crown, gave medical evidence concerning 
the relevance of genetic and environmental factors in sudden unexpected death in 
infancy (SUDI); the statistical evidence was as to the likelihood of the two deaths being 
because of natural causes. At that time Sir Roy Meadow’s view that ‘one sudden infant 
death is a tragedy, two is suspicious and three is murder until proved otherwise’294 
was sufficiently well established to be known as ‘Meadow’s Law.’295  
 
A possible manifestation of intellectual interest is the tendency to become wedded to 
a particular position or theory, the so-called ‘overly dogmatic’ expert, of which Roy 
Meadow was arguably one. The need to avoid being overly dogmatic was noted by 
Judge LJ in respect of the causes of SUDI syndrome, noting of competing theories: 
 
We cannot avoid the thought that some of the honest views expressed 
with reasonable confidence in the present case (on both sides of the 
argument) will have to be revised in years to come, when the fruits of 
 
294 R Meadow ABC of Child Abuse (British Medical Journal London 1989) 
295 R Meadow (editor) ABC of Child Abuse (third edition BMJ Publishing Group 1997). This book 
was a standard reference guide for health care and social workers running to 4 editions all 
edited by Roy Meadow. In the chapter on ‘Fatal Abuse and Smothering’ Meadow concludes: 
‘there is now substantial experience of mothers who repetitively smother consecutive 
children,… ‘One sudden infant death is a tragedy, two is suspicious and three is murder until 
proved otherwise’ is a crude aphorism but a sensible working rule for anyone encountering 
these tragedies’, 29 
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continuing medical research,…,become available. Until then, any 
tendency to dogmatise should be met with answering challenge 296 
Noting this warning against dogmatism, which manifests as bias, it is perhaps salutary 
to review the circumstances surrounding R v Harris.297 A mother was found guilty of 
murdering her child. Expert evidence played a key role in the case, specifically in 
respect of the so-called ‘triad of injuries,’ the triad consists of:  
• Encephalopathy (disease of the brain affecting function of the brain) 
• Subdural haemorrhages (bleeding into the space between the membranes 
around the brain) 
• Retinal haemorrhages (bleeding within the retina) 
These features were said, at the time, to be diagnostic of non-accidental head injury 
(NAHI).298 
 
One of the experts for the Crown, Dr Squier, gave expert evidence that the triad was 
diagnostic. At the appeal five years later,299 the same expert gave evidence for the 
appellant, but now expressed the opinion that the triad did not prove the existence of 
NAHI, but rather that the range of injuries could have natural causes.  
 
Dr Squier explained that research had led her to revise her opinion. The conviction 
was overturned. This departure from the mainstream theory of the diagnostic triad 
emerged in 2004.300 It remains outside the mainstream, with the CPS requiring the 
 
296 R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1 [22] 
297R v Harris [2005] EWCA Crim 1980 
298 The triad of injuries is currently listed on the CPS website noting that “despite medical 
uncertainty surrounding the mechanism, the triad of injuries is a strong medical pointer to the 
infliction of NAHI” CPS ‘Non Accidental Head Injury Cases (NAHI, formerly referred to as 
Shaken Baby Syndrome [SBS]) - Prosecution Approach’ (2018)  https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-
guidance/non-accidental-head-injury-cases-nahi-formerly-referred-shaken-baby-syndrome-sbs 
accessed 25/09/18 
299R v Harris [2005] EWCA Crim 1980 
300 Between 2000 and 2004 Dr J Geddes produced 3 papers which proposed the ‘unified 
hypothesis’ which called into question the diagnostic certainty of the NAHI Triad. 
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triad be supported by additional evidence to take a case forward. The ‘unified 
hypothesis’ was rejected by the Court of Appeal in 2010.301 
 
Dr Squier was reported to the GMC by the National Policing Improvement Agency, and 
following a hearing by the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) was removed 
from the medical register. 
 
The MPTS decision to strike Dr Squier from the medical register was quashed on 
appeal,302 on the basis that while elements of the finding in regard to her behaviour 
were correct, there were significant flaws in the conduct and finding of the tribunal. 
The court imposed restrictions on her practice such that she could not act as an expert 
witness in the criminal or family courts for a period of three years. 
 
Thus it can be argued that the overly dogmatic expert is sanctioned for an ‘honestly 
held’ opinion, but the expert who responds to new evidence and performs a volte-face 
may also be penalised.  
 
Commenting on the Squier case, Pamplin303 notes the risks of publicly confronting 
dogma, expressing the concern that this case will have a ‘chilling effect on the supply 
of experts willing to stand up in court and confront professional dogma’. Following the 
determination, a group of some 20 high profile lawyers and medics writing to The 
Guardian expressed the concern that ‘it is sad day for science when a 21st-century 
inquisition denies one doctor the freedom to question mainstream beliefs.’304 Michael 
Powers QC further noted the risk that others will be reluctant to challenge mainstream 
opinion.305 
 
301 R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269 
302 Squier v General Medical Council [2016] EWHC 2739 (Admin) 
303 C Pamplin ‘Confronting Dogma’(2017) 167 New Law Journal 19 
304 M Mansfield et al ‘General Medical Council behaving like modern inquisition’ (Letters 21 
March 2016) The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/mar/21/gmc-
behaving-like-a-modern-inquisition-by-striking-off-dr-waney-squier accessed 04/08/19 
305 MJ Powers ‘Why the shaken baby syndrome tribunal led to Dr Waney Squier being stuck off’ 
The Guardian (Letters 22 March 2016) 
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An interesting aside to note is that claims as to the reliability of the diagnostic accuracy 
triad continue. A 2017 systematic review of the evidence relating to the triad 
concluded that ‘there was insufficient scientific evidence on which to assess the 
diagnostic accuracy of the triad in identifying traumatic shaking…It also demonstrated 
that there is limited scientific evidence that the triad and therefore its components can 
be associated with traumatic shaking.’306 
 
The question which then arises is, given the recognition of these forms of bias, do the 
revised CrimPR serve to manage these effects such that the jury is aided in its decision 
making? 
 
It is arguable that the overriding duty to the court, the need for impartiality, and the 
guidance with regard to stating both supportive and non-supportive evidence for the 
opinion being expressed will ensure that the evidence placed before the jury should be 
balanced. But the previously noted concerns regarding the lack of use of the rules 
could effectively prevent this from occurring. It is also difficult to see how the legal 
system’s preference for ‘winners’ will be affected, and if one considers the seeming 
discouragement meted out to experts who challenge existing theory, then the 
potential decrease in the pool of experts willing to testify may further limit the range 
of expert opinion placed before the courts. 
 
4.3 Conclusion: A Missed Opportunity or the Most Comprehensive Guidance in the 
Common Law World? 
Hodgkinson and James, as previously noted, suggested that the English criminal courts, 
in the revised CrimPR, and specifically in Part 19, have the best guidance in the 
common law world; however, it is argued that while that may be one view, another 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/mar/22/why-the-shaken-baby-syndrome-
tribunal-led-to-dr-waney-squier-being-struck-off accessed 25/09/18 
306 N Lynøe, G Elinder, B Hallberg, M Rosén, P Sundgren and A Eriksson ‘Insufficient Evidence 
for ‘Shaken Baby syndrome’ – a Systematic Review’ (2017) 106 Acta Paeditrica 1021 
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equally valid view is that the Law Commission review missed the opportunity to do far 
more. 
 
The missed opportunity element, it is argued, was the failure to engage with a review 
that went beyond the issue of reliability and instead considered the other limbs of the 
Bonython test, namely the acceptance of the Turner test and the simple restatement 
of the test of impartiality. The concerns relating to the fitness of the Turner Principle 
are considered in detail in the Chapter 6. 
 
Returning to the elements that are incorporated from the review, Lord Thomas CJ, 
commenting on the success of the first 10 years of the criminal procedure rules,307 
cites the incorporation of the Law Commission reforms into the CrimPR without 
primary legislation as one of the most striking achievements of the Criminal Procedure 
Rules Committee. However, he goes on to note that ‘the one significant issue that the 
proper use of the rules and practice direction faces is the failure of practitioners to 
refer to and use them’.308 As a comment from the most senior judge in the land, this 
seems a somewhat damning point; if the rules are not being used, then change will not 
happen and miscarriages of the type that lead to the review may happen again. The 
evidence from the NCECJS supports this position, and perhaps links very neatly back to 
Edmonds’ concern noted earlier that the LC325 does not in itself recognise the need 
for culture change such that the rules are used and understood. Lord Thomas closes 
his paper by noting that: 
 
…it is plainly the responsibility of practitioners to put behind them the 
culture that the applicable procedure set out in the Rules and Practice 
direction is something that does not matter.309 
 
While this appears on the surface something of a trite comment, the difficulty of 
achieving significant and sustained cultural change is not something to be dismissed 
 
307 J Thomas ‘The Criminal Procedure Rules: 10 years On’ (2015) 6 Criminal Law Review 395 
308 ibid 398 
309 ibid 398 
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lightly. Although outwith this thesis, it needs to be noted that there is copious 
academic literature to support the notion of how challenging it is to achieve and 
sustain such cultural change.310  
 
The wider lack of engagement with the Crim PR is made clear by Sir Brian Leveson in 
the 2015 Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings,311 wherein he noted the 
(hopefully) extreme comments from a cited study in which a circuit judge said of the 
CrimPR, ‘I’ve never looked at them; don’t even know where they are’. Another judge 
cited in the review said, ‘The detail of the CPR [CrimPR] is a desert to 95% of the Bar 
and a very large proportion of the judges.’312 Leveson warns that compliance with the 
rules is not optional and recommends the Judicial College and Criminal Procedure 
Rules Committee consider ways to improve both understanding and use of the 
CrimPR.313 
 
It is also worth noting that similar issues with lack of engagement with the Daubert 
standard and its use in the US courts can be inferred from the study noted earlier.314 
 
The lack of engagement with the revised rules identified earlier in this chapter 
arguably goes to the need for cultural change, and is another element that indicates 
perhaps the greatest weakness in the changes is simply the failure to legislate, and 
instead to rely on ‘active encouragement’. While Hodgkinson and James argue that the 
current CrimPR ensures that the English courts have the most extensive guidance in 
the common law world, there must be a concern that it is precisely that, guidance.  
 
 
310 e.g. B Burnes ‘Kurt Lewin and the Planned Approach to Change: A Re-Appraisal’(2004) 41 
Journal of Management Studies 913 
311 B Leveson Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 
2015) 
312 ibid at 192 
313 ibid at 193 
314 J Groscup, S Penrod, C Studebaker, M Huss and K O’Neil ‘The Effects of Daubert on the 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases' (2002) 8 Psychology, 
Public Policy & Law 339 – considered in 4.2.1 
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Sir Brian Leveson in R v H said of the revised CrimPR that: ‘A new and more rigorous 
approach on the part of advocates and the courts to the handling of expert evidence 
must be adopted.’315 This perhaps begs the question what obligation will there be on 
the judiciary to ensure this happens, what will be the sanction if it does not? It is worth 
revisiting the issue of appellate review which did not make it into the CrimPR. The Law 
Commission seemed to have assumed that fear of closer appellate review would 
improve the courts’ treatment of expert evidence; it may be that this is actually the 
case, and if no other sanctions are available, this is the only pressure that can be 
exerted?  
 
In LC325 the Law Commission argued that the implementation of their 
recommendations would not only establish a framework for screening of expert 
evidence at the admissibility stage, but would also have the effect of raising the 
standards among experts. They do, however, also caution that even had all the 
recommendations within that paper been taken forwards it was ‘unlikely to provide a 
panacea’,316 and that further schemes are required to ensure minimum standards for 
evidence and a more critical approach on the part of some judges with regard to the 
evidence before them.   
 
Within LC325, the commission re-evaluates the possible outcome of four of the cases 
which had been identified as miscarriages of justice where expert evidence had been 
central to the wrongful conviction. In each case the report concludes that it is likely 
that the miscarriage would have been avoided had their proposed changes, which 
have subsequently been incorporated into the CrimPR, been in effect at the time of 
the trial317. 
 
The revised CrimPR and associated practice directions have only been in effect for a 
relatively short period of time and, as such, it is too early to see if miscarriages of the 
 
315 R v H [2014] EWCA Crim 1555 [44] 
316 Law Commission Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com 
No 325, 2011), 1.42 
317 ibid 8.9-8.30 
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type identified within the Law Commission paper have ceased. It is, however, of some 
concern that there is emerging evidence that is of concern regarding the use of the 
rules by the courts.  
 
In the recent case of R v Pabon,318 the appellant appealed against his conviction for 
conspiracy to defraud in respect of dishonestly rigging the London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR). One of the grounds for the appeal was that one of the expert witnesses 
testifying on behalf of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) had strayed outside his area of 
expertise. It was also noted that the expert, Mr Rowe, had exchanged multiple text 
messages with other experts during the course of his evidence seeking advice with 
regard to the very area within which he was giving expert testimony.319 During cross 
examination, which the transcript describes as ‘damaging’320 the expert indicated to 
the trial judge that he had not fully read the information relating to being an expert 
witness prior to signing the declaration, and indicated an awareness that he was 
testifying outside his area of expertise.321 
 
The conclusion of the Court of Appeal was that Rowe had ‘signally failed to comply 
with his basic duties as an expert’.322 Fortunately, however, the court was also able to 
conclude that Rowe’s failings were ultimately irrelevant to the key issues in the case, 
and did not undermine the safety of the appellant’s conviction. 
 
Somewhat disturbingly, this does not appear to be a unique case. In May 2019, 
following the collapse of a carbon credits fraud trial, evidence emerged of an expert, 
Andrew Ager, who was found not be qualified in the field,323 leading the judge to state 
that: 
 
318 R v Pabon [2018] EWCA Crim 420 
319 ibid [44]-[49] 
320 ibid [50] 
321 ibid [50]-[51] 
322 ibid [58] 
323 S Osborne ‘Carbon credits fraud trial collapses after expert witness found to have no 
expertise’ Independent (20 May 2019) 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/carbon-credits-fraud-trial-collapses-andrew-
ager-expert-witness-a8935921.html accessed 2/06/19  
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Andrew Ager is not an expert of suitable calibre. He has little or no 
understanding of the duties of an expert. He had received no training 
and attended no courses. He has no academic qualifications. His work 
has never been peer-reviewed.324 
 
He has since been removed from the National Crime Agency’s (NCA) list of approved 
experts, but is noted to have given expert testimony at the instigation of the 
prosecution in some 20 cases previously, thus raising the potential question as to the 
safety of any convictions.325  
 
Searching both Westlaw and Lexis326 it has not been possible to locate any cases 
wherein this expert is named as having given evidence. Given that cases of first 
instance are rarely reported, it may well be that none of the cases where he gave 
expert testimony have reached the Court of Appeal. It could be argued that this 
indicates that the system is still not fit for purpose in that it took a voir dire at the 
instigation of the defence to expose the fact that this expert should never have been 
giving testimony or been listed by the NCA. 
 
In terms of what these failures indicate about the effectiveness of changes to the 
CrimPR, in Pabon the SFO concluded that the expert’s ‘conduct resulted from a failure 
of integrity on his part rather than a failure of SFO policies or procedures’.327 The need 
to testify only to matters within one’s areas of expertise was present in previous 
iterations of the CrimPR, and while it is too soon to know what the conclusion will be 
with regard to Mr Ager, the findings regarding the expert in Pabon could be viewed as 
a wider indication of a failure of the rules. What could also, and perhaps more 
 
324 C Coleman ‘Carbon Credit fraud trial collapses as expert witness was no expert’ BBC News 
(30 May 2019) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48444605 accessed 2/06/19 
3252 Hare Court ‘Major Carbon Credit & Diamond Trial Collapses After Narita Bahra QC Exposes 
Fundamental Disclosure failings’ (29 May 19) 
https://www.2harecourt.com/2019/05/29/narita-bahra-qc-causes-carbon-credits-diamonds-
trial-collapse/ accessed 2/06/19 
326 Search terms ‘Andrew Ager’, ‘Ager’, ‘carbon credits’, ‘emissions trading’, ‘expert evidence’ 
327 R v Pabon [2018] EWCA Crim 420 [76] 
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forcefully, be argued is that this ‘debacle’, and its widespread reporting, does nothing 
to encourage public confidence in expert testimony.328 In respect of Mr Ager, the 
failure to either note or disclose the fact that he did not meet even the most basic 
requirements to be an expert witness makes the term ‘debacle’ not seem too strong. 
 
Returning to the question asked at the start of this chapter, a case has been made that 
it is both comprehensive guidance and missed opportunity; the guidance is clear but, 
until and unless the appropriate education and training occurs resulting in a cultural 
shift such that all judges and lawyers within the criminal justice process are engaged, 
the problem is likely to remain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
328 A Verity ‘A Court raps SFO for use of ‘inexpert’ expert witness’ BBC News (24/11/17) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
42109725?intlink_from_url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/cvenzmgyw42t/banking&link
_location=live-reporting-story accessed 01/12/17; L Burton ‘Libor families hit back at SFO with 
further claims of non-experts’ The Telegraph (06/01/18) 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/01/06/libor-families-hit-back-sfo-claims-non-
experts/ accessed 01/12/17 
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Chapter 5: The Jury and Expert Evidence – Can the Courts Better Aid the 
Jury in their Search for the Truth? 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The majority of criminal cases in England and Wales are disposed of via the 
magistrates’ courts,329 and in many cases a magistrates’ court will clear several cases a 
day, largely on the basis of guilty pleas. The Crown Courts deal with the more complex 
and serious cases, which can run over several days or sometimes weeks, as such while 
the Crown Court jury trial disposes of a fraction of criminal cases, these are the most 
serious cases.  
 
In 2017 magistrates’ courts in England and Wales disposed of 1.5 million cases, 78% of 
which were summary offences. Over the same period, Crown Courts disposed of 
118,600 cases, 38% were for trials for either-way offences, 25% were for trials for 
indictable offences, 29% were cases appearing for sentencing, and 9% were appeals 
against decisions in the magistrates’ court.330 Of those cases coming before the Crown 
Courts, the overall guilty plea rate was 67%.331 
 
How the courts evaluate expert evidence or, more specifically, how a jury evaluates 
such evidence is, it will be argued, simply another facet, or an extension of how they 
evaluate all the evidence placed before the court. Although magistrates’ courts do 
hear expert evidence, this is generally the less complex end of the spectrum,332 and 
importantly it should be noted that the stakes for the defendant are substantially 
 
329 More than 90% of all criminal cases are dealt with in magistrates’ court. Courts and 
Tribunals Judiciary ‘Magistrates’ Courts’ https://www.judiciary.uk/you-and-the-
judiciary/going-to-court/magistrates-court/ accessed 12/06/18 
330 G Sturge ‘Court statistics for England and Wales Briefing paper CBP 8372’ House of 
Commons Library November 2018 at 2.1 – NB the figures given for the Crown Court activity 
total 101% there is no explanation given for this discrepancy. 
331 Ministry of Justice Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly, England and Wales, January to March 
2018 (Annual 2017) Published 28 June 2018 
332 This is not always the case. In R v Bromley Justices Ex p Haymill (Contractors) [1984] 1 WLUK 
1135 a bench of three justices heard a case involving conflicting expert evidence, were unable 
to resolve the conflict and ordered the case be reheard by a fresh bench. The Divisional Court 
overturned this and made an order requiring the justices to reach a decision on the evidence 
already heard. 
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lower with the maximum term of imprisonment available to the magistrates’ court 
being limited to six months for a single offence, although the possibility of unlimited 
fines exists.333 As such, with the majority of complex expert testimony and the higher 
stakes which come through the crown courts in front of a jury, this will be the focus. 
 
The jury as the finder of fact is a core component within the criminal justice system 
and in this chapter an examination will be made of how juries make decisions, 
specifically in relation to the management and understanding of expert evidence.  
 
A range of alternative methods which may, it will be argued, better manage expert 
evidence will be considered with specific reference to the approach within the 
Australian courts and the use of concurrent (hot tubbing) and consecutive evidence. 
Consideration will also be given to other more exotic solutions including the arguably 
extreme solution of ‘no-jury’ trials for cases heavily reliant on expert testimony. 
 
5.1 The Role of the Jury as Finder of Fact 
5.1.1 The Jury System in England and Wales 
In England and Wales, individuals aged between 18 and 76 can be summoned to serve 
on a jury, while there are some factors which can disqualify an individual from jury 
service 334 there is no requirement that individuals have any particular skills in 
analysing complex information. This is arguably a concern given the increasing 
complexity of evidence being presented in criminal trials. 
 
 
333 GOV.UK Criminal Courts – Magistrates Courts https://www.gov.uk/courts Accessed 
223/07/19 
334 Reasons for being disqualified from jury service are (a)Being subject to certain sections of 
the MHA 1983; (b) lacking capacity within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005; (c) 
being on bail in criminal proceedings or having been convicted of or imprisoned for certain 
offences. Courts and Tribunals Service ‘Guide to Jury Summons’ (2018) 
http://formfinder.hmctsformfinder.justice.gov.uk/jury-summons-guide-eng.pdf accessed 
14/04/18  
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To understand exactly how a jury reaches the decision it does is difficult within this 
jurisdiction, given the effective bar on jury research.335 Consequently, much of the 
research to be considered has its roots in the US, with some recent evidence also 
emerging from Australia.  
 
In one study in this jurisdiction, Thomas336 concluded that juries are essentially fair, 
delivering verdicts that reflect the evidence. However, those cases where juries must 
be sure of the state of mind of a defendant or complainant appear to have the lowest 
conviction rates.337 Although not discussed within the paper, it is arguable that this is 
because the jury lacks the means to judge the credibility of the defendant. This will be 
explored in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
The relevance is that expert evidence as to state of mind is often complex, and if one 
returns to Turner may not even be subject to expert evidence. In the event that expert 
evidence is admissible to aid the jury in its deliberations, the level of complexity can be 
high, and if juries are not able to understand the judge’s directions on Actual Bodily 
Harm (ABH) and self-defence as per the Thomas study,338 then how confident can one 
be that they will understand highly complex medical or psychiatric evidence? 
 
Although not relating to medical evidence, the difficulties that lay juries can have with 
complex evidence is well illustrated with the courts’ ultimately misguided attempts to 
engage the jury with Bayes’ theorem in R v Adams.339 Bayes’ theorem is a statistical 
approach which describes the probability of an event occurring or being true, taking 
account of the other known related factors and is widely used in a number of fields.340  
 
 
335 Contempt of Court Act (1981) s8 makes it a criminal offence (not just a contempt of court) 
to ‘obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made, opinions expressed, 
arguments advanced, or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations’. 
336 C Thomas Are Juries Fair? (Ministry of Justice 2010) 
337 ibid 3.2  
338 ibid 3.3 
339 R v Adams(No 2)[1998] 1 Cr App R 377 
340 In probability theory Bayes’ theorem gives a probability of an event occurring or being true 
(known as the likelihood ratio) based on the weight that is attributed to the various known 
elements which are inserted in to the formula 
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It is important at this point to be clear that the use of statistics can have two distinct 
approaches/roles, one of which is acceptable and one which is not. The use of statistics 
to generate primary evidence, which is then relayed by the expert to the jury, is 
admissible, such evidence would include DNA evidence as set out in R v Doheny: 
 
When the scientist gives evidence …He will properly explain to the jury 
the nature of the match… between the DNA in the crime scene and the 
DNA in the blood sample taken from the defendant. He will properly, 
on the basis of empirical statistical data, give the jury the random 
occurrence ratio … Provided that he has the necessary data, and the 
statistical expertise, it may be appropriate for him to say how many 
people with the matching characteristics are likely to be found in the 
United Kingdom.341 
 
In Adams the jury was invited to complete 24 questions, and then apply these figures 
to a formula to indicate the probability that the accused was the rapist. While Bayes’ 
theorem is a recognised approach to probability in a range of situations, the Court of 
Appeal expressed ‘the gravest reservations about its use in jury trials…’342 noting:  
 
To introduce Bayes’ Theorem, or any similar method, into a criminal 
trial plunges the jury into inappropriate and unnecessary realms of 
theory and complexity deflecting them from their proper task. 343 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, academic opinion is less clear-cut on this rejection with 
Robertson and Vignaux344 arguing that Bayes’ theorem is simply a formalisation of a 
logical approach to calculating probabilities and, given that the guilty verdict was 
upheld, casting doubt on the concern that the instruction as to the use of Bayes would 
cause confusion or distraction.  
 
341 R v Doheny [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 at 374 
342 Adams (No2)[1998] 1 Cr App R 377 at 384 
343 R v Adams (Denis)[1996] 2 Cr App R 467 at 482 
344 B Robertson and T Vignaux ‘Explaining Evidence Logically’ (1998) 148 New Law Journal 159 
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While the rejection of Bayes’ theorem being placed before the jury was the issue in 
these cases, more recently R v T345 seems to have effectively prevented likelihood 
ratios already calculated by the expert witness being placed before a jury, other than 
in very restricted circumstances. 
 
In R v T, footwear impressions had been recovered from the scene of the crime. An 
expert from the FSS reached the conclusion that there was a moderate degree of 
scientific evidence to support the opinion that a trainer worn by the accused had been 
the source of the footwear impression. In reaching this conclusion, the expert had 
ascribed likelihood ratios to each of the parameters of sole pattern, size, wear, and 
damage. However, the database from which these likelihood ratios were derived was 
determined by the courts to be inadequate. The court, allowing the appeal, stated that 
the use of mathematical formulae was not appropriate given the current state of data 
relating to footwear.346  
 
The court went on to state that the use of Bayes’ theorem and likelihood ratios was 
expressly prohibited outside the field of DNA and other areas where there is an 
appropriately firm statistical base.347 As such, this judgment could be viewed as simply 
affirming the core test of admissibility, in that there is a ‘sufficiently reliable basis’ for 
the evidence. However, this ruling is contested by some academics348 arguing that the 
decision in R v T was based upon flawed reasoning and misunderstanding, further 
arguing that such a move limited the jury from hearing potentially useful evidence.  
 
5.1.2 Juror Comprehension of Expert Evidence 
If one returns to the assertion that miscarriages of justice relating to expert evidence 
can be broadly seen as relating to either individual inaccuracies within the expert 
 
345 R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 
346 ibid [80]-[87] 
347 ibid [90] 
348 GS Morrison ‘The Likelihood-Ratio Framework and Forensic Evidence in Court: A Response 
to R v T’ (2012) 16 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 1; the judgment was sufficiently 
controversial that the whole journal Law, Probability and Risk 11(4) (2012) focussed on the 
decision. 
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evidence or failures within the criminal justice system, then of particular relevance to 
this thesis is the ability of juries to understand expert evidence.  
 
Two particularly useful studies are the 2016 Bond Solon Expert Witness Survey349 and 
a substantial piece of work undertaken by Australian academics Freckleton et al.350 
who conducted extensive research in three Australian jurisdictions.  
 
While not undertaken as a piece of academic research, the Bond Solon survey of more 
than 740 expert witnesses is of interest as it found that of the experts surveyed, 60% 
indicated they did not believe juries were equipped to understand expert evidence, 
concluding that: 
 
This could be due to experts not explaining things properly or clearly 
enough or because the issue is so complex ordinary citizens cannot be 
expected to understand.351 
 
While it could be seen that such a sentiment could sound elitist or dismissive, it is 
argued that it may simply be a pragmatic recognition that some subjects are so 
complex that, even with careful and detailed exploration, many ‘ordinary citizens’ will 
not be able to fully follow or comprehend some expert testimony. Steps which may be 
taken to aid comprehension are considered within this chapter. 
 
It is perhaps worth noting at this point that concerns as to the understanding of expert 
evidence may also extend to the understanding of the judiciary. In this same survey, 
66% of respondents indicated that they believed the judges understood complex 
 
349 Bond Solon Annual Expert Witness Survey Report 2016 First Joint Annual Expert Witness 
Survey in Collaboration with The Times 
350 I Freckleton, J Goodman-Delahunty, J Horan and B McKimmie Expert Evidence and Criminal 
Jury Trials (Oxford University Press New York, 2016). The research was conducted in the three 
largest Australian jurisdictions: New South Wales (NSW), Victoria and Queensland. All 
materials were de-identified to ensure that individual trials could not be identified and also to 
ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants. 
351 Bond Solon Annual Expert Witness Survey Report 2016 First Joint Annual Expert Witness 
Survey in Collaboration with The Times, 4 
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technical evidence,352 clearly the obverse of this is that some 34% either believe judges 
do not understand the evidence, or have no opinion.  
 
Moving to the Australian study, Freckleton et al. were given access to jurors, judges, 
barristers, and expert witnesses post-verdict, allowing an analysis of the experience 
and understanding of expert evidence from multiple viewpoints. The authors analysed 
written survey responses from 296 jurors and interview responses from a further 111 
jurors as to their perception of expert evidence that was presented at 55 trials. The 
responses from the jurors were compared with 43 interviews from judges, 115 
interviews with barristers, and 80 interviews with expert witnesses.353 
 
The data was collected from the 55 trials via the three methods noted below: 
 
(a) surveys to obtain jurors’ perceptions of the expert evidence presented to them;  
(b) post-verdict interviews with jurors, trial judges, trial lawyers, and experts about the 
expert evidence in those trials; and  
(c) wherever possible, trial observations, and reviews of the transcript of proceedings 
and other visual aids and documentary materials relating to the expert evidence, such 
as the expert’s report.354 
 
The authors did note that one of the limitations of the methods utilised was that it is 
not possible to assess the basic truth of whether the jurors actually understood the 
expert evidence.355 Was the expert biased? Was the expert testimony strong or 
 
352 ibid 6 
353 I Freckleton, J Goodman, J Horan and B McKimmie Expert Evidence and Criminal Jury Trials 
(Oxford University Press New York, 2016) 1.09 
354 ibid 1.17 
355 It should be noted that this concern applies to all evidence, and as the jury is not permitted 
to discuss outside the jury room how the decision was reached there can be no explanation 
how the verdict was arrived at. For exploration of possible options around the notion of the 
explained verdict see M Coen and J Doak ‘Embedding Explained Verdicts in the English Criminal 
Trial’ (2017) 37 Legal Studies 786 
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weak/simple or complex?356 Triangulation of data from multiple sources was deemed 
by the authors to have offset this limitation. 
 
Some of the key findings from this research were that: 
• jurors are generally aware of the challenges posed by expert evidence and that 
extraneous factors play at most a modest role in influencing jurors’ 
consideration of that evidence;357 and  
• that experts generally are aware of the difficulties their evidence can present to 
jurors’ comprehension and attempt to minimise this effect; 358 and 
• that judges intervene when they are concerned that expert evidence is being 
presented in such a way that juror understanding was likely to be impacted.359 
 
When assessing an expert’s credibility, the participants in the study identified the 
following six factors as relevant: 
 
1. An arrogant demeanour 
2. Defensiveness 
3. Use of emotive language 
4. Evasiveness 
5. Extent of experience 
6. The manner of delivery of the evidence360 
 
Factors 1 to 4 were all seen as having a negative impact on the jurors’ perception of 
the credibility of that expert witness, the triangulation data noted that in at least a 
portion of cases the perception of the juror was echoed by both the barristers and the 
judge.361  
 
356I Freckleton, J Goodman-Delahunty, J Horan and B McKimmie Expert Evidence and Criminal 
Jury Trials (Oxford University Press New York, 2016) 9.81 
357 ibid 9.07 
358 ibid 5.47-5.53 
359 ibid 5.72 
360 ibid 8.33 
361 ibid 8.34- 8.42 
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Factor 5 indicated, perhaps unsurprisingly, that expert witnesses who lacked court 
experience performed less well and were perceived as less effective, in some cases 
being perceived as defensive or biased.362  
 
The final factor concerns basic elements around speed and method of delivery, and 
use of jargon etc.363 Even without this research, it is of little surprise that the rapid 
delivery of complex information, replete with jargon would challenge members of a 
jury. 
 
Certain extra-legal influences did have a degree of impact on juror assessment of the 
credibility of expert evidence; these included factors such as demeanour, gender, and 
the credentials of the expert. When the expert was male, the case was seen as being 
stronger, and the more well qualified the prosecution expert, the greater the belief of 
jurors that the prosecution had a strong case.364  
 
Freckleton et al. concluded that most jurors were capable of understanding complex 
expert evidence as long as the courts support them in doing this.365 They make 
recommendations for ways in which jurors could be supported in their 
comprehension. These include the use of consecutive evidence and greater use of 
concurrent evidence, both elements which will be addressed later in the chapter 
 
The issue of how to aid juries in understanding complex expert evidence has been 
raised in a number of papers. If one looks back to Zander’s 1993 study of 7,000 
jurors,366 almost all felt they understood the judge’s directions, but this did not 
actually assess the extent to which the jurors did actually understand the directions. 
Although it did not examine comprehension of expert evidence, the issue of juror 
 
362 ibid 8.43-8.45 
363 ibid 8.46-8.47 
364 ibid 5.64  
365 ibid 9.07 
366 M Zander and P Henderson Crown Court Study. Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
Research Study No 19 (London HMSO 1993) 
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comprehension of legal instruction was addressed in the previously noted Thomas 
study which found that: 
 
Most jurors believed they understood the judge’s directions on the law. 
However, a substantial proportion of those jurors in fact did not fully 
understand the directions in legal terms used by the judge. A written 
summary of legal directions improved juror comprehension of the law… 
Such understanding is crucial to ensure that miscarriages of justice do not 
occur as a result of jury misunderstanding of legal instructions.367 
Stone368 argues that the changes to the criminal practice directions (CPD) made 
following the recommendations of Sir Brian Leveson’s Review of Efficiency in Criminal 
Proceedings369 addresses these concerns. Perhaps the most relevant for this thesis are 
the elements dealing with the requirement to set out a written route to verdict, 
addressing both the elements of law, but also allowing a specific focus in the event of 
specialist evidence such as expert opinion evidence. 370 
 
367 C Thomas Are Juries Fair? (Ministry of Justice 2010), 36-37 
368 J Stone ‘Are We Doing Enough to Ensure Juries Understand Expert Evidence and Judicial 
Directions?’ (2017) 4 Archbold Review 5 
369 B Leveson Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary 
2015) 
370 Criminal Practice Directions – October 2015 as amended April 2016 and October 2017 
26K.11 A route to verdict, which poses a series of questions that lead the jury to the 
appropriate verdict, may be provided by the court (CrimPR 25.14(3)(b)). Each question should 
tailor the law to the issues and evidence in the case.  
26K.12 Save where the case is so straightforward that it would be superfluous to do so, the 
judge should provide a written route to verdict. It may be presented (on paper or digitally) in 
the form of text, bullet points, a flowchart or other graphic.                      
26K.13 Where the judge decides it will assist the jury, written materials should be provided. 
They may be presented (on paper or digitally) in the form of text, bullet points, a table, a 
flowchart or other graphic.  
26K.14 For example, written materials may assist the jury in relation to a complex direction or 
where the case involves:  
• A complex chronology;  
• Competing expert evidence; or  
• Differing descriptions of a suspect. 
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Although this case did not concern expert evidence, R v Brown371 is of relevance as it 
perhaps gives some indication of the limits set on the need for a written route to 
verdict. Appealing against conviction for robbery, assault, and false imprisonment, one 
of the grounds for appeal was that the incoherence of the summing up was such that 
‘in the absence of a written route to verdict to assist the jury, the convictions are 
unsafe.’372 
 
Quashing the conviction in part because of the failure to deliver a written route to 
verdict, the Court of Appeal (seemingly critical of the structure and the content of the 
trial judge’s summing up) stated that: 
 
Not every trial requires a written route to verdict. However, where 
none is provided to assist the jury, it is all the more important that the 
legal directions given to the jury by the judge orally are well structured 
and defined, with a clear focus on each issue and the evidence that 
might be relevant to that issue... Its absence and the unstructured 
guidance given to the jury by the judge on the legal issues without any 
marshalling of the facts was a recipe for disaster.373 
One possible interpretation of this is that it could be seen as the Court of Appeal 
actively managing the courts to follow the requirements of the CPD. If this proves to 
be the case going forward, it is to be hoped that a similar approach is taken in respect 
of the CrimPR; as noted in Chapter 4, the evidence appears to indicate that these are 
not consistently adhered to. 
 
As previously noted, the convention in the English courts that the jury deliberations 
remain confidential mean that it is not possible to determine how the jury reached the 
verdict, as such it remains unknown and unknowable if the jury did indeed understand 
 
371 R v Brown [2017] EWCA Crim 167 
372 ibid [27] 
373 ibid [71] 
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the expert evidence and apply it correctly in their deliberations. However, the 
examination of explained verdicts is outwith this thesis.  
 
Returning to the previously noted Bond Solon figures, 60% of experts who give 
evidence believed the jury do not fully understand this evidence.374 This may mean 
that jurors understood part of the evidence, none of the evidence or, even worse, 
were confident they understood the evidence, but actually did not. That being the 
case, the logical question is what can the courts do to support the jury such that the 
deliberations are based only on the evidence presented, not on another set of 
evidence which is the ‘misunderstood’ set?  
 
5.2 Alternative methods to better manage expert evidence? 
5.2.1 Concurrent and Consecutive Evidence 
Concurrent and consecutive evidence are two alternate approaches which have been 
used with some success, originating in Australia but now seeing limited use elsewhere 
and subject, at least in the case of concurrent evidence, to considerable academic 
debate. 
 
Concurrent evidence or ‘hot tubbing’, is described by McLellan HJ as: 
 
…a discussion chaired by the judge in which the various experts, the 
parties, the advocates and the judge engage in a cooperative endeavour 
to identify the issues and arrive where possible at a common resolution 
to them. Where resolution of issues is not possible, a structured 
discussion with the judge as the chairperson, allows the experts to give 
their opinions without the constraints of the adversarial process and in a 
forum which enables them to respond directly to each other. The judge is 
 
374 Bond Solon Annual Expert Witness Survey Report 2016 First Joint Annual Expert Witness 
Survey in Collaboration with The Times, 4 
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not confined to the opinion of one advisor but has the benefit of multiple 
advisors who are rigorously examined in public.375 
 
The technique has been used successfully in Australia and, following the report of 
Jackson LJ into civil litigation costs,376 a pilot scheme was set up in the Manchester 
Construction Courts. Between June 2010 and December 2011, 18 cases were identified 
as meeting the pilot criteria. Only three of those went to trial, as such the evaluation 
was based on a small sample and thus the interim report notes ‘there is insufficient 
data to reach solid conclusions as to the effectiveness of the procedure.’377 While 
recognising the need for greater data collection, the report does conclude that 
evidence so far is positive and that concurrent evidence should remain available to the 
courts. 
 
This became the case with provisions that came into effect on 1 April 2013 under 
practice direction 35 of the civil procedure rules (CPR) where the court ‘can direct that 
some of all of the evidence of experts from like disciplines shall be given 
concurrently.’378 There are reported cases wherein concurrent evidence has been 
taken as per the practice direction,379 and interestingly in the case Swain v Swain380 
the judge agreed to expert evidence being taken concurrently over the objection of 
one of the claimants.  
 
The Civil Justice Council undertook a more comprehensive assessment of the situation 
following the amendment.381  Surveys were distributed to the judiciary (n=14), legal 
practitioners (n=33) and expert witnesses (n=51). Considering four of the key 
 
375 P McClellan ‘New Method with Experts – Concurrent Evidence’(2010) 3 Journal of Court 
innovation 259, 264 
376 R Jackson  Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final report (December 2009), 3.23 
377H Genn Manchester Concurrent Evidence Pilot – Interim Report (UCL Judicial Institute 2012) 
at para 13 
378 Practice Direction 35 11.1 
379 Unwired planet international Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd and others [2017] EWHC 
2988 (pat) [58] 
380 Swain v Swain [2015] EWHC 660 (Ch) [3] 
381 Civil Justice Council, Concurrent Expert Evidence and ‘Hot-Tubbing’ in English Litigation Since 
the ‘Jackson Reforms’ (2016) 
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objectives of the Jackson reforms (time saving, quality of expert evidence, assisting the 
court and cost saving) the review concluded that: 
 
• Concurrent evidence saved time at trial, although the preparation time for 
effective use of the technique was greater, as such it is perhaps more about 
time being reallocated.  
 
• Over 80% of the judges and legal practitioner respondents considered the 
quality of the expert evidence was improved when given via the hot-tub, with 
60% of experts stating they felt the hot-tub improved the quality of the 
evidence given. 
 
• Even more strikingly 100% of judges and 94% of legal practitioners’ responses 
indicated that they believed hot-tubbing assisted the court in terms of disputed 
expert evidence. A significant majority of the experts were in agreement (71%). 
 
• One of the objectives of the reforms had been that of cost saving, interestingly 
less than half of the respondents believed that the approach saved costs.382 
 
Samuels383 notes that the practice of concurrent evidence is generally liked by both 
judges and experts, that there is a belief that the quality of expert evidence gained via 
this approach is improved, and that the process is less adversarial and generally more 
constructive. Samuels further notes that concurrent evidence is widely used in 
technical cases such as those coming before the technical and construction courts,384 
but can also be successfully used in all types of cases, although interestingly the list of 
examples given notably excludes criminal cases. 
 
 
382 ibid 57-61 
383 A Samuels ‘A Body of Evidence’ (2016) 166 New Law Journal 21 
384 e.g. Bluewater Energy Services BV v Mercon Steel Structures BV [2014] EWHC 2132 (TCC) 
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Writing more recently, Edmond et al385 express the concern that the limited evidence 
for the effectiveness of concurrent evidence in a limited range of circumstances is 
outweighed by its potential impact on the fundamental nature of the adversarial 
system within this jurisdiction, concluding that: 
 
We should be confident that abandoning traditional roles and 
procedures, and embracing more explicitly inquisitorial approaches to 
expertise, will actually improve the quality of the evidence, 
comprehension, fairness, rectitude, access to justice and party 
satisfaction before moving to adopt them.386 
 
Whilst this is argued in terms of civil litigation, any such concern must logically apply to 
any such move within the criminal setting. 
 
With regard to consecutive evidence, the practice of calling experts ‘out of order’ is 
not unheard of and does not occur infrequently, largely because of the availability of 
the experts.387 The option for consecutive evidence in the English courts would appear 
to run contrary to the CrimPR rule 25.9388 which clearly identifies the requirement that 
the prosecution case is completed prior to the introduction of the defence case.  
 
However, there is some limited support in the case law that witnesses can be called 
out of order on occasion. In R v Sutton389 the Court of Appeal held that calling one of 
the defence witnesses first, before the prosecution case, deprived the accused of a fair 
trial. Hooper LJ said: 
 
In our view, requiring the expert to give evidence first deprived the 
appellant of a fair trial. It must have been extremely difficult for the jury to 
 
385 G Edmond, AP Ferguson and T Ward, ‘Assessing Concurrent Expert Evidence’ (2018) 37 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 344 
386 ibid 366 
387 Personal Comment J Robson 
388 CrimPR 29.5 Procedure on plea of not guilty 
389 R v Sutton [2008] EWCA Crim 3129 
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follow the evidence of the psychiatrist…they were having to listen to 
evidence describing the expert’s view of the defendant’s mental state 
without having had the benefit of seeing the defendant, hearing his 
account… 
 
Without suggesting that the defence witnesses can never be called out of 
order [author italics], in our view this was not the right approach in this 
case.390 
 
While clearly not encouraging witnesses to be called out of order, this ruling would 
appear to leave the route open in some circumstances. In this case, it was simply that 
the witness in question was only available on that day, but could there be other 
circumstances where it could be argued that consecutive evidence could serve justice? 
It should also be noted that PACE s79 allows the court discretion to change the order 
in which witnesses are called. It should be noted that this is only in the context of the 
order of the defence witnesses, although as noted Sutton does appear to leave other 
options open. 
 
It should also be noted that this has effectively been subsumed within Part 3 of the 
CrimPR which gives the judge wide latitude in case management to aid the court in 
reaching the overriding objective ‘that criminal cases be dealt with justly.’391 
One has to look further afield for the use of concurrent or consecutive evidence in the 
criminal courts with the use of both concurrent and consecutive evidence part of the 
Criminal Procedure Rules of Victoria (Australia). Practice note No 2 of 2014 states: 
11.1 Where —  
(a) two or more parties have served expert evidence 
relating to the same issue or relating to two or more closely 
related issues;  
 
390 ibid [16]-[17]  
391 CrimPR 1.1(1) 
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(b) the commissioning parties agree; and  
(c) the Court so orders,  
 
evidence may be given by the experts consecutively (i.e. one after 
the other) or concurrently (i.e. with all of the experts present in 
court, sworn, or affirmed at the same time).  
11.2  The procedure to be followed for consecutive or concurrent 
evidence is to be determined by the court, with the expectation that the 
parties will have conferred in advance and attempted to agree on the 
procedure.392 
 
Although not directly comparable, the closest equivalent in this jurisdiction in criminal 
cases is the provision for the appointment of a single joint expert under r 19.7 of the 
CrimPR. This states that: 
 
(1) Where more than one defendant wants to introduce expert evidence 
on an issue at trial the court may direct that the evidence on that issue is 
to be given by one expert only. 
 
There do not appear to be any reported criminal cases in which a single joint expert 
was instructed to act for two or more defendants in accordance with this rule. This 
obviously leaves open the possibility that this may have occurred at Crown Court level, 
and unless this was grounds for appeal is likely to remain unreported. It is worth 
noting in R v Blasiak393 that the psychiatrist treating the complainant was initially 
agreed to by prosecution and defence as ‘single joint’ expert as to the complainant’s 
mental health and her reliability as a witness. The defence subsequently objected as 
the report by the psychiatrist did not address the issue of witness reliability and made 
a successful application to instruct their own expert.394  
 
392 Supreme Court of Victoria Practice note No. 2 of 2014 Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials 
393 R v Blasiak [2010] EWCA Crim 2620  
394 ibid [13] 
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So although there is currently nothing directly comparable in this jurisdiction, both 
consecutive and concurrent evidence have been used to some effect in Australia. In 
consecutive evidence, the defence expert immediately follows the prosecution 
expert(s), this may avoid the issue noted of long gaps between the evidence. This is of 
particular relevance if one considers the recency effect. It is well recognised in memory 
literature that individuals remember more recent events, so in the context of the jury, 
the recency effect indicates that jurors are more likely to recall evidence presented 
later in the case. 395  Costabile and Klein 396  undertook mock juror studies and 
determined that evidence presented late in the trial was more likely to be 
remembered, and thus influence the verdict, than the same evidence presented earlier 
in the trial. Of course, a potential disadvantage of such an approach could be that by 
being able to compare the testimony of the two experts in such close proximity, there 
is a possibility that this may lead to comparison of the experts rather than their 
evidence. 
 
Shortly after the practice note No 2 came into effect, the whole notion of consecutive 
evidence was called into question by the Victoria Court of Appeal. In Ta-Vuong v R397 
the defence expert witness was called immediately after the prosecution expert in the 
middle of the prosecution case. The Court of Appeal noted that this was based on the 
practice direction, but questioned the legality of the action, and thus the direction. 
Priest JA (with Croucher AJA agreeing)398 noted that: 
 
No matter how convenient it might be thought to be to call a defence 
expert before the prosecution case is concluded, in my view it is not a 
course authorised by statute. Indeed, it seems to me that s226 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 contemplates that an accused is entitled 
 
395 ML Howe, LM Knott and MA Conway Memory and Miscarriages of Justice (Routledge, 
London 2018), 142 
396 KA Costabile and SB Klein ‘Finishing Strong: Recency Effects in Juror Judgments’ (2005) 27 
Basic and Applied Psychology 47 
397 Ta-Vuong v R [2015] VSCA 238 
398 ibid [125] 
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“to answer the charge by choosing to give evidence or call other witness 
to give evidence or both” only after “the close of the case for the 
prosecution”. In the circumstances of this case, however, the course taken 
with respect to the evidence of the experts can have had no effect on the 
verdict.399 
Showing a high degree of responsiveness this concern was addressed in the 2015 
iteration of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) with the Judicial College of Victoria 
noting that the revised provision permits both the prosecution and the accused to 
‘split their case in relation to expert witnesses.’400 This indicates a high degree of 
commitment on the part of the state legislature and the judiciary to ensure this 
technique can be successfully applied in the criminal setting. However, reviewing 
reported cases from Australia via Lexis International no other cases were identified 
where consecutive evidence was presented in a criminal case.401 
Considering next the use of concurrent evidence, Freckleton et al. note that the main 
use is in civil cases; they do, however, note that there has been some use of the 
approach either before a judge sitting alone or in voir dire and before magistrates in 
summary proceedings in New South Wales.402 Reviewing the Westlaw International 
database of Australian cases, there is only limited use made of concurrent evidence in 
the criminal courts and interestingly none have been located where that evidence was 
heard in front of a jury.403  
 
 
399 ibid [110] 
400 Judicial College of Victoria – Victorian Criminal Proceeding Manual at 5.6.2.5 last updated 
3/04/17 http://www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/eManuals/VCPM/index.htm#64414.htm 
accessed 10/07/18 
401 The fact that only a minority of cases are reported and that they are primarily appellant 
cases means that this finding cannot be taken to mean there are no such cases 
402 I Freckleton, J Goodman-Delahunty, J Horan and B McKimmie Expert Evidence and Criminal 
Jury Trials (Oxford University Press New York, 2016), 3.50 
403 Cases identified were R v Wilson [2015] NSWSC 1538 – fitness to be tried; Yazdani v The 
Queen [2016] NSWCCA 194 – concurrent evidence given by appellants and crown expert [81-
82]; R v Waszczuk [2012] NSWSC 380 – fitness to be tried; R v Papley [2017] NSWSC 1068 –
Arguing defence of mental illness in child death case.  
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Although heard before a single judge, perhaps the most widely reported case was the 
high profile murder trial Western Australia v Rayney.404 This case was the first use of 
concurrent evidence in a West Australian criminal court;405 two of the experts gave 
evidence concurrently at the suggestion of both counsel. The judge made no comment 
as to any legal principle underpinning the use of concurrent evidence, but did note 
‘they were impressive witnesses who were careful in staying within their area of 
expertise’.406 The tone of this does not indicate that the judge found taking evidence in 
this format problematic. It should be noted that both of the experts were those called 
by the Crown and were identified as having overlapping areas of expertise.  
 
It is also worth noting the comment attributed to the state prosecutor that such a 
move would quicken proceedings.407 If one considers the increasing financial pressure 
on the public sector, likely in all jurisdictions, it seems probable that an intervention 
which does not give a concern of unfairness, and saves time and thus money, will be 
positively evaluated and thus pressure may increase to actively consider such 
measures outside the intended area of use. 
 
A possible manifestation of such ‘mission creep’ may be evident in a recent civil 
proceeding before the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Following the outcome of 
the criminal case, Rayney launched a defamation suit against the police.408 As part of 
this hearing, three journalists who covered a press conference where the alleged 
defamation occurred were called to the stand simultaneously to give evidence as to 
the questions they asked in the press conference. Given that concurrent evidence 
generally relates to expert testimony, this may be seen a departure, although it should 
be noted that in Western Australia there is no specific legislation addressing 
 
404 Western Australia v Rayney [no 3] [2012] WASC 404 
405 AL Brown ‘Bra links death to home: The Rayney trial’ WAtoday (15/08/12) 
https://www.watoday.com.au/national/western-australia/bra-links-death-to-home-the-
rayney-trial-20120814-246hl.html accessed 01/07/18 
406 Western Australia v Rayney [no 3] [2012] WASC 404 [971] 
407 W Caccetta ‘Red brick fragment on Corryn Rayney bra a ‘remarkable’ match to family home’ 
(14 August 2012) Perth Now Sunday Times https://www.perthnow.com.au/news/nsw/red-
brick-fragment-on-corryn-rayney-bra-a-remarkable-match-to-family-home-ng-
70d43765ccc65189da0f6eaac82e72ea accessed 01/07/18 
408 Rayney v The State of Western Australia [No9][2017] WASC 367 
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concurrent evidence. According to press coverage, the approach was agreed by the 
judge following a suggestion by the state lawyer to save court time.409 The official 
judgment simply notes the cross examination of three journalists called by the 
plaintiff, with no mention of the evidence being taken concurrently.410 
 
The issue that the use documented thus far leaves open is exactly how such evidence 
would be approached in the case of a jury trial. The view of respondents in the 
Freckleton et al research, was that judges and prosecutors were generally enthusiastic, 
with defence lawyers generally (although not exclusively) more guarded, part of the 
concern being that prosecution experts were more likely to be mainstream, whereas 
defence experts could be more ‘fringe’ and as such they expressed concern as to how 
well this would stand up if comparing the two.411  
 
However, if one returns to the use made of concurrent evidence in the Rayney case 
this may actually illustrate a logical ‘half way house’ which could be considered by the 
English criminal courts. Unlike the concurrent evidence wherein both parties’ experts 
‘hot tub’, in that case only 2 of the 10 expert witnesses were heard concurrently, 
because of the overlapping nature of their evidence.  
 
Interestingly, there is evidence of such an approach having been taken within a 
coroners’ court in the north-west of England in front of a jury, wherein two clinicians 
gave evidence concurrently.412 It should, however, be noted that the procedure within 
a coroners’ court is very different to that within a criminal trial, being inquisitorial in 
nature. Nonetheless, this is worthy of note as it may indicate that a jury can address 
issues of concurrent evidence. Unfortunately, no judicial or academic comment can be 
located as to the effectiveness of such an approach in front of a jury. 
 
409 T Clarke ‘Journos testify in rare hot tub’ The West Australian (16/03/17) 
https://thewest.com.au/news/wa/journos-testify-in-rare-hot-tub-ng-b88417761z accessed 
01/07/18 
410 Rayney v The State of Western Australia [No9][2017] WASC 367 [137] 
411 I Freckleton, J Goodman-Delahunty, J Horan and B McKimmie Expert Evidence and Criminal 
Jury Trials (Oxford University Press New York, 2016), 3.56 
412 A colleague of the author gave evidence concurrently, and the author has written 
confirmation from the Hospital Trust solicitor concerned that concurrent evidence in front of a 
jury has taken place on a number of occasions in one coronial district. 
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It is perhaps also worth returning to the previous comment that the judge in the 
criminal trial made no comment as to legal principles underpinning the decision to use 
concurrent evidence, and to note the fact that unlike the State of Victoria, Western 
Australia (WA) has no specific rule relating to concurrent evidence. However the WA 
CrimPR, with regard to pre-trial hearing at r34(3)(d) allows that:  
 
with the consent of the parties, and where the court thinks it desirable 
and convenient to do so, direct that evidence be given at the trial other 
than strictly in accordance with the laws of evidence.413 
 
It is argued that this may be regarded as a statement of an underpinning principle 
where unnecessary restrictions are eased to achieve the aims of justice. An alternative 
view could, it is argued, be that by allowing convenience to become a principle guiding 
the application of law, the possibility exists that convenience could slip into 
compromise and thus potentially lead to a ‘slippery slope’. 
 
So could such an innovation be possible within the English courts? There is nothing 
within the CrimPR which either explicitly prohibits or allows concurrent evidence. It is, 
however, worth considering an analysis of the FRE undertaken by Welch,414 who, 
noting that nothing specifically permitted ‘hot tubbing’ argued that the admission of 
concurrent evidence may be possible under the FRE citing Rule 102 which states: 
 
[t]hese rules shall be constructed to secure fairness in administration, 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth 
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 
 
 
413 Western Australia Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 
414 S Welch ‘From Witness Box to the Hot Tub: How the “Hot Tub” Approach to Expert 
Witnesses Might Relax an American Finder of Fact’ (2010) 5 Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Technology 154 
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Welch notes that ‘rule 102 gives the trial judge the authority to fashion evidentiary 
procedures to deal with situations not specifically covered by the rules.’415 Although 
Welch was considering concurrent evidence in the context of civil litigation, it should 
be noted that the FRE apply to both civil and criminal cases, as such, if such an 
argument were supportable then it could equally be applied to criminal cases. 
Interestingly, Welch does note that although his paper does not argue that concurrent 
evidence could never come before a jury in a criminal trial that such a move would add 
a new realm of complexity.416  
 
If one then compares this to the overriding objectives of the CrimPR: 
 
CrimPR 1.1-(1) is that criminal cases be dealt with justly 
 
 (2) Dealing with a criminal case justly includes 
(a) acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty 
(b) dealing with the prosecution and the defence fairly 
(e) dealing with the case efficiently and expeditiously 
(g) dealing with the case in ways that take into account 
… 
(iv) the needs of other cases 
 
Arguably, the same principles are captured in that the need to deal with a case justly is 
core to both the FRE and the CrimPR, as is the need for fairness and efficiency, which 
by implication includes cost containment. This being the case, and noting that the pilot 
for concurrent evidence in the civil courts occurred prior to the changes in the CPR, it 
is argued that, should the will exist, so could the possibility of elements of concurrent 
evidence appearing before a jury. 
 
 
 
 
415 ibid citing The Advisory Committee Notes at fn 99 
416 ibid citing The Advisory Committee Notes  at fn  100 
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5.2.2 The Non-jury Trial 
A further possibility which warrants consideration is that of non-jury trials in the event 
a case is going to be based entirely on complex expert evidence. The notion has been 
aired by legal academics, with Peter McClellan, a Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of 
NSW, discussing the challenges faced maintaining the current system. He considers 
both the complexity of expert evidence, and also the cost of maintaining the current 
system noting ‘a trial with only a judge, or multiple judges, will be far less time 
consuming and would result in significantly reduced expense to the state’.417 The tenor 
of the piece does not indicate that this is the direction McClellan CJ would wish to 
take, but acknowledges it as a possibility. Writing about the system of plea bargaining 
that exists in the US, Langbein418 argues that this practice has largely eliminated 
criminal jury trials, once again noting, with apparent distaste, that cost to the state 
argues against the universal use of the jury trial. 
 
The following examination of the use of non-jury trials in the UK and the 
Commonwealth do not relate directly to expert evidence, but rather are an indicator of 
the willingness (or otherwise) to consider the use of non-jury trials generally.  
 
The Diplock Courts of the 1970s during the Troubles in Northern Ireland are the last 
time widespread non-jury trials took place. The Diplock Courts, in which a single judge 
tried serious criminal cases without a jury, were introduced in 1973 and heard large 
numbers of cases before being disbanded as part of the peace process in 2007. It is 
worth noting the words of the then Northern Ireland Secretary before the introduction 
of the emergency provisions legislation in 1973: 
 
 
417 e.g. P McClellan ‘The future Role of The Judge: Umpire, Manager, Mediator or Service 
Provider?’ (2011) NSW Judicial Scholarship no 44 
418 JH Langbein ‘On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal Jury 
Trial’ (1992) Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 548 at 125 
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Given the cessation of violence for political ends in Northern Ireland, the 
Government will be only too glad to see these provisions brought to an 
end.419 
 
This statement may be taken as an indication of the reluctance with which such 
changes were instigated.  
 
While the situation in Northern Ireland is the highest profile example of non-jury trials, 
it is not the only such example. In August 2012, the Under-secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs announced the suspension of the constitutional 
right to trial by jury in the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) in response to systemic 
corruption within TCI.420 The TCI Constitution (interim amendment) Order 2009 (SI 
2009/701) removed the absolute right to trial by jury and provided for a judge to order 
a trial in the absence of a jury if it was in the interests of justice. The only reported trial 
under these provisions was Misick v the Queen.421  
 
More recently, provisions under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 were enacted to allow 
for trial without jury (a) in complex fraud cases, and (b) where jury intimidation was a 
factor. Section 43, which allowed for the non-jury trial of complex fraud was, however, 
repealed by s 113 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, without ever having been 
bought into force. However, it is instructive to revisit elements of the debate in 
relation to s 43. The strength of feeling against this move was captured by Baroness 
Kennedy QC in the Lords committee stage of the Criminal Justice Bill 2002-03 debate 
who powerfully explained and supported the reason for and the strength of the jury 
system: 
 
Juries keep the law honest and comprehensible because working with 
juries…puts an obligation on all of us to explain the law and the rules and 
 
419 S Doran and J Jackson ‘Diplock courts: A model for British justice?’ The Independent (13 
September 1995) https://www.independent.co.uk/money/spend-save/diplock-courts-a-
model-for-british-justice-1600830.html accessed 13/06/18 
420 HL Deb 12 October 2009 Vol 713 Col15WS 
421 Misick and Others v The Queen (Turks and Caicos) [2015] UKPC 31 
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to apply the standards of the public to what is right and wrong. The jury 
stops the law becoming opaque. It stops the law becoming closed and 
sometimes even dishonest.422 
 
Interestingly the former Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson, supported the 
Government proposal noting that he ‘totally reject[s] the idea that the jury is the great 
bulwark of liberty against the establishment’ also expressing concerns that the 
unusually high conviction rate in jury fraud trials, as against non-fraud cases may 
indicate that the jury find the accused guilty because they do not understand the 
evidence and assume that the individual would not be on trial unless they were 
guilty.423  
 
The resistance to s43 came not just from within the Houses of Parliament. The Law 
Society, Bar Council, and the human rights organisation Justice were all critical of the 
proposed implementation of s43 of the Act.424 
 
Julien, commenting on s43, concluded that the state imposition of judge only trials 
would be a fundamental change to the English system of justice and would be a 
‘serious step toward converting England and Wales judges into civil law judges’.425 
 
Thus, while s43 never came into force, s44 has been brought into effect and provides 
the option for non-jury trials where there is a danger of jury tampering or where jury 
tampering has taken place. At the time of writing R v Twomey (no2)426 is the only non-
jury case to have been heard under the Act. 
 
 
422 HL Deb 15 July 2003 Vol 651 col 776 
423 ibid cols 793-794 
424 M Peck ‘The Fraud (Trials without a Jury) Bill 2006-07’ (2006) House of Commons Library 
Research Paper 06/57, 20 
425 RF Julien ‘Judicial Perspectives in Serious Fraud Cases – The Present Status Of And Problems 
Posed by Case Management Practices, Jury Selection Rules, Juror Expertise, Plea Bargaining 
and Choice of Mode of Trial’ (2008) 10 Criminal Law Review 764 
426 R v Twomey, Blake Hibberd and Cameron (No 2) [2011] 1 Cr App R 29 CA 
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The reluctance of the judiciary to follow this path was clearly articulated in R v J, S and 
M, wherein the Crown had applied for the case to be heard without a jury pursuant to 
s 44(2) of the CJA. The Court of Appeal declined the application and speaking per 
curiam: 
 
The trial of a serious criminal offence without a jury ... remains and must 
remain the decision of last resort, only to be ordered when the court is sure 
(not that it entertains doubts, suspicions or reservations) that the statutory 
conditions are fulfilled.427 
 
However, it should be noted that there are a number of routes already present via 
which a trial, and thus potentially expert evidence, can be heard without a jury. For 
summary or triable either way cases, it should be noted that r 24 of the CrimPR allows 
that expert evidence may be called in a magistrates’ court either in person or in 
writing.428 Expert evidence does comes before magistrates’ courts,429 although it is 
more likely that were this to happen a professional district judge is likely to be 
allocated to the case.430 In the event that an individual is found guilty by a magistrates’ 
court following a plea of non-guilty, under s 108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 
this can be appealed to the Crown Court where the case will be re-heard without a 
jury. 
 
The question of whether a non-jury trial would engage a defendant’s rights under 
Article 6, was addressed by the Court of Appeal in R v Twomey when discussing the 
effect of a judge only trial in the case of jury tampering: 
 
…the process of dispensing with a jury in a case where it is established 
that a jury trial is likely to be abused or subverted, the end result is not an 
 
427 R v J, S and M [2010] EWCA Crim 1755 [H4]  
428 r 24.4(2)(a)(ii) and r 24.5(1)(b) 
429 e.g. expert evidence regarding breath tests Regina (Bourne) v Scarborough Magistrates 
Court [2017] EWHC 2828 (Admin); R (on the application of the Crown Prosecution Service) v 
Sedgemoor Justices [2007] EWHC 1803 (Admin) 
430 Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability – a 
Consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009), B.14 
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unfair trial, but a trial by judge alone, where the necessary procedural 
safeguards available in a trial by jury are and remain available to the 
defendant ... The trial would take place before an independent tribunal, 
and…, for the purposes of article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, it is irrelevant whether the tribunal is judge and jury or judge 
alone.431 
 
It should however be noted that this ruling applied to jury tampering, not the complex 
fraud cases (the aborted provision under s 43) which, it is argued, would have been 
analogous to the problems caused by expert evidence. 
 
The previously considered Australian case, Rayney, was a non-jury trial. The 
application for a non-jury trial had been made by the defendant in light of the fact this 
was a high profile case, the accused was a QC and his charging attracted extensive 
publicity which the judge identified as potentially prejudicial to the accused.432 
 
In that jurisdiction, a non-jury trial can be requested by either the accused or the 
prosecution under s118 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004. The accused must agree 
to be tried by a judge alone, if the prosecution do not agree, the trial judge may still 
make a trial by judge order if they believe it would be in the interests of justice to do 
so.433 Arguably, this is similar to the management of triable either way offences under 
English law where such cases must be tried by a jury unless both the accused and the 
magistrates’ court agree to a summary trial either before the lay magistrates or a 
single district judge.434 However, for indictable offences there is no option for judge 
alone trial, unlike Australia where this is the case. 
 
 
431 R v Twomey, Blake Hibberd and Cameron (No 2) [2011] 1 Cr App R 29 CA [18] 
432 Western Australia v Rayney [no 3] [2012] WASC 404 [16] 
433 Criminal Procedure Act 2004 s 118 (1) – (4) [Western Australia] 
434 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 s17A-23 
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The first Australian state to legislate for judge-only trials was South Australia in 
1984,435 followed by New South Wales 1990,436 Australia Capital Territory 1993,437 
Western Australia 2004,438 and Queensland in 2008.439 Judge-only trials can only take 
place with regard to state level offences. Crimes being tried under federal statutes 
must be in front of a jury, this requirement having been set out in s80 of the 
Constitution,440 and recently affirmed by the High Court of Australia.441  
 
Although judge-only trials are possible in a range of states and territories in Australia, 
the evidence from NSW is that judge-only trials are the exception rather than the rule 
– at least in that jurisdiction. Between 1993 and September 2014, there were 14,833 
jury trials compared to only 1,110 judge-only trials.442  
 
An inquiry into judge-only trials was produced by the NSW Standing Committee on Law 
and Justice443 in 2010. This addressed a number of issues of relevance within this 
thesis. The committee had highlighted two areas where a judge-only trial may be 
preferable, these were where the evidence was highly technical and also where the 
evidence related to particularly heinous crimes.444 With regards to the issue of highly 
technical evidence, the participants giving evidence to the committee were split with 
some taking the view that that such evidence was better suited to a judge alone, with 
the evidence from the DPP noting:  
We take the view that if the principal evidence is of a technical nature and 
there are issues that need to be resolved about that, a judge alone is in a 
 
435 Juries Act 1927, version 5.3.2018, s7 [South Australia] 
436 Criminal Procedures Act 1986, s132 [New South Wales] 
437 Supreme Court Act 1933, s68B [Australia Capital Territory] 
438 Criminal Procedure Act 2004 s117-120 [Western Australia] 
439 Criminal Code and Jury Act and another Amendment Act 2008 s615 [Queensland] 
440 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (The Constitution) s80 - Trial by Jury 
441 Hamdi Alqudsi v The Queen [2016] HCA 24 
442 P Krisenthal ‘Judge Alone trials in NSW Practical considerations’ (2016) 
https://criminalcpd.net.au/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Judge_alone_trials_in_NSW_peter_krisenthal.pdf accessed 
29/12/18 
443 New South Wales Standing Committee on Law and Justice (2010) Inquiry into judge alone 
trials under s.132 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (Report no 44) 
444 ibid 4.102-4.128 
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better position to master the evidence, to master the issues and to make 
the decisions that need to be made rather than having twelve laypeople 
coming to perhaps uncertain or conflicting views about aspects of the 
evidence and about the issues to be determined and ending up in a state of 
confusion. 445 
However, other participants noted the responsibility of counsel to ensure that 
technical evidence be made comprehensible and also highlighted the need ‘to ensure 
that the community remains connected to the trial process.’446 
 
The committee concluded that since it was difficult to define what constitutes ‘truly 
abhorrent’ or ‘highly technical’ evidence, it was more appropriate to leave the decision  
to apply for a judge only trial to counsel, and that the applicable test should be 
whether it is in ‘the interests of justice.’447 The committee went on to note that the 
‘interests of justice’ is a well-established concept which the courts are well used to 
applying and which allows sufficient discretion as to the factors to be considered in an 
application for a judge-only trial.448 Having noted this, the majority of the states or 
territories which legislate for judge-only trials have the likely complexity of the trial as 
one of the criteria supporting this approach. Interestingly, Edmond449 notes that there 
is little evidence that judges address the issues of expert evidence any better than 
juries.  
 
If one considers that the jury trial, as well as ensuring that the public are engaged in 
the judicial process, is also about bringing to bear the common-sense of the fabled 12 
good men and true, this gives an obvious concern that a judge-only trial could be more 
about factual accuracy and application of the law, than on a judgment if something 
was ‘reasonable’ or how ‘a man of the age and type of the defendant would react’ in a 
given set of circumstances.  
 
445 ibid 4.121 
446 ibid 4.127  
447 ibid 4.129-4.131 
448 ibid 5.24 
449 G Edmond ‘Forensic Science Evidence and the Conditions for Rational (Jury) Evaluation’ 
(2015) 39 Melbourne University Law Review 77, 124 
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The Australian legislation addresses this concern by having an ‘objective community 
standard’. The courts recognise that this may sometimes be a difficult concept to apply 
precisely, and this is recognised if one considers the NSW legislation. In respect of 
orders for judge-only trial, the legislation states: 
 
…the court may refuse to make an order if it considers that the trial will 
involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community 
standards, including (but not limited to) an issue of reasonableness, 
negligence, indecency, obscenity or dangerousness.450  
 
Although only considering a narrow range of sources, the reporting of judge-only trials 
in the Australian press does not appear to indicate any widespread public disquiet with 
the application of this approach, with reporting merely noting either that a judge-only 
or jury trial was held,451 and it is arguable that by judge-only trials being instigated at 
the request of the accused they are actually an expression of the autonomous rights of 
that individual to select how they interact with the justice system and, as such, simply 
one more aspect of a move to an increasingly rights-based society.  
 
For a change which has been in existence for a number of decades in some states, 
there is surprisingly little academic consideration and assessment of the change. 
Writing in 2011, O’Leary452 noted the lack of recent academic writing on the subject of 
judge-only trials. A search of the journals section of Westlaw International using the 
search terms ‘non-jury’ and ‘judge alone’, generated a combined total of 14 titles 
where either of the terms was used, but in each case the reference was an 
 
450 Criminal Procedures Act 1986 (NSW), s 132 (5) 
451 e.g. Rayney see fn 394 and 396; S Rawsthorne and S Keoghan ‘The Obstacles to Convicting 
Chris Dawson of his Wife’s Murder’ The Sydney Morning Herald (8 December 2018) 
https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/the-obstacles-to-convicting-chris-dawson-of-his-wife-
s-murder-20181207-p50ky2.html accessed 9/12/18; Canberra Times ‘WA mother jailed after 
killing son while in a psychotic state’ (7 December 2018) 
https://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/western-australia/wa-mother-jailed-after-killing-
son-while-in-a-psychotic-state-20181207-p50ky4.html accessed 9/12/18 
452 J O’Leary ‘Twelve Angry Peers or One Angry Judge: An Analysis of Judge Alone Trials in 
Australia’ (2011) 35 Criminal Law Journal 154 
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acknowledgement of the use of such trials, with minimal to no comment as to the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the approach. 
 
However, in England and Wales, the strength of the assertion previously cited by the 
Lord Chief Justice, coupled with the repeal of the option for non-jury trial in complex 
fraud trials, argues strongly against any such move in this jurisdiction. The possibility 
was arguably made more remote in a written statement to the House of Lords by Lord 
Hunt of Kings Heath, the then Parliamentary under Secretary of State in the  Ministry 
of Justice, who confirmed that there was no intention to extend the provision for trial 
without a jury beyond the provisions in the CJA 2003 and the DVCVA 2004.453 
 
However, the pressures on the courts and judiciary in Australia noted by McClellan CJ, 
are, it is argued, little different to the pressures of time and cost that face the courts in 
England. That being the case, the pressure for change is unlikely to vanish and as such 
the possibility must exist that as with the US and Australia we may see that pressure 
pushing back the right to jury trial.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
There are, it is argued, some very practical steps that the courts can take to aid juror 
understanding of expert evidence; the first as noted within the Freckleton study is to 
ensure that the expert evidence is presented in a clear, logical, jargon free (or at least 
jargon lite) format. This requires that both counsel and judge select and marshal the 
experts effectively. However, a potential risk is that if, as evidence seems to suggest, 
jurors generally find experienced experts more credible, then these experts keep 
getting called and we return to the concern that only a limited range of expertise 
comes before the courts. 
 
Potential flaws in the evidence presented by the experts, be it in the form of bias or 
the adducing of unreliable expert testimony on the other hand, are more open to 
judicial control. Rigorous application of the CrimPR should, it is argued, address some 
 
453 HL Deb 29 September 2008, vol 703 Col 197WS 
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of the issues raised, but this is reliant on the judge acting as the gatekeeper in both 
name and deed. Williams and Saks454 argue that judges fail to guard the gates. 
Although this was specifically in reference to permitting ‘poor science’ to come before 
the courts, the same it is argued can be said if judges fail to apply the CrimPR and thus 
permit biased, partial evidence to come before the jury. So it seems this element of 
potential control to ensure that evidence coming before the jury is appropriate already 
lies within the gift of the courts, as evidenced by the previously noted management of 
expert testimony in R v H.455 
 
With regard to concurrent and consecutive evidence, it is clear that this form of 
evidence is being successfully adduced without explicit statutory provision in the 
majority of the Australian states studied, the exception being Victoria, where the use 
of consecutive evidence appears to have encountered some difficulties, which were 
subsequently addressed. This could, it is argued, show a degree of commitment to the 
approach which it can be inferred does mean that the courts deem the approach 
useful.  
 
It could be argued that the rule in Western Australia which allows evidence to be 
introduced ‘other than strictly in accordance with the laws of evidence’456 provides a 
considerable degree of latitude to the courts to introduce innovation. If one considers 
the introduction of concurrent evidence into the civil courts in England, while it is now 
part of the CPR, this was not the case at the time it was trialled, as such it can be 
argued that if the will to trial new approaches exists this can be done without changes 
to either legislation or the relevant procedure rules.  
 
However, with regard to the criminal courts the apparent lack of any use of this format 
in front of a jury mean that there is no ‘ready-made’ pre-existing model which could be 
considered. Practice Note No2 in Victoria stipulates that it is for the parties to agree 
 
454 KEG Williams and MJ Saks ‘Why Don’t the Gatekeepers Guard the Gates? Comments 
prompted by Edmond (2015)’ (2015) 36 Adelaide Law Review 109 
455 R v H [2014] EWCA Crim 1555 [44] 
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the procedure in advance, but again no case law could be located wherein a trial 
before a jury had occurred. It is perhaps, however, worth revisiting the use made of 
the technique in Rayney. As noted previously, only two of the 10 expert witnesses gave 
evidence concurrently. This is a much smaller, and thus potentially more palatable, 
step in both making overlapping areas of expertise more accessible to a jury, and also 
in streamlining and thus potentially making the trial process more efficient.  
 
There currently seems to be little appetite for the notion of judge-only trials in this 
jurisdiction, but it is important to note that a former Master of the Rolls is not averse 
to the idea in the case of complex fraud, and legislatively Parliament has not shied 
away from the notion in extremis. These extreme positions are ‘obvious’ with the 
reaction to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, and corruption in the TCI, demanding 
action. It is also worth noting that the use of the jury in civil cases has changed 
radically over time. Until 1854, all civil cases were tried with a jury,457 there are now 
only a very limited range of civil cases tried by jury. Although the rationale for the jury 
in civil cases was historically different to the rationale in criminal cases, the point to be 
made is that change can and has occurred. Despite such changes having occurred it 
seems the notion of the jury-free trial for cases heavily reliant on expert evidence 
remains a remote prospect. 
 
However, given that Australia has been utilising this approach for some years with, it 
appears, no ill effects on the administration of justice as the judge-only trial 
constitutes only a small portion of cases, it does beg the question of whether the 
trenchant rejection of the judge alone trial is a manifestation of dogma rather than a 
rational and reasoned consideration of the notion? 
 
 
457 The Common Law Procedure Act 1854 made jury trial optional for Civil Cases in the Royal 
Courts at Westminster. For a useful examination of the decline of the Jury in Civil cases see C 
Hanly ‘The Decline of the Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century England’(2005) 26 Journal of 
Legal History 253 
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Judicial reasoning can be seen to evolve in response to external factors, consider for 
example the strongly paternalistic judgment in the civil case Sidaway458 in 1985 and 30 
years later the ringing endorsement of patient autonomy in Montgomery459 in 2015. 
Such a move is reflecting wider changes in society, if we consider the objective of the 
Law Commission is to ‘ensure the law is as fair, modern, simple and as cost effective as 
possible’460 and the comments made by McClellan CJ, it seems clear that the pressure 
to deliver justice on an ever tighter budget will continue and just possibly rigorous 
policing of the CrimPR and elements of concurrent evidence may enable the courts to 
do precisely that. 
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15/07/18 
147 
 
Chapter 6: Is the Turner Principle Fit for Purpose? A Case Study of 
Eyewitness and Earwitness Evidence 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Up to this point, this thesis has focussed on and analysed the management and 
possible approaches to expert evidence by the courts. However, expert evidence does 
not exist in a vacuum, appearing only within the trial; it can also be used to inform 
other stages within the criminal justice system. The case studies in this chapter 
consider the use of expert evidence as part of the whole system through the medium 
of eyewitness and earwitness (voice identification) evidence. 
 
There are fundamental differences in the way in which the courts utilise expert 
evidence with regard to these two forms of evidence and in this chapter consideration 
will be given to both the underpinning scientific evidence and case law. Consideration 
will also be given to the wider systemic issues wherein expert evidence is utilised pre-
trial to ensure that identification which does come before the courts is reliable, before 
suggesting possible changes which would better enable the jury to reach a rational 
decision and, hopefully, the truth. 
 
As previously noted, the Law Commission consultation was narrowly focussed on the 
issue of reliability of proffered expert testimony, and excluded the other elements 
from Bonython relating to competence, the restatement of the Turner test and 
impartiality, noting that they were ‘relatively uncontroversial,’461 while acknowledging 
that they may give rise to occasional problems in application. 
 
The Turner principle was outlined in Chapter 3, but requires closer examination in the 
context of this chapter. To re-iterate, Turner states that expert opinion is only 
admissible if it: 
 
 
461 Law Commission, A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability – a 
Consultation. (Consultation paper No 190, 2009),1.8 
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… is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or 
jury If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their own 
conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary. 
In such a case, if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon, it may make 
judgment more difficult.462  
  
Lawton LJ further held that:  
 
Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are 
not suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses 
and strains of life.463 
 
There has been considerable academic commentary regarding the perceived 
difficulties with this seemly straightforward assertion. Muzaffar highlights the difficulty 
raised by such an assertion, noting that the idea of a clear-cut distinction between 
mental illness and normality does not fit with the current understanding of mental 
illness,464 further noting the difficulty of bringing together the differing approaches 
and philosophies of law and psychiatry.465 Coleman and Mackay argued that expert 
help was sometimes needed by jurors to better enable them to understand what is 
normal and abnormal conduct,466 having previously noted that ‘the assumption of a 
clear dividing line between normality and abnormality is misconceived’.467 Redmayne 
argues that the rule ‘does not encourage careful analysis of expert evidence, and can 
 
462 R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 841 
463 ibid 842 
464 S Muzaffar ‘Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Courts: the Need for Better Understanding’ 
(2011) 51 Medicine, Science and the Law 141, 142 
465 ibid 145 
466 AM Coleman and R D Mackay ‘Equivocal Rulings on Expert Psychological and Psychiatric 
Evidence: Turning a Muddle into a Nonsense’ (February 1996) Criminal Law Review 88  
467 R D Mackay and AM Coleman ‘Excluding Expert Evidence: a Tale of Ordinary Folk and 
Common Experience’ (November 1991) Criminal Law Review 800, 805 
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lead to bad decisions.’468 Commenting recently, Hallett notes that ‘there is ambiguity 
about what is within the common experience and understanding of a jury’.469  
 
It will be argued that this ambiguity is, in the case of eyewitness and earwitness 
identification evidence, adversely impacting the ability of jurors to rationally assess 
such evidence, leading, in some cases, to miscarriages of justice.  
 
While acknowledging the concerns about ambiguity, it needs to be noted that the 
courts have shown flexibility in their application of Turner in respect of a number of 
issues. In R v Ward,470 when considering the reliability of the appellant’s confession 
evidence, the Court of Appeal rejected any requirement of a recognised mental health 
diagnosis, stating: 
 
… we conclude on the authorities as they now stand that the expert 
evidence of a psychiatrist or a psychologist may properly be admitted if 
it is to the effect that a defendant is suffering from a condition not 
properly described as mental illness, but from a personality disorder so 
severe as properly to be categorised as mental disorder …’471  
 
In R v O’Brien,472 the courts clarified and set limits on the statement from Ward as to 
when expert evidence relating to the potential unreliability of confession evidence was 
acceptable: 
 
…the abnormal disorder must not only be of the type which might 
render a confession or evidence unreliable, there must also be a very 
significant deviation from the norm shown.473 
 
 
468 M Redmayne Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2001), 196 
469 N Hallett ‘Psychiatric Evidence in Diminished Responsibility’ (2018) 82 Journal of Criminal 
Law 442, 443  
470 R v Ward (1993) 96 Cr App R 1 
471 ibid 66 
472 R v O’Brien [2000] Crim LR 676; [2000] 1 WLUK 529 CA  
473 Full judgment contains no paragraph or page numbers 
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The courts have thus moved from the position that expert evidence as to abnormal 
psychological conditions is admissible only if there is a recognised mental illness, to 
one in which the boundary between normal and abnormal psychology is blurred, the 
important thing being that it must still be something outside the ordinary knowledge 
of experience of the average juror. 
 
6.1 Eyewitness Identification Evidence 
6.1.1 Expert evidence and eyewitness testimony in the courts 
 
Mistaken eyewitness identifications contributed to approximately 71% of 
the more than 360 wrongful convictions in the United States overturned 
by post-conviction DNA evidence.474 
 
The figure above from the Innocence Project gives some idea of the potential concerns 
and level of mistaken eyewitness identification evidence. Although these figures apply 
to the US, there is equally clear evidence that this is a concern in this jurisdiction. 
 
One of the most notorious miscarriages of justice relating to eyewitness testimony 
occurred more than 100 years ago, and led directly to the formation of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal. Adolf Beck was convicted once and almost convicted a second time 
on the basis of eyewitness identification evidence, with at least 15 individuals, under 
oath, attesting to the fact that Beck was the person who robbed them.475 The impact 
of this case was such that it is still on occasion cited by the courts as a cautionary story 
of the potential impact of identification evidence.476 
 
The power of confident eyewitness identification evidence cannot be under-estimated. 
The US Supreme Court powerfully acknowledged this point noting: 
 
474 Innocence Project, ‘Eyewitness Identification Reform’ (nd) 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/eyewitness-identification-reform/ accessed 09/08/19 
475 B Cathcart ‘The Strange Case of Adolf Beck’ The Independent (17/04/04) 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-strange-case-of-adolf-beck-535209.html 
accessed 23/02/19 
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151 
 
 
…there is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who 
takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the 
one!’477 
 
However, despite the frequency of its use, there is evidence that it can be erroneous. 
Sadly, Mr Beck’s case was far from the last where eyewitness identification evidence 
has been found to be incorrect. As far back as 1972 the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee considering the issue of mistaken eyewitness identifications and noted that 
it was ‘…by far the greatest cause of actual or possible wrong convictions. Several 
cases have occurred in recent years,…when a person has been charged or convicted on 
what has later been shown beyond doubt to have been mistaken identification.’478 
More recently, Gross et al. reported that mistaken eyewitness testimony was the most 
common cause of wrongful conviction and imprisonment in the US.479 
 
An important early attempt to address issues of misidentification was the Devlin 
Committee480 which was set up in 1974 to review ‘all aspects of the law and procedure 
relating to evidence of identification in criminal cases’481 following a number of 
wrongful convictions. 
 
In addition to recommendations around the standardisation of identification 
parades,482 and welcoming the additional focus placed on identification evidence in 
the judges’ summing up,483 the committee made this, arguably radical for the time, 
recommendation: 
 
477 Watkins v Sowders, 449 US 341 (1981) at 352 
478 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report: Evidence (General), Cmnd 4991 (HMSO 
London, 1972), 196 
479 SR Gross, K Jacoby, DJ Matheson and N Montgomery ‘Exonerations in the United States 
1989 through 2003’ (2005) 95 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 523, 542 
480 House of Commons  Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the 
Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (Devlin Committee), 
Cmnd 338 (HMSO London, 1976) 
481 ibid Terms of Reference p. vii 
482 ibid 8.13 
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Research should be directed to establishing ways in which the insights 
of psychology can be brought to bear on the conduct of identification 
parades and the practice of the courts. In particular, research should 
proceed as rapidly as possible into the practicability of voice 
identification parades with the use of tape recorders or any appropriate 
aids.484 
 
The use of psychological research in support of safe and effective identification 
evidence is a theme to which we shall return shortly. 
 
It is important to both note and acknowledge that incorrect eyewitness identification 
evidence is most often the result of a genuine mistake on the part of the witness, only 
rarely is the misidentification malicious. The eyewitness is giving honestly held 
testimony in the belief that they are correctly identifying the individual and thus 
supporting the delivery of justice. Given that incorrect eyewitness identification 
evidence does frequently still come before the courts, could expert testimony aid the 
jury in exposing or understanding it? 
The leading case in English law is R v Turnbull485 in which a five-judge Court of Appeal 
gave particular attention to assessing the quality of the identification. The court said: 
In our judgement when the quality is good as for example when the 
identification is made after a long period of observation, or in satisfactory 
conditions by a relative, a neighbour, a close friend, a workmate and the 
like, the Jury can safely be left to assess the value of the identifying 
evidence even though there is no other evidence to support it.486 
However, the court went on to consider the situation with regard to cases were the 
evidence is of poorer quality: 
 
484 ibid 8.1 
485 R v Turnbull [1977] QB 244 
486 ibid 138 
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When, …, the quality of the identifying evidence is poor, as for example 
when it depends solely on a fleeting glance or on a longer observation 
made in difficult conditions, the situation is very different. The judge 
should then withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal 
unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of 
the identification.487  
 
The Turnbull guidelines as set out by the Court of Appeal, and as subsequently set out 
in published guidance produced for the judiciary,488 can be viewed as an example of 
group character evidence,489 with the evidence being presented through judicial 
instruction rather than being given by an expert witness. Turnbull is guidance that 
judges must give to any jury in a case where the case rests largely or exclusively on 
eyewitness (and earwitness) testimony. The adequacy or otherwise of the Turnbull 
guideline in this respect will be considered in section 6.4 of this thesis. 
 
While the Turnbull guidelines offer some ‘expert guidance’ via the group character 
principle, the admissibility of expert evidence per se with regard to eyewitness 
testimony has not yet been considered in this jurisdiction. However, the Scottish 
Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary considered the issue in Gage v HM 
Advocate,490 Roberts491 believes that the conclusions from that ruling may give an 
indication of how such evidence would be addressed within this jurisdiction. 
 
The appellant sought to introduce new evidence at appeal from a professor of 
psychology attesting as to the factors that would make the eyewitness identification 
 
487 ibid 139; for a recent example of a weak visual ID saved by strong supporting evidence, see 
R v Gray [2018] EWCA Crim 2083 
488Judicial College Crown Court Compendium Part 1 2019 at 15.1 
489 RP Mosteller ‘Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law’(1996) 46 Duke 
Law Journal 461 
490 Gage v HM Advocate [2011] HCAJC 40 
491 A Roberts ‘Case Comment – Expert evidence on the reliability of eyewitness identification – 
some observations on the justifications for exclusion: Gage v HM Advocate’ (2012) 16 
International journal of Evidence and Proof 93 
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evidence which was central to the original conviction unreliable. The court declined to 
admit the evidence on three grounds: 
 
1. That expert evidence is not admissible unless it was necessary for the jury 
to reach a sound conclusion without it;492  
2. That the reliability and credibility of the witnesses’ evidence was a matter 
for the jury and that the court has sufficient safeguards to enable the jury 
to reach a just decision;493 
3. That admitting such evidence could lead to rebuttal expert evidence and 
thus lengthen trials, this issue could also extend to trials under summary 
procedures.494 
 
Taking the points in turn, the court rejected the appellant’s argument that the 
proposed expert evidence should be admitted because it would be useful to the jury, 
citing the authority of Turner495 and Raghip496 that expert evidence is only admissible 
‘if it is necessary for the proper resolution of the dispute’.497 The court drew a clear 
distinction between mere usefulness and necessity, citing Lawton LJ that ‘if on the 
proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the 
opinion of an expert is unnecessary.’498  
 
It is worth at this point exploring in more detail where the threshold between ‘helpful’ 
and ‘necessary’ lies. Returning to LC325, the proposed codification of the Turner test 
notes that expert evidence is likely to be admissible if it is likely to be ‘outside the 
judge’s or jury’s experience or knowledge and would give them help in arriving at their 
conclusions.’499 It seems the key point to note is that this proposed codification makes 
no reference to the principle of necessity, and even in their everyday use helpfulness 
 
492Gage v HM Advocate [2011] HCAJC 40 [22] 
493 ibid [28] 
494 ibid [32]- [33] 
495 R v Turner [1975] QB 834 
496 R v Raghip The Times 9 Dec 1991 
497 Gage v HM Advocate [2011] HCAJC 40 [22] 
498 R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 841 
499 Draft Criminal Evidence (Experts) Bill 1(1)(a) 
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and necessity are two very different beasts. The notion of helpfulness was previously 
explored in the Canadian case R v Mohan,500 wherein the Canadian Supreme Court 
held that helpfulness was too low for the threshold of admissibility, and like Gage held 
that necessity was the appropriate threshold, but with Sopinka J noting ‘I would not 
judge necessity by too strict a standard.’501 As such it seems fair to say that there is 
some dispute as to the appropriate threshold and the question as to whether or not a 
jury can form their conclusion without expert help is a point to which we shall return 
shortly. 
 
With regard to the second point, in 1976 Lord Devlin acknowledged the limitations of 
this approach: 
 
The problem peculiar to identification is that the value of the evidence…is 
exceptionally difficult to assess. The weapon of cross-examination is 
blunted. A witness says he recognises the man, and that is that or almost 
that. There is no story to be dissected, just a simple assertion to be 
accepted or rejected. If a witness thinks that he has a good memory for 
faces when in fact he has a poor one, there is no way of detecting the 
failing.502  
 
One could question some elements of this statement in that, potentially, the witness 
having poor eyesight or being a long distance away is part of the story to be dissected, 
and such considerations are built into the current Turnbull direction.503 The safeguards 
built in by Turnbull would, it may be argued, address these points as they have the 
effect that a jury may be invited to convict on the basis of either: 
 
• Apparently good/strong identification evidence, or 
 
500 R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9 
501 ibid 23 
502 House of Commons  Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the 
Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (Devlin Committee), 
Cmnd 338 (HMSO London, 1976) at 1.24 
503 Judicial College Crown Court Compendium part 1  (July 2019) 15-1 to 15-3 
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• Weaker or fleeting identification evidence that is supported by other 
incriminating evidence. 
 
But the judge must withdraw the case from the jury if the identification evidence is 
weak and there is little/no other supporting incriminating evidence.504 
 
From this, it is arguable that a possible role for expert evidence would be to indicate 
the strength or otherwise of the identification evidence, noting the potential difficulty 
of marshalling such evidence, while ensuring it stops short of telling the court if the 
eyewitness should be believed or not. Whether that could be achieved via a modified 
Turnbull direction, or whether it requires expert testimony on a case-by-case basis, is 
something that will be considered shortly. 
 
The judgment in Gage notes that to ensure that the jury place the evidence in the 
correct context and attribute appropriate weight, a judicial direction as to the 
eyewitness testimony will give ‘the jury a specific and thorough direction that warns 
them that in certain circumstances such evidence may be unreliable and… specific 
considerations that might … affect the reliability of an identification made by an 
eyewitness.’505 The court further expressed concern that the presence of expert 
testimony could be such that the probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect. Roberts506 takes the view that the availability of such safeguards are ‘a far from 
compelling justification for the exclusion of expert evidence’ while acknowledging the 
concern with regard to the probative value. 
 
Finally the third, and possibly most straightforward point, which echoes that in 
England. Approximately 95% of cases are disposed of via sheriff or justice alone courts; 
as such this concern is, as the court acknowledges, essentially practical and arguably a 
reflection of public policy with regards to ensuring that the court system continues to 
 
504 R v Turnbull [1977] QB 244 
505 Gage v HM Advocate [2011] HCAJC 40 [29] 
506 A Roberts ‘Case Comment - Expert evidence on the reliability of eyewitness identification – 
some observations on the justifications for exclusion: Gage v HM Advocate’ (2012) 16 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 93 
157 
 
function and that additional strains and expense are not incurred. Similar concerns 
have been raised in respect of polygraph evidence in some jurisdictions, this will be 
examined in some detail in the next chapter. 
 
Although the exception, there are examples of common law jurisdictions admitting 
expert testimony with regard to eyewitness identification. Roberts507 examines the 
Australian case R v Forbes508 in which a single judge hearing the case without a jury 
admitted the evidence of an expert psychologist specialising in visual face recognition, 
the expert did not give evidence as to the specific identification, but rather as to the 
factors influencing the accuracy of identification evidence in general. Gray J noted that 
he found this evidence helpful.509 Part of the evidence related to the research 
concerning the ‘forgetting curve’ highlighting the fact that most forgetting happens 
soon after the event, and then memory loss slows down.510  
 
As with English courts, the Australian courts are required to advise the jury of factors 
which can make eyewitness identification evidence unreliable, with the Evidence Act 
s165(2) noting that: 
 
If there is a jury and a party so requests, the judge is to: 
(a) warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable; and 
(b) inform the jury of matters that may cause it to be unreliable; and 
(c) warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept 
the evidence and the weight to be given to it. 511 
 
It is important to note the difference here between eyewitness visual identification 
and facial mapping. Facial mapping, whereby measurements of the distance between 
key features on the face are taken from CCTV or security camera footage and 
 
507 A Roberts ‘Case Comment Eyewitness identification and expert insight: R v Forbes’ (2010) 
14 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 57 
508 R v Forbes [2009] ACTSC 1 (Sup Ct (ACT)(Full Ct)) 
509 ibid [35] 
510 ibid [45] 
511 Evidence Act (1995) is a Federal Act, but the majority of States have equivalent legislation 
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compared with those of the defendant’s photograph taken at the time of arrest, has 
been adduced on numerous occasions. 512 Hodgkinson and James note that this 
technique ‘amounts to a more sophisticated attempt to do what an ordinary eye-
witness does when making a visual identification’. 513  Arguably, it also has the 
advantage of invariably having actual images of the offender to compare with the 
accused. 
 
6.1.2 What does the Research Indicate? 
Returning to the previously noted Devlin Report, consideration was given to the then 
current research regarding the psychology of memory and recall514 and the report 
noted that this highlighted the ‘general inadequacy of the average man’s powers of 
memory.’ 515 The topic of eyewitness identification and factors which impact its 
accuracy are, according to Redmayne writing in 2001, one of the most researched 
psycho-legal topics with more than 2,000 relevant books and articles at that time.516 
 
It is helpful at this point to briefly consider how memory works. Memory is not akin to 
a recording whereby the recording is made and (barring the destruction of the 
tape/disc) remains fixed and immutable. Memory, on the contrary, is reconstructive, 
and the reconstructed memory is based on the stored remnants of the original 
experience with schema-driven information making that memory coherent.517 Current 
theory also asserts that memory is malleable, so each time a memory is reconstructed, 
it changes.518 This is not about deception on the part of the individual doing the 
 
512 Attorney General’s Ref No.2 of 2002 [2003] 1 Cr App R 21; R v Clarke (1995) 2 Cr App R 425; 
R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260; R v Hookway [1999] Crim LR 750 
513 T Hodgkinson and M James (2015) Expert Evidence: Law and Practice (Fourth Edition Sweet 
and Maxwell 2015), 17-008 
514 It should be noted that issues of memory and recall impact all forms of evidence, not just 
issues of identification 
515515 House of Commons Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the 
Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (Devlin Committee), 
Cmnd 338 (HMSO London, 1976) at 4.12 
516 M Redmayne Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2001), 187 
517 Schema in this context is the cognitive framework through which an individual makes sense 
of the world and new information 
518ML Howe, LM Knott and MA Conway Memory and Miscarriages of Justice (Routledge Oxon 
2018), 1 and 63-64 
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remembering, this is biological and chemical processes, which are still not fully 
understood, at work. 
 
While this is the current science of memory, the understanding of the public, and thus 
potential jurors, is substantially different. Simons and Chabris 519 surveyed 1,500 
members of the public with regard to aspects of memory. Some 47% of the sample 
agreed that a memory, once formed, did not change, but of 89 memory experts asked 
the same question, none agreed with the statement. 
 
Other examples of naive beliefs about accuracy of memory which present a challenge 
to the courts is the inaccurate perception that detailed accounts are more believable 
that less detailed ones. Howe et al. cite research which indicates that this perception is 
held by both laypeople520 and legal professionals,521 further noting that false not true 
memories are the ones that tend to have the richest detail.522 
 
Desmarais and Read523 undertook a meta-analysis of 23 surveys regarding the level of 
knowledge of the general public about elements that may affect the reliability of 
eyewitness evidence. The authors took as the base for their analysis the work of 
Kassein et al. 524 wherein 16 distinct areas of knowledge relating to eyewitness 
evidence had been identified as being sufficiently reliable to present in court by a 
 
519  DJ Simons and CF Chabris ‘What People Believe About How Memory Works: A 
Representative Survey of the U.S. Population’ (2011) PLos ONE 6(8), e22757 
520 S Magnussen, RA Wise, AQ Raja, MA Safer, N Pawlenko and U Stridbeck ‘What Judges Know 
About Eyewitness Testimony: A Comparison of Norwegian and US judges’ (2008) 14 
Psychology, Crime and Law 177 
521 RA Wise and MA Safer ‘What US Judges Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony’ 
(2004) 18 Applied Cognitive Psychology 427 
522 ML Howe, LM Knott and MA Conway Memory and Miscarriages of Justice (Routledge Oxon 
2018), 40 
523 SL Desmarais and JD Read ‘After 30 Years, What Do We Know About What Jurors Know? A 
Meta-Analytic Review of Lay knowledge Regarding Eyewitness Factors’ (2011) 35 Law and 
Human Behavior 200. It should be noted of the 23 surveys 3 were undertaken in the UK, 11 in 
the USA, 7 in Canada and 2 in Australia 
524 SM Kassein, VA Tubb, HM Harmon and A Memon ‘On the ‘General Acceptance’ of 
Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New Survey of the Experts’ (2001) 56 American Psychologist 
405. The 16 topics and the statements against which the judgment of reliability was made is 
given in Table 1. 
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group of 64 psychologists. In this study the definition for ‘sufficiently reliable’ was that 
at least 80% of the 64 psychologists were in agreement with the given statement.  
 
The results were further divided into system and estimators variables, defined as: 
• System variables are those elements which are within the control of the 
criminal justice system, for example how the questions are worded;  
• Estimator variables are those elements over which the criminal justice system 
has no control, for example how long the witness actually observed the 
individual at the time they saw them. 
 
The meta-analysis, while utilising the 16 statements, was not looking for consensus 
among experts, but was determining the extent to which expert opinion and the 
opinion of laypeople, and thus potential jurors, was in accordance. The results are 
given in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
 Area of 
knowledge 
Statement upon which at least 80% of 
experts are in agreement 
Percentage of Lay 
respondents in 
agreement with 
statement 
Overall percentage agreement with expert opinion for system variables  71% 
1 Wording of 
questions 
An eyewitness’ testimony about an event 
can be affected by how the questions put 
to that witness are worded. 
87% 
2 Confidence 
malleability 
An eyewitness’ confidence can be 
influenced by factors that are unrelated to 
identification accuracy. 
81% 
3 Line-up 
instructions 
Police instructions can affect an 
eyewitness’ willingness to make an 
identification. 
75% 
4 Mugshot–
induced bias 
Exposure to mugshots of a suspect 
increases the likelihood that the witness 
will later choose that suspect in a line up. 
65% 
5 Presentation 
format 
Witnesses are more likely to misidentify 
someone by making a relative judgment 
when presented with a simultaneous (as 
opposed to sequential) line-up. 
49% 
Overall percentage agreement with expert opinion for estimator variables 67% 
6 Alcoholic 
intoxication 
Alcoholic intoxication impairs an 
eyewitness’ later ability to recall persons 
and events.   
92% 
7 Attitudes and 
expectations 
An eyewitness’ perception and memory for 
an event may be affected by his or her 
attitudes and expectations. 
88% 
8 Child 
suggestibility 
Young children are more vulnerable than 
adults to interviewer suggestion, peer 
pressure, and other social influences. 
75% 
9 Post-event 
information 
Eyewitness testimony about an event often 
reflects not only what they saw but the 
information they obtain later. 
74% 
10 Unconscious 
transference 
Eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a 
culprit someone they have seen in another 
situation or context. 
69% 
11 Exposure time The less time an eyewitness has to observe 
an event, the less well he or she will 
remember it. 
65% 
12 Forgetting curve The rate of memory loss for an event is 
greatest right after the event and levels off 
over time. 
61% 
13 Cross race bias Eyewitnesses are more accurate when 
identifying members of their own race than 
members of other races. 
57% 
14 Hypnotic 
suggestibility 
Hypnosis increases the suggestibility to 
leading or misleading questions. 
53% 
15 Weapon focus The presence of a weapon impairs the 
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. 
52% 
16 Accuracy 
confidence 
An eyewitness’ confidence is not a good 
predictor of his or her identification 
accuracy. 
51% 
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Considering the issue of admissibility, Desmaris and Read ask the question which of 
the topics are ‘beyond the ken’ of potential jurors? If the level of concordance being 
sought is, as per Kassein et al. 80%, then there are only 4 of the 16 topics where the 
potential jurors and the experts are in agreement, (No. 1, 2, 6 and 7 in table 1) which it 
could be argued supports the notion that expert evidence in relation to the other 12 
should not be rejected out of hand.  
 
Perhaps more concerning are those elements where the potential jurors showed a 
wide disparity with expert opinion, such that agreement was around 50%, then there 
are still five topics where the meta-analysis indicates that the study subjects had poor 
understanding of those elements. These were weapon focus (52%) accuracy–
confidence (51%), hypnotic suggestibility (53%), confidence malleability (51%), and 
presentation format (49%). 
 
More recently Houston et al.525 explored this issue further in two recent studies with 
Scottish jurors and judges. This research is different in that it assesses the knowledge 
of both judges and potential jurors from the same population. In the first study, 99 
judges participated and the finding was that the highest level of consistency with 
expert opinion related to alcoholic intoxication of the witness at the time of the crime 
(97%) and post-event information (91%); the lowest correlation with expert opinion 
was in exposure duration,526 weapon focus, and mugshot bias with less than 50% 
consistency.  
 
In the second study, 192 members of the public (potential jurors) demonstrated 61% 
consistency with expert opinion. This figure is well below the overall 67% reported by 
 
525 KA Houston, L Hope, A Memon and DJ Read ‘Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Evidence: In 
Search of Common Sense’ (2013) 31 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 637. The two studies are 
considered within this single paper. 
526 Exposure time – the less time an eyewitness has to observe an event the less well he or she 
will remember it; Weapon focus – The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitnesses ability to 
accurately identify the perpetrators face; Mugshot bias – exposure to mugshots of a suspect 
increases the likelihood that the witness will later choose that suspect in a lineup –definition 
from S Kassin, VA Tubb, HM Hosch and A Memon (2001) ‘On the “General Acceptance” of 
Eyewitness Testimony Research’ (2001) 56 American Psychologist 405, 408 
163 
 
the Demarais and Read study noted previously. It is important to note that this survey 
generated responses in two formats; the first was the use of multi-choice questions 
(MCQ), the second was the use of response generation (RG) questionnaires. In the 
latter the respondent generates their own response rather than selecting from a pre-
populated list as with MCQ. There are distinct differences in the responses between 
the two formats. For judges, the highest level of correlation with the expert opinion 
was in relation to alcohol intoxication, with 91.7% of MCQ responses consistent with 
the expert opinion while 68.8% of RG responses were consistent. With the MCQ group, 
3 of the 11 measured criterion fell below 50% consistency with the expert opinion, and 
for the RG group 5 of the 11 criterion were below 50%. The authors conclude that 
there may be a place in the legal system for researchers to present scientific findings 
to the courts in order to assist with the training of the judiciary, and also to present 
this evidence to the jury. 
 
A recent study looking at the understanding of police, memory experts, and members 
of the public527 replicated many of the findings of the earlier studies and classified the 
results by identifying two memory belief systems. The system held predominately by 
the general public and the police (non-experts) was designated the common sense 
memory belief system (CSMBS) and the other, the scientific memory system (SMS) was 
held predominately by the memory experts. 
 
Mirroring earlier findings, the researchers concluded that beliefs that made up the 
CSMBS where contradicted by the SMS, therefore raising the possibility that because 
of the faulty beliefs there could be major errors when it came to assessing memory 
evidence. 
 
As with any research, further research is always possible, however juries in criminal 
trials are generally required to reach their verdict ‘beyond reasonable doubt’,528 and 
 
527 S Akhtar, LV Justice, L Knott, F Kibowski and MA Conway ‘The ‘Common Sense’ Memory 
Belief System and its Implications’ (2018) 22 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 289 
528 Exceptions would include cases where ‘Not guilty by reason of insanity’ is argued where it is 
for the defence to prove and the proof is on the balance of probabilities 
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yet current research demonstrates that in a number of categories there is a wide 
disparity with expert opinion. How is it then possible to argue that conclusions as to 
the reliability of the evidence and thus the finding of guilt or otherwise is based on a 
sound understanding of the evidence? This concern here is raised in respect of 
eyewitness testimony, but it is argued that the same concerns exist in relation to other 
forms of evidence.  
 
Interestingly, the issue of the state of psychological research relating to eyewitness 
identification was explored in depth by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the case 
State v Henderson.529 The court appointed a special master who presided over an 
evaluation of the scientific and other evidence relating to eyewitness identification, 
considering hundreds of studies and testimony from seven experts. Commenting on the 
report generated the court noted that: 
 
We are convinced from the scientific evidence in the record that memory 
is malleable, and that an array of variables can affect and dilute memory 
and lead to misidentifications. These factors include system variables like 
line-up procedures, which are within the control of the criminal justice 
system, and estimator variables like the lighting conditions or the 
presence of a weapon, over which the legal system has no control… we 
conclude that the current standard for assessing eyewitness 
identification evidence does not fully meet its goals…It also over states 
the jury’s inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by eyewitnesses 
who honestly believe their testimony is accurate.530 
 
A number of recommendations came out in this report the majority of which were 
adopted by the New Jersey courts. This included revision to the model jury charge, the 
equivalent of the Turnbull direction, which will be considered shortly. 
 
 
 
529 State v Henderson 27 A3d 872 (NJ 2011) 
530 ibid 878 
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6.1.3 Can a Case be made for the Admission of Expert Evidence as to Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence? 
As noted in Chapter 4, the Law Commission in its review took the decision that the 
Turner principle did not require review, and chose to focus on ensuring the reliability of 
expert evidence to be presented to the courts. As such, while the research into the 
reliability of eyewitness identification appears likely to meet the requirements of the 
reliability test set out in the CrimPR, the authority of Gage is that the evidence fails on 
the basis of the Turner principle, in that it is deemed not be a necessity. 
 
The range of studies considered here, and the fact that flawed eyewitness identification 
is the most common form of miscarriage of justice, make it seems a little disingenuous 
to argue that, as per Turner, expert testimony in respect of the research underpinning 
eyewitness testimony cannot be regarded as necessary, rather than merely useful and 
therefore inadmissible as per Gage. The issue of the divergence between the ‘common 
sense’ understanding of the evidence and the ‘scientific’ understanding of the evidence 
may mean that not only do the jury not have a full understanding of the relevant 
factors, they do not even realise they may have possibly gaping lacunae in their 
knowledge. 
 
In the case of expert testimony, the expert evidence would not be used to challenge 
the credibility of the witness; as such there is arguably no concern that the expert 
would be replacing the jury as the ‘lie detector’. Rather, by highlighting the research 
into this subject the expert would be providing the information the jury requires to fully 
weigh the evidence that has been presented. It is important to recall that eyewitness 
testimony can, in some cases, be the only evidence that comes before the courts and 
noting that the weight of such evidence can be pivotal in a case. That being so – and 
acknowledging that in a number of critical areas there is wide disparity between what 
the research indicates to be the truth, and what members of the public accept as being 
the case – how can the argument be supported that expert evidence to highlight these 
disparities, and thus allow the jury to reach a reasoned verdict, is merely useful rather 
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than a necessity? Of course, such a change could then open the way to other concerns 
such as not slipping into oath helping. 
 
The possibility of utilising the expert evidence to improve the utility of the Turnbull 
direction will be considered shortly. 
 
6.2 Earwitness Identification Evidence 
Voice identification or earwitness evidence is utilised less often than eyewitness 
testimony, however the effect of incorrect identification is no less damaging. Sherrin531 
identified 17 individuals in the US who were wrongly convicted, based at least in part 
on incorrect voice identification evidence, noting that in five of these cases the voice 
identification was central to the case. In this jurisdiction, Smith and Braber identify two 
cases where convictions were quashed in which voice identification played a role. 532  
 
6.2.1 Forms of Earwitness Identification Evidence – Lay and Expert Evidence 
Voice identification testimony can come before the courts in either the form of lay 
witness identification, which may or may not have supporting expert testimony, or in 
the form of expert evidence. As such it is immediately apparent that there are 
differences in the treatment of eye and earwitness evidence, in that it must be 
assumed that earwitness evidence can and does meet the Turner threshold to permit 
the admission of expert evidence. The question which must then logically follow is, 
does this difference in the treatment of the two forms of identification evidence 
support the process of truth seeking? 
 
The rationale underpinning this ‘mixed economy’ was set out in R v Hersey in 1998 
wherein the Court of Appeal said: 
 
 
531 C Sherrin ‘Earwitness Evidence: The Reliability of Voice Identifications’ (2015) 52 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 819 
532 H Smith and N Braber ‘Improving the accuracy and reliability of earwitness evidence’ (2018) 
http://www.empac.org.uk/improving-accuracy-reliability-earwitness-evidence/ accessed 
18/03/19. Listed cases are R v R (2000) Crim LR 183 (written as Robert (2000) on the EMPAC 
website) and R v Nealon [2014] EWCA Crim 574 in both cases, from the case reporting the role 
of voice identification appears to have been relatively minor. 
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As a matter of generality, in cases of voice identification there will 
undoubtedly be cases calling for the assistance of an expert and others in 
which the issues are within the competence of the jury. It was important 
there should not be a proliferation of expert evidence … it was in each 
case for the judge to decide if the issue was one on which the jury could 
be assisted by an expert.533 
The lay testimony can be either jury identification whereby the jury are asked to 
compare a recording of the probable offender with the voice of the accused individual, 
or it may be a witness who heard/overheard the alleged offender’s voice and has been 
asked to pick this out in a voice line-up. 
 
Expert evidence relating to eyewitness identification evidence as has been 
demonstrated is generally inadmissible on the basis of the Turner test.534 The situation 
with regard to voice identification/earwitness identification evidence is substantially 
different, in that the case law clearly shows that expert evidence regarding voice 
identification evidence has been successfully adduced for a number of years.  
 
Thus, while expert testimony with regard to voice identification is admissible, it is not 
always adduced in the cases of either jury voice identification, or in the case of 
laywitness voice identification testimony. This section will argue firstly that the failure 
to access expert testimony in respect of laywitness voice identification may inhibit the 
ability of the jury to reach a rational decision. The argument will then be made that the 
approach with regard to expert testimony taken within this jurisdiction is irrational and 
does not support the truth seeking process. 
 
 
 
 
 
533 R v Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281 at 282 
534 It should be noted that such inadmissibility relates to direct eyewitness identification, 
expert testimony is admissible with regard to facial mapping. 
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6.2.1.1 What is the Evidence Regarding the Reliability of Lay Earwitness Testimony? 
As noted above, lay earwitness identification may take the form of either: 
A) the jury being asked to compare a voice with a recording and being asked to 
carry out a comparison, or; 
B) a laywitness giving testimony as to a voice or conversation they have heard and 
attributing that voice to a given individual 
 
Unfortunately, the author has been unable to locate a similar analysis of the research 
in relation to the factors and understanding of earwitness testimony to that set out in 
Table 1 at 6.1.2 with regard to eyewitness testimony. Nonetheless there is a 
considerable and evolving body of research relating to this area.  
 
Research indicates that auditory memory is generally inferior to visual memory,535 
McGorrery and McMahon536 note that the reason for this is unclear, although it is 
possibly because of the more complex nature of auditory information, or may be 
because of different neural pathways being involved in the process of auditory as 
against visual information. 
 
Sherrin provides an overview of some of the applicable psychological research 
regarding the accuracy of voice identification, noting that while the majority of studies 
indicate poor rates of accuracy with regard to correct identification, there are some 
which appear to indicate that under the correct conditions much higher levels of 
successful identification can be achieved with relatively low levels of false 
identifications, but that typically the levels of successful identification are between 35-
65% with false positive rates falling in a range between 20% and 40%.537  
 
 
535 MA Cohen, TS Horowitz and JM Wolfe ‘Auditory Recognition Memory is Inferior to Visual 
Recognition Memory’ (2009) 106 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 6008 
536 PG McGorrery and M McMahon ‘A Fair ‘Hearing’: Earwitness Identifications and Voice 
Identification Parades’ (2017) 21 The International Journal of Evidence and Proof 262 
537 C Sherrin ‘Earwitness Evidence: The Reliability of Voice Identifications’ (2015) 52 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 819, 823-827 
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As with eyewitness identification, the variables which can impact the accuracy of voice 
identification can be categorised as either system or estimator variables (defined at 
6.1.2). The list of factors which are identified as affecting voice comparison and 
recognition are, as might be expected, wide-ranging. There is a substantial body of 
research with regard to the factors which affect voice identification, and a full 
evaluation of the literature is beyond the remit of this thesis, consequently a review of 
the literature undertaken by Daniel Yarmey538 in 1995 forms the basis of this review, 
with some elements of more recent literature included where appropriate. The 
following are some of the key estimator variables, but this list should not be regarded 
as exhaustive, and it should also be noted that some research bridges a number of the 
variables. 
 
Estimator Variables 
Familiarity with the voice 
Yarmey,539 in reviewing the then current studies, indicated a somewhat mixed picture 
with a number of studies indicating that an individual who is well known to the witness 
is more likely to be successfully identified than someone with whom the witness is less 
familiar or unknown. More recently, Yarmey et al. 540  demonstrated correct 
identifications as high as 95% when the individual was highly familiar, but false positive 
identifications as high as 45% when the individual was not known to the witness. If one 
is considering putting such evidence before the courts, a false positive rate as high as 
that is, at best, seriously disturbing. 
 
Exposure time 
Cook and Wilding541 found that the length of the exposure to the target voice 
impacted recognition, with shorter exposures leading to lower levels of successful 
 
538 AD Yarmey ‘Earwitness Speaker Identification’ (1995) 1 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 
792 
539 ibid 796 
540 AD Yarmey, AL Yarmey, MJ Yarmey and L Parliament ‘Commonsense Beliefs and the 
Identification of Familiar Voices’ (2001) 15 Applied Cognitive Psychology 238 
541 S Cook and J Wilding ‘Earwitness Testimony: Never Mind the Variety, Hear the Length’ 
(1997) 11 Applied Cognitive Psychology 95  
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identification. This replicates the finding of Yarmey 542  in the earlier review of 
literature. If one then applies this to jury identification, there will have been a longer 
period of exposure, but also the risk of confirmation bias which will be considered 
shortly. 
 
Retention interval 
Yarmey notes that while there are a number of factors which affect retention, 
generally the research indicates that the longer the delay, the fewer identifications 
and the greater the possibility of false positives.543 More recently, looking at multiple 
elements, Kerstolt et al. 544 undertook a study looking at the effects of accent, 
telephone, and longer retention periods (3-8 weeks) on identification. This also 
returned relatively low levels of successful identification of the target voice. The target 
voice was not present in all of the voice line-ups, and while 24% of the participants 
correctly identified the target voice when it was present, 50% identified the target 
voice as being present when it was not. Thus, as per Yarmey, false identification was 
an issue. The study found that where the target voice had a strong accent unfamiliar to 
the listener, correct identification was reduced. Ability to identify the target voice 
remained relatively stable over the one-, three-, or eight-week period. 
 
Listener confidence/confidence accuracy 
Yarmey, 545  in reviewing 11 research papers pre-1995, noted that earwitness 
confidence is an unreliable indicator of earwitness identification accuracy. McGorrery 
and McMahon note that as with visual identification there is no strong relationship 
between confidence and accuracy. 546  Once again, this disconnect between the 
 
542 AD Yarmey ‘Earwitness Speaker Identification’ (1995) 1 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 
792, 804 
543 ibid 805 
544 J H Kerstholt, NJM Jansen, AG Van Amelsvoort and APA Broeders ‘Earwitnesses: Effects of 
Accent, Retention and Telephone’ (2006) 20 Applied Cognitive Psychology 187 
545AD Yarmey ‘Earwitness Speaker Identification’ (1995) 1 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 
792, 802 
546 PG McGorrery and M McMahon ‘A Fair ‘Hearing’: Earwitness Identifications and Voice 
Identification Parades’ (2017) 21 The International Journal of Evidence and Proof 262, 266 
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common sense understanding and the expert understanding must be cause for 
concern. 
 
Differences in voice 
One of the key differences between eye and earwitness identification is that a 
speaker’s voice can be more readily disguised than can physical appearance. An 
individual’s voice has a wide range of variation, they may be speaking more quickly/ 
slowly/loudly/softly. Orchard and Yarmey,547 writing in 1995, noted that voice disguise 
through whispering or via changes in tone between initial hearing and line-up 
influenced the accuracy of identification. They also found that the individuals within 
the test group overestimated the exposure duration to the voice, especially where the 
sample was short (30 seconds). 
 
Ӧhman et al.548 tested a group of children aged 11-13 (n=160) and adults (n=148) by 
exposing them to an unfamiliar voice for 40 seconds, either angry or normal, then 
testing the ability of both adults and children to correctly identify that individual in a 
voice line up either immediately after exposure to the test voice, or two weeks later. 
The listeners were informed that the target voice may or may not be present in the 
line-up, thus a comparable instruction to that given prior to voice identification 
parades by the police.549 At best, 19% of the adults and 25% of the children correctly 
identified the test voice immediately after exposure; after two weeks this dropped 
with 14% of the adults and 9% of the children identifying the target voice correctly. 
Perhaps more worrying still was the number of false identifications which ranged 
between 41% and 59%.  
 
 
547 TL Orchard and AD Yarmey ‘The Effects of Whispers, Voice Sample Duration, and Voice 
Distinctiveness on Criminal Speaker Identification’ (1995) 9 Applied Cognitive Psychology 249 
548 L Ӧhman, A Eriksson and PA Granhag ‘Angry Voices from the Past and Present: Effects on 
Adults’ and Children’s Earwitness Memory’ (2013) 10 Journal of Investigative Psychology and 
Offender Profiling 57 
549 Home Office Advice on the use of Voice Identification Parades Home Office Circular 
057/2003 at para 23 
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It is also perhaps unsurprising that there is greater success in identifying voices in 
familiar languages than unfamiliar ones.550 Edmond et al.551 also highlight the concerns 
where a jury is asked to undertake voice comparison where the voices are not in their 
native language. This issue was examined in the Australian case R v Korgbara 552which 
is considered in 6.2.1.2. 
 
The listener 
A range of personal characteristics can affect the ability of a witness to make an 
accurate voice identification. Hearing begins to decline from the age of about 40,553 
which has implications for both witnesses brought before the court, but also 
potentially for jurors asked to make comparisons in court. Vermeire et al.554 note that 
even with only minimal hearing loss, older adults find it more difficult to understand 
speech in noise, which has clear implications where a witness has overheard a 
conversation against a noisy background. Robson and Smith note that there has been 
little discussion in the legal literature as to the impact of such personal characteristics 
when assessing evidence before the courts.555 
 
Recording quality  
As is apparent from the case law, voice identification may require a judgment to be 
made on the basis of poor quality recordings, sometime gained covertly.556  
 
 
 
550 AC Philippon, J Cherryman, R Bull and A Vrij ‘Earwitness Identification Performance: The 
Effect of Language, Target, Deliberate Strategies and Indirect Measures’ (2007) 21 Applied 
Cognitive Psychology 539 
551 G Edmond, K Martire and MS Roque ‘Mere Guesswork’: Cross-Lingual Voice Comparisons 
and the Jury’ (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 395 
552 R v Korgbara [2007] NSWCCA 84 
553 T Yamasoba, FR Lin, S Someya, A Kashio, T Sakamoto and K Kondo ‘Current Concepts in Age-
Related Hearing Loss: Epidemiology and Mechanistic Pathways’ (2013) 303 Hearing Research 
30 
554 K Vermeire, A Knoop, C Boel, S Auwers, L Schnus, M Talaveron-Rodriguez, C De Boom and M 
De Sloovere ‘Speech Recognition in Noise by Younger and Older Adults: Effects of Age, Hearing 
Loss and Temporal Resolution’ (2016) 125 Annals of Otology, Rhinology and Laryngology 297 
555 J Robson and H Smith ‘Can We Have Faith Jurors Listen Without Prejudice?: Likely Sources 
of Inaccuracy in Voice-Comparison Exercises (2019) 2 Criminal Law Review 115, 123 
556 R v Chenia [2002] EWCA Crim 2345 
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System variables 
The system variables are those over which the criminal justice system and the courts 
do have control. Robson and Smith557 identify the following as system variables: 
 
Sequencing of playback 
Unlike eyewitness parades, the voice parade has to be sequential. So, while this 
element is under the control of the operator, the options are more limited.  
 
Gap in time between two samples 
A number of studies indicate that auditory information is retained as a sensory 
memory for a matter of seconds after exposure.558 Robson and Smith note that on the 
basis of current knowledge, the jury and presumably a witness undertaking a voice line 
up should hear the voices in immediate succession. The guidance as to the conduct of 
a voice identification procedure states only that the witness may listen to the voice 
samples as often as they wish,559 but gives no guidance as to the time between 
samples.  
 
Acoustics of the courtroom 
The Old Bailey has been in its current location for more than 350 years.560 While much 
of the courts’ estate is a great deal newer than this, it is fair to say that few of the 
current courts will have been constructed with acoustics as a primary concern. 
Mulcahy notes that the design of these buildings are the result of competing factors,561 
of which the acoustics are just one minor part. However, one of the primary functions 
 
557 Robson J and Smith H ‘Can We Have Faith Jurors Listen Without Prejudice?: Likely Sources 
of Inaccuracy in Voice-Comparison Exercises (2019) 2 Criminal Law Review 115, 127-129 
558 M Sams, R Hari, J Rif and J Knuutila ‘The Human Auditory Sensory Memory Trace Persists 
about 10 sec: Neuromagnetic Evidence’ (1993) 5 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 363; Z Lu 
and G Sperling ‘Measuring Sensory Memory: Magnetoencephalography Habituation and 
Psychophysics’ 319- 342 in Magnetic Source Imaging of the Human Brain edited by Z Lu and L 
Kaufmann (First Edition Taylor and Francis New York, 2003) 
559 Home Office ‘Advice on the use of Voice identification parades’ Home Office Circular 
057/2003 at para 25 
 560History of the Old Bailey Courthouse https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/The-old-
bailey.jsp accessed 19/03/19 
561 L Mulcahy ‘Architects of Justice: The Politics of Courtroom Design’ (2007) 16 Social and 
Legal Studies 383 
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of a courtroom is to facilitate speech. The issue of poor acoustics is not just limited to 
the UK, a study of 29 courtrooms in Portugal found that the majority did not have the 
best acoustics for their designed function of speech.562  
 
Noting this, it is encouraging that a Court and Tribunal Design Guide has recently been 
published which does make clear the need for both appropriate acoustics and the 
need for accessible hearing loops.563 Whilst the guide appears very prescriptive it does 
appear that the ‘usability’ of the estate is being prioritised in the case of either new 
build or upgrading existing facilities, although given current funding constraints it 
seems unlikely that this will result in rapid improvement to the current situation. 
 
Robson and Smith note that for lay listeners the acoustics of the room and the noise 
from the environment are likely to make the task of voice matching even more 
challenging, and noting the earlier comments regarding hearing loss in jurors over the 
age of 40, it seems this will impact further.  
 
Bias 
An immediate concern with regard to bias, particularly for court identifications is the 
risk that if the jury are asked, as they were in R v Kapikanya564 to compare an audio 
recording with the voice of the defendant there must be a risk of confirmation bias, in 
that the jury may assume that the accused would not be in court if the evidence was 
not sound. In much research there is the possibility that the target voice may be 
absent from the test line up, this is unlikely to be the case in court.  
 
For identifications which are carried out as part of a voice parade PACE Code D565 
witnesses are advised that the perpetrator may, or may not be present. This applies 
 
562 A Carvalho and C Monteiro ‘Acoustics of Courtrooms in Portugal’ NOISE-CON 2003 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1010.7983&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
accessed 19/03/19 
563 HM Courts & Tribunals Service Court and Tribunal Design Guide Public Version 1.1 
(Feb 2019)  
564 R v Kapikanya [2015] EWCA Crim 1507 
565 PACE Code D Annex A para 11 
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equally to eyewitness identity parades and has been shown (in the case of eyewitness 
parades) to reduce the number of false positive identifications.566 Robson and Smith 
note the need for further research in this area. 
 
6.2.1.2 Case law – Lay Earwitness Testimony 
Laywitness voice identification and voice identification by the jury both occur within 
this jurisdiction, both with and without expert evidence. There is a body of applicable 
case law which considers the issues raised by both of these types of voice 
identification. 
 
Looking first at jury identification, in R v Kapikanya the jury was asked by the defence 
to compare the voice on a good quality recording of a telephone conversation with 
that of one of the defendants. At appeal, one of the grounds was that: 
  
The jury should have been directed: 
 
(ii) Not to attempt a voice identification of the appellant [Kapikanya]; 
alternatively 
 
(iii) Adequately as to the special danger and difficulty of voice identification 
by the jury unassisted by expert or lay listener evidence or recognition 
evidence.567 
 
The appeal failed on both grounds, with the Court of Appeal accepting that while the 
trial judge’s summing up could have been more emphatic in his warning to the jury of 
the need for caution, this was not a serious shortcoming.568 The Court of Appeal also 
determined that the trial judge had not erred in allowing the jury to consider the 
 
566 RS Malpass and PG Devine ‘Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and the Absence 
of the Offender’ (1981) 66 Journal of Applied Psychology 482 
567 R v Kapikanya [2015] EWCA Crim 1507 [37] 
568 ibid [57] 
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recording to determine if they recognised the voice as belonging to the accused 
individual.569  
 
It should be noted that in reaching this conclusion the court did emphasise that there 
were three special features in this case which made it unusual: 
• The prosecution did not seek to rely on the evidence  
• The recording was of good quality and significant length  
• The jury made the comparison immediately after listening to the defendant 
giving testimony for several days.570 
 
In reaching this outcome, the Court of Appeal considered the earlier authorities of R v 
Chenia 571and R v Flynn and St John.572 At first instance in Chenia the jury were 
directed that they could use their own judgment in relation to the voice captured on a 
number of poor quality surveillance tapes. At appeal, Clarke LJ, made the following 
statement with regard to the jury assessment of voice identification: 
 
We have reached the conclusion that, on the particular facts of this case, 
where the jury were unassisted by expert evidence, they should have been 
warned that they should not compare one voice with another by comparing 
the characteristics of each because of the dangers of doing so.573 
 
However, this judgment was considered in Flynn and St John and the Court of Appeal 
determined that this element of the judgment in Chenia was unsupported by other 
authority.574 It should also be noted that one of the key distinguishing features of the 
recording in Kapikanya was that the recording, unlike Chenia, was of good quality.  
 
 
569 ibid [60] 
570 ibid [47]-[51] 
571 R v Chenia [2002] EWCA Crim 2345 
572 R v Flynn and St John [2008] EWCA Crim 970 
573 R v Chenia [2002] EWCA Crim 2345 [107] 
574 R v Flynn and St John [2008] EWCA Crim 970 [56] See also Bentum (1989) 153 JP 538 
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Usefully, Gage LJ in Flynn noted the factors, based on the expert evidence before the 
court, which may impact on the ability of a lay listener to undertake voice 
identification: 
 
(3) The ability of a lay listener correctly to identify voices is subject to a 
number of variables. There is at present little research about the effect 
of variability but the following factors are relevant: 
(i) the quality of the recording of the disputed voice or voices; 
(ii) the gap in time between the listener hearing the known 
voice and his attempt to recognise the disputed voice; 
(iii) the ability of the individual lay listener to identify voices in 
general. Research shows that the ability of an individual to 
identify voices varies from person to person; 
(iv) the nature and duration of the speech which is sought to be 
identified is important. Obviously, some voices are more 
distinctive than others and the longer the sample of speech the 
better the prospect of identification; 
(v) the greater the familiarity of the listener with the known voice 
the better his or her chance of accurately identifying a disputed 
voice. 
However, research shows that a confident recognition by a lay listener of 
a familiar voice may nevertheless be wrong. 575 
 
As can be seen, the factors outlined show a degree of recognition of, and commonality 
with, the estimator variables relating to eyewitness identification outlined in 6.1.2; as 
such, it could be argued that the Court of Appeal – and thus by the principle of 
precedent the lower courts – in effect have access to group characteristic evidence, 
even in the absence of individual expert evidence. 
  
 
575 ibid [16] 
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In addition to listing the factors which can impact the ability of the lay listener to 
undertake such an exercise, Gage LJ also usefully highlighted the fundamental 
difference between expert and lay listener testimony: 
 
…the crucial difference between a lay listener and expert speech analysis 
is that the expert is able to draw up an overall profile of the individual’s 
speech patterns, in which the significance of each parameter is assessed 
individually, backed up with instrumental analysis and reference 
research. In contrast, the lay listener’s response is fundamentally 
opaque. The lay listener cannot know, and has no way of explaining, 
which aspects of the speaker’s speech patterns he is responding to. He 
also has no way of assessing the significance of individual observed 
features relative to the overall speech profile. We add, the latter is a 
difference between visual identification and voice recognition; and the 
opaque nature of the lay listener’s voice recognitions will make it more 
difficult to challenge the accuracy of their evidence. 
 
The additional concerns of identifying a voice speaking a language other than that of 
the jury was an issue in the Australian case R v Korgbara,576 which concerned the jury 
comparing voices in the Nigerian language of Igbo. Of interest is that in a dissent Grove 
J of the NSW Court of Appeal is ‘fortified’ that his conclusion that expert evidence 
should in certain cases be required, was consistent with the judgment of Nicholson LJ 
in R v O’Doherty (which will be considered shortly 6.2.2.1).  
 
The majority in Korgbara determined that it was not for the court ‘to establish a 
prescriptive rule that voice comparison evidence should only be admitted where 
supported by expert evidence’577 noting the lack of Australian authority to support 
such an approach, but Grove J dissenting argued that: 
 
 
576 R v Korgbara [2007] NSWCCA 84 
577 ibid [74] 
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…permitting the comparison of one language with a different language 
without suitable material which I would contemplate as evidence of 
someone either possessing relevant expertise or familiar with the voice of 
the accused in the language used where identity is challenged (an “ad 
hoc” expert) is not to establish a prescriptive rule but, to the contrary, to 
extend the scope of what is permissible beyond recognised boundaries.578 
 
Although much of the preceding case law relates to jury identification of voice 
evidence, Flynn is also of interest in that at the trial of first instance, police officers had 
given evidence that the voice on the poor quality covert recording was the accused. At 
appeal this evidence was rejected on the basis that expert testimony indicated that 
using both acoustic and auditory analysis the experts were unable, in some cases, to 
even distinguish words the police officers testified having heard as part of their 
identification.579 
  
The concerns regarding the reliability of such evidence is not limited to this 
jurisdiction. In 2015 the Ontario Court of Appeal quashed a conviction which had 
relied, in part, on voice identification evidence, citing those factors while noting that 
voice identification evidence ought to be treated with extreme caution.580 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the factors listed in Flynn simply reflect the concerns in respect 
of the estimator variables discussed at 6.1.2. There are also clear parallels with the 
eyewitness topics identified as being sufficiently reliable to present in court at 6.1.2, 
the common areas such as length of exposure, confidence of the identification, and 
the forgetting curve are mirrored. Although a differentiation has been made between 
jury and laywitness identification, what seems clear from the preceding section is that 
the factors that will impact the accuracy of the identification are largely the same, with 
the question perhaps being one of degree given that the different variable will be 
present in varying levels for both. 
 
578 ibid [113] 
579 R v Flynn and St John [2008] EWCA Crim 970 [48] –[55] 
580 R v Dodd 2015 ONCA 286 [79]-[81] 
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It is arguable that the fact that the similarity in the factors affecting eye and earwitness 
testimony support the need for a single joined-up approach to the issue of ensuring 
reliable evidence comes before the courts. 
 
6.2.1.3 Is there a Role for Expert Evidence in Support of Lay Earwitness Identification 
Evidence? 
While the case law is clear that juror voice identification in the absence of expert 
testimony is accepted, academically there are reservations to this idea. Ormerod 
expressed strong reservations, cautioning that: 
 
If the jury have not heard expert evidence on the voice identification, it is 
submitted that there are serious risks involved in allowing them to conduct 
ad hoc identification in the courtroom…The dangers inherent in any 
stranger voice identification exacerbated by the delay between hearing the 
voices, the stress of the exercise in the courtroom, the danger of bias, the 
risk of over confidence from the jurors, all point strongly against this as a 
worthwhile exercise in terms of the likely accuracy of the outcome.581 
 
More recently, Robson and Smith,582 noting the complexity of the task jurors are being 
asked to undertake, assert that jurors should not be asked to make voice 
identifications in the absence of expert auditory evidence, also noting the need for 
further research.  
 
6.2.2 Expert Evidence: Auditory/Acoustic Analysis 
There are two distinct techniques that can and have been presented to the courts: 
auditory analysis and acoustic analysis. In the case of auditory analysis, the expert 
 
581 D Ormerod ‘Sounding Out Expert Voice Identification’ (October 2002) Criminal Law Review 
771, 787 
582 J Robson and H Smith ‘Can We Have Faith Jurors Listen Without Prejudice? Likely Sources of 
Inaccuracy in Voice-Comparison Exercises’ (2019) 2 Criminal Law Review 115  
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listens repeatedly to samples of the suspect’s voice and compares this to the unknown 
voice, repeatedly, looking for points of similarity/dissimilarity.583  
 
In contrast, acoustic analysis relies on electronic analysis of the voice. Bull describes 
acoustic analysis thus: 
 
[R]ecognition by spectrographic voice analysis is based upon an electronic 
scan of a speech sample which produces a visible 
amplitude/frequency/time display. This spectrogram can then be compared 
with other spectrograms to see if a match can be made.584 
 
Eriksson notes that while the usefulness of the spectrogram is indisputable, its utility in 
voice identification was grossly overestimated. As with other technological solutions, 
the technology changes and greater reliability is claimed. The current method of 
auditory analysis typically utilises this visual analysis coupled with aural examination of 
the voice samples. 585 The majority of members of the only professional organisation of 
forensic speech scientists – the International Association for Forensic Phonetics and 
Acoustics (IAFPA) – utilise the dual approach of aural/acoustic analysis. At their 2007 
Conference the IAFPA passed a resolution in which the organisation comprehensively 
rejected the approach of only using the spectrogram: 
 
IAFPA dissociates itself from the approach to forensic speech comparison 
known as the “voiceprint” or “voicegram” method…The Association 
 
583 D Ormerod ‘Sounding Out Expert Voice Identification’ (October 2002) Criminal Law Review 
771, 773 
584 R Bull ‘Voice Identification by Man and Machine: a Review of Research’ in SMA Lloyd-
Bostock (ed), Psychology in Legal Contexts: Applications and Limitations (Palgrave Macmillan 
1981), 33 
585 A Eriksson ‘Aural/ Acoustic Methods in Forensic Phonetic Case Work’ in A Neustein and HA 
Patel (Eds) Forensic Speaker Recognition: Law Enforcement and Counter-terrorism (Springer-
Verlag New York,2012) 
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considers this approach to be without scientific foundation and should not 
be used in forensic casework.586 
 
Ormerod587 considered the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches, concluding 
that the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland in R v Doherty588 
was to be welcomed. Key concerns noted by Ormerod in relation to auditory analysis 
were that it is person dependant, the individual expert compares the samples and 
judges if there are similarities between the recorded voices. There has been no large-
scale study to ascertain the error rates associated with the technique and there is also 
no objective way to check the reliability of the technique as applied by an individual 
expert in a given case. He concludes that auditory analysis ‘offers only a very 
subjective assessment of the match between voice samples’.589 
 
However, the review of the reliability of the ‘more scientific’ technique of acoustic 
analysis is also subject to concerns. The concerns among others that the accuracy is 
reduced if the speaker changes or alters their voice, whether deliberately or not, led 
the National Research Council in 1979 to conclude that: 
 
…technical uncertainties concerning the present practice of voice identification 
are so great as to require that forensic applications are approached with great 
caution.590 
 
A more recent change is the attempt to automate voice recognition, via automatic 
speaker recognition (ASR) technology. ASR would seem to represent a variant of 
acoustic analysis and works on the principle that individual voices can be distinguished 
 
586 International Association for Forensic Phonetics and Acoustics ‘Voiceprint Resolution’ 
(IAFPA Conference Plymouth UK 2007) https://www.iafpa.net/the-association/resolutions/ 
accessed 21/02/19 
587 D Ormerod ‘Sounding Out Expert Voice Identification’ (October 2002) Criminal Law Review 
771 
588 R v O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 5CA (Crim Div) (NI) 
589 D Ormerod ‘Sounding Out Expert Voice Identification’ (October 2002) Criminal Law Review 
771, 778 
590 National Research Council On the Theory and Practice of Voice identification  (Washington 
DC National Academies Press 1979), 2 
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from one another as the vocal tracts of individuals give rise to differences in the voice 
by virtue of the different anatomical dimensions and proportions. The known sample 
voice is compared to the questioned voice and the machine generates a statistical 
model giving a likelihood ratio. The samples are also compared against a set of 
statistical models from a reference population.591  
 
This technology appeared before the courts recently and will be considered shortly  
 
6.2.2.1 The Case Law 
A review of the case law relating to this approach shows a clear divergence in the 
approach taken by the English and Northern Irish courts. Auditory analysis was the 
approach in R v Robb592 where the evidence was ruled admissible. The court in Robb 
acknowledged the fact that auditory analysis was very much the minority expert 
approach, noting that: 
 
The great weight of informed opinion, including the world leaders in 
the field, was to the effect that auditory techniques unless 
supplemented and verified by acoustic analysis, were an unreliable 
basis of speaker identification.593 
 
The court also noted that other western European countries did not accept such 
evidence, instead focussing on acoustic analysis.594 Lord Bingham, while accepting the 
expert evidence, highlighted the absence of hard data or publication which would 
allow testing of the technique.595 Commenting on the reservations that the court 
seemed to be expressing, Ormerod suggests that any decision to reject the evidence 
on the basis of lack of reliability would undermine the established position that there is 
 
591 R v Slade [2015] EWCA Crim 71 [155] 
592 R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 CA 
593 ibid 166 
594 ibid 166 
595 ibid 166 
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no enhanced test of admissibility for expert evidence. 596 Having noted that, Ormerod 
suggested that: 
 
If English law also required explicitly that the technique was 
demonstrated to meet a standard of reliability, admissibility would be 
extremely unlikely.597 
This does raise the interesting question, had this technique been put before the courts 
with the revised CrimPR in place, would it have been ruled admissible? As Ormerod 
notes, auditory analysis cannot be independently appraised, there is no indication of 
failure rates, and given the lack of published data as to its efficacy, it seems unlikely 
that it would meet the requirements of the CrimPR and as such would be ruled 
inadmissible. 
 
If such evidence continues to be admitted, despite the inception of the enhanced test 
of admissibility, this would seem to affirm previously noted and somewhat jaundiced 
statements that ‘each ill-informed decision becomes a precedent binding on future 
cases’ (as per fn 181). It seems arguable that with the arrival of the enhanced test of 
reliability there would be a strong case for either contesting the admissibility of such 
evidence, or at the very least the expert opinion would be cast in such a way that the 
weight of the evidence would be greatly reduced. 
 
In contrast to the ruling in Robb, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in R v 
O’Doherty598 ruled that voice recognition evidence based purely on acoustic analysis 
was not admissible, ruling that reflecting current scientific knowledge: 
 
…no prosecution should be brought in Northern Ireland in which one of 
the planks is voice identification given by an expert which is solely 
 
596 D Ormerod ‘Sounding Out Expert Voice Identification’ (October 2002) Criminal Law Review 
771, 776 
597 ibid 778 
598 R v O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 5CA (Crim Div) (NI) 
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confined to auditory analysis. There should also be expert evidence of 
acoustic analysis … which includes formant analysis.599 
 
In R v Flynn and St John600 the Court of Appeal considered the issue of both lay and 
expert testimony relating to voice recognition. It is of note that both the experts who 
gave testimony in this case had utilised both auditory and acoustic analysis, and 
although the court did note that this technique is the more reliable, it then went on to 
note in a postscript that: 
 
…we think it neither possible nor desirable to go as far as the Northern 
Ireland Court of Criminal Appeal in O'Doherty which ruled that auditory 
analysis evidence given by experts in this field was inadmissible unless 
supported by expert evidence of acoustic analysis.601 
 
One assumes that such evidence would still need to be supported by other credible 
evidence. Robb came before the courts well before the CrimPR and, more critically, the 
revised CrimPR with the reliability test came into effect in 2015. If one reviews the 
cases regarding voice identification evidence which have come before the courts since 
2015, R v Minnott602 is the only reported case before the Court of Appeal, and as that 
was originally heard in June 2015 preceded the revised CrimPR. As such, at this time 
there do not appear to any reported cases where the reliability of auditory analysis has 
been assessed against the criteria within r19 and the associated practice directions. 
 
Given that the Court in Flynn and St John seem to acknowledge the limitations of 
auditory analysis, it is of some interest to note the following observation from 
Elizabeth McClellan, the expert in Slade who follows the practice of auditory analysis: 
 
 
599 ibid [59]. Formants are the distinctive frequency components of the acoustic signal 
produced during speech 
600 R v Flynn and St John [2008] EWCA Crim 970 
601 ibid [62] 
602 R v Minnott (Simone Estha) [2016] EWCA Crim 2215 
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It’s important to recognise that forensic voice analysis isn’t equivalent in 
any sense to identification evidence from, for instance, DNA or 
fingerprinting. The conclusions we can reach in terms of voice 
identification should only be used in conjunction with other evidence as 
part of a picture. You can’t identify an individual solely using an opinion 
from a forensic voice analyst.603 
 
This is of interest in that as an expert who is noted to have testified in many cases,604 
the witness recognises the limitations of the approach. What is unclear from this is if 
she applies the same caution to forensic analysis via acoustic analysis.605  
 
Slade is of interest in another respect in that the Court of Appeal considered the use of 
automatic speaker recognition (ASR) technology in the form of a system known as 
Batvox.  
 
The court declined to admit the evidence from the Batvox on a number of grounds: 
 
• The sample size of the reference population, 20 or 30 speakers, may not 
adequately cover all the possible variations in the geometry of the vocal cords 
• That in testing the system generated more than 30% false positives (likelihood 
ratio of greater than one) 
• That the court was being asked to accept that the software reaches the right 
results with no explanation to the court of how this is so 
• That the expert witness and counsel were not able to indicate how such 
evidence should or could appropriately be presented to a jury 
• That the evidence presented to the court was that different ASR machines 
would present different results dependant on their software, and that the 
 
603 R v Slade [2015] EWCA Crim 71 [146] 
604 R v Minott; R v Sachithananthan [2012] EWCA Crim 1859; McIntyre v HM Advocate [2009] 
HCJAC 63; R v Paton [2007] EWCA Crim 1572; R v Terry [2004] EWCA Crim 3252.  
605 Review of the relevant academic databases has not located any publications authored by E 
McClellan to determine if she does have a view re other techniques. 
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appellants had been unable to satisfy the court how the jury should address 
this conflict 
• The expert witnesses had not used the system in any other trial/casework, and 
the court felt that the experts’ responses to this query had been hesitant606 
 
This would seem to reflect the position in R v T in that the lack of a sufficiently robust 
database was a feature in the rejection of the evidence. However, Davis LJ, noting that 
the appeal had been decided on other grounds, stated: 
 
…it is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to make any definitive 
ruling in this case as to whether such evidence can ever be admissible, 
or as to what the position might be in the future in light of any further 
scientific advance.607 
 
Broeders,608 writing in 2004, reflects this assertion, noting that the performance of ASR 
did not warrant their large-scale use in anything beyond investigative applications. As 
such, the situation with regard to the possible future admissibility of ASR is possible, 
but noting the courts’ concerns, it seems likely that currently such evidence would fall 
foul of the CrimPR, although these were not expressly mentioned within the judgment. 
 
The need for caution on the part of the jury when assessing the expert evidence 
relating to voice identification is made clear in the suggested modified Turnbull 
direction outlined in the current Crown Court Compendium,609 which includes case 
specific detail, e.g. that the recording quality was affected as it was recorded through a 
wall. 
 
 
606 R v Slade [2015] EWCA Crim 71 [177] - [181] 
607 ibid [176] 
608 APA Broeders ‘Forensic Speech and Audio Analysis, Forensic linguistics – A Review: 2001-
2004’ (Conference Paper to 14th INTERPOL Forensic Science Symposium, Lyon France, June 
2004)  
609 Judicial College Crown Court Compendium Part 1 (July 2019), 15-31 
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With regard to voice identification, Robson610 argues that the piecemeal development 
of the case law has led to inconsistencies in approach that may adversely affect the 
effective management and use of such evidence, noting that the courts in a number of 
jurisdictions611 have struggled with approaches to voice identification evidence, being 
criticised for their ad hoc approaches. 
 
6.3 Eyewitness, Earwitness, and Expert Evidence – A Whole System Approach? 
A number of elements seem clear from the forgoing discussion; that expert evidence in 
court is not ordinarily admissible in relation to the reliability of eyewitness testimony, 
and that in the case of voice identification, expert testimony is admissible in two 
respects a) to conduct the comparison exercise and b) to explain an earwitness’ 
evidence, but it is argued such evidence is not always being sought when both logic and 
science would indicate that it would support the jury in the search for truth. 
 
Arguably there is a clear case for expert evidence to be more generally accessed in the 
case of both eye and earwitness identification evidence. But a concern given the 
number of, particularly, eyewitness identifications that come before the court is how 
practical would this actually be? This is potentially where a whole systems approach 
may be more relevant, making use of expert testimony not just at the point of trial 
evidence, but in the earlier phases of the criminal justice process. 
 
Twining 612 argues, taking as a working example the issue of eyewitness 
misidentifications, that the legal system, by focussing on the decisions of the Court of 
Appeal and the individual cases, fails to address the broader systemic problems which 
can result in injustice. Twining describes this approach which may take account of the 
work of multiple disciplines as a contextual approach. 
 
610 J Robson ‘Lend Me Your Ears’: An Analysis Of How Voice Identification Evidence in Treated 
in Four Neighbouring Criminal Justice Systems’ (2018) 22 International Journal of Evidence and 
Proof 218 
611 ibid 218 
612 W Twining Identification and Misidentification in Legal Processes: Redefining the Problem in 
Rethinking Evidence Exploratory Essays (second Edition) (2006). Note this chapter was 
originally published in SMA Lloyd-Bostock and BR Clifford (eds), Evaluating Witness Evidence: 
Recent Psychological Research and New Perspectives (John Wiley and Sons, 1983) 
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Identification procedures are governed by Code D of PACE613 and it is argued that they 
are a reflection of this contextual approach, formulating a comprehensive procedure 
for identification evidence to be collected and collated which reflects the requirements 
of law, while reflecting the findings from relevant psychological/scientific research, 
and thus allowing the formulation of a consensus within the scientific community 
permitting a set of common guidelines to be agreed and formulated while research 
continues to further refine the approach.614  
 
Taking this notion, Robson615 discusses in some detail the steps taken to develop a 
robust process, developed in conjunction with the scientific evidence, for voice 
identification. This process and the associated guidelines were approved and issued as 
Home Office Circular 57/2003 616  and have been identified as representing best 
practice. The relevance in terms of the expert witness is that the procedure stipulates 
the assistance of a ‘commissioned expert witness’ to select the speech samples which 
will go into the voice ‘line up’.617 
 
 
613 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) Code D Code of practice for the identification 
of persons by police officers (February 2017) London The Stationery Office Code D para 1.2 
states that nothing in it precludes the use of aural identification procedures, and annex 
B, para. 18, states that a witness may ask any member of an identification parade to speak. In 
such a case, the witness should first be asked if he can make a purely visual identification, and 
must be reminded that participants will have been chosen on the basis of their appearance 
only. Members of the parade may then be asked to comply with the request of the witness to 
hear them speak. However Code D makes no direct provision for cases in which the attempted 
identification is to be made on the basis of voice alone. 
614 e.g. GL Wells, M Small, S Penrod, RS Malpass, SM Fulero and CAE Brimacombe ‘Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Line-ups and Photo- spreads’ (1998) 22 Law 
and Human Behavior 603;  Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence Eyewitness 
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (Washington DC: US Department of Justice 1999); AS 
Luby ‘Strengthening Analyses of Line-Up Procedures: a Log-Linear Model Framework (2017) 16 
Law, Probability and Risk 241 
615 J Robson ‘Lend Me Your Ears’: An Analysis Of How Voice Identification Evidence in Treated 
in Four Neighbouring Criminal Justice Systems’ (2018) 22 International Journal of Evidence and 
Proof 218 
616 Home Office Circular 57/2003 Advice on the use of Voice identification parades 
617 Home Office circular 57/2003 at 12 
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However, despite being circulated to police forces, unlike with eyewitness 
identifications, there is no requirement to use them, and Robson notes that in a 
freedom of information request of the 43 forces questioned: 
 
• 21 had no data/had conducted no voice identifications 
• 4 had considered using parades in specific cases but deemed it 
unnecessary/inappropriate 
• 7 indicated that on policy grounds they did not undertake voice parades.618  
 
Setting aside for a moment the poor compliance with 57/2003 a question which 
requires consideration is why, given such a seemingly robust approach to the structure 
of the ‘voice parade’ with the use of experts to formulate the ‘parade’, is this not also 
the case with eyewitness parades?  
 
A possible response to this is that the database which contains visual images is likely to 
have been created with expert assistance, and also that the computer-based systems 
contain a large database of images to be drawn from, thus enhancing the ability to 
choose suitable foils.619 However, it should be noted that as the selection of the foils is 
undertaken by officers, there is a degree of subjectivity in selecting individuals who 
resemble ‘the age, general appearance and position in life’ of the individual being 
placed in the parade. Rees,620 commenting on Flynn, argues that the case for the 
incorporation of both visual and voice identification procedures into Code D has 
considerable force. 
 
There does not appear to be any guidance setting out the rationale for the exclusion of 
such expert testimony in the formulation of eyewitness parades. However, it should be 
noted that the current reforms contained within PACE Code D do reflect current 
 
618 J Robson ‘A Fair Hearing? The use of Voice Identification Parades in Criminal Investigations 
in England and Wales’ (2017) 1 Criminal Law Review 36, 45 
619 R Horry, A Memon, R Milne, DB Wright and G Dalton ‘Video Identification of Suspects: A 
Discussion of Current Practice and Policy in the United Kingdom’ (2013) 7 Policing: A Journal of 
Policy and Practice 307  
620 T Rees ‘Evidence: Identification – Voice Recognition’ (2008) 10 Criminal Law Review 799 
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scientific theory with regard to memory and recall, and as such there has been expert 
input but at a much earlier point in the process (as per Fn 607). 
 
The guidance within PACE Code D stipulates that eyewitness identification parades, 
both video and in person, will consist of individuals who ‘so far as possible, resemble 
the suspect in age, height, general appearance and position in life’.621 PACE Code D has 
been described as an ‘intensely practical document’622 and given that the requirement 
is that similar looking individuals are selected for the lineup, this appears on the 
surface a far simpler procedure than collating similar sounding sound clips. Broadly 
speaking, an individual is male or female, has dark hair or light hair, but it is arguably 
far less clear cut when a voice is ‘gruff’ or the suspect has ‘a northern accent’. It should 
be noted that there is ongoing research to try to improve the level of objective 
evidence in relation to lay voice identification.623 It should also be noted that in the 
case of a visual identity parade, the police have the suspect present so therefore the 
identification of people who generally resemble the suspect is perhaps more 
straightforward. 
 
It may be the case that the norms applied to the selection of those foils in relation to 
eyewitness identification are still somehow those seen as aligning to ‘commonsense’? 
 
The public policy/resource consideration is also worth noting. Roberts, 624  in 
considering the rights of the defendant pre-trial, notes the reality of finite resources 
places constraints on the opportunities for defence participation in the investigative 
process. Roberts cites Dworkin who claimed that a suspect does not have the 
procedural right for the most accurate procedures that are available to distinguish guilt 
 
621 Pace Code D Annex A para 2 and Annex B para 16 
622 I Dennis The Law of Evidence (sixth edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2017), 7-014  
623 H Smith, N Braber, J Robson, D Wright and S Kelly (2018) ‘Not Deep Just Average: Improving 
the Usability of Lay-Listener Voice Descriptions’ (2018) Germanic Society for Forensic 
Linguistics (GSFL2018), University of York, York, 2-5 August 2018 
624 A Roberts ‘Pre-Trial Defence Rights and the Fair Use of Eyewitness Identification Procedures 
(2008) 71 Modern Law Review 331 
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and innocence. As Roberts notes, it can be generally assumed that greater accuracy 
implies greater cost.625  
 
Noting that some police forces have taken a policy decision not to undertake voice 
parades as per the Home Office guidance, this must raise a question as to the 
enforceability of the guidelines, and the issue that they are precisely that – guidance. 
Rees626 expresses the concern that the guidance ‘fails to offer sufficient guidance, and 
it lacks the peremptory force which some elements of the Code [PACE] possesses.’  
 
The 2006 case R v Hall627 would seem to echo this concern. In Hall, one ground for 
appeal was that the appellant citing 57/2003 should have been asked for his consent 
for a sample of his recorded interview to be used for identification purposes, and had 
not been. Refusing leave on this ground, the single judge noted there was nothing 
unlawful in the prosecution using the sample for comparison purposes.628  
 
Noting the apparent lack of consequence for police forces not adhering to the 
guidance in 57/2003, and the much greater number of visual identity parades 
undertaken, it may be appropriate to speculate as to the financial impact on already 
stretched police budgets of retaining expert opinion in determining visual line ups? 
This would seem to replicate the government response to LC325 and the refusal to 
legislate on cost grounds. 
 
It is arguable that by utilising expert witnesses earlier in the process, the evidence 
which does finally come before the courts has been reached in a rational manner, thus 
improving the likelihood that it is probative. However, while the utilisation of expert 
witnesses to ensure that robustness of the evidence coming before the courts is as 
grounded as it can be, the fact remains that it is still for the jury to decide if they 
accept that voice identification testimony to deliver the verdict.  
 
625 ibid 335 
626 T Rees ‘Evidence: Identification – Voice Recognition’ (2008) 10 Criminal Law Review 799 
627 R v Hall [2006] EWCA Crim 3401 
628 ibid [21] 
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6.4 Is the Turnbull Direction Adequate? 
A Turnbull direction is required wherever identification evidence has been adduced. 
While the Crown Court Compendium lists those factors which need to be raised within 
the Turnbull direction to advise jurors of the elements which affect the reliability of the 
identification, it is argued that the direction is insufficiently nuanced. 
 
To illustrate this point, it is helpful to revisit one of the topics identified by Desmarais 
and Read,629 in relation to eyewitness identification, as being sufficiently reliable to 
present in court, which has also been identified as an element in earwitness testimony; 
that of accuracy confidence. The current Turnbull guidelines for eyewitness and 
earwitness testimony in this respect are similar, both noting that confidence and 
accuracy do not always mean that an identification is correct. The relevant sections of 
the sample guidance from the Crown Court Compendium for eyewitness identification 
evidence state that: 
 
You must be cautious when considering this evidence because experience 
has shown that any witness who has identified a person can be mistaken 
even when the witness is honest and sure that he/she is right. Such a 
witness may seem convincing but may be wrong.630 
 
And in respect of earwitness voice identification evidence: 
 
When considering this evidence you need to be especially cautious 
because experience has shown that any witness who gives 
identification evidence can be mistaken; and this is so even when the 
witness is honest and convinced that he/she is right. Such a witness 
may well seem convincing but this does not mean that the witness 
cannot be wrong. This is so even when a witness knows a person well 
and says that he/she has recognised this person.631 
 
629 Discussed in section 6.1.2 
630 Judicial College Crown Court Compendium Part 1 (July 2019), 15-4 
631 ibid 15-32 
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It is arguable that the tone and content of the directions do not fully reflect the 
psychological research and evidence with regard to this parameter, in particular they 
lack specificity. There is no reflection in the direction that there is any sound scientific 
basis for the assertion, and it is suggested with respect that ‘experience has shown’ is 
altogether too nebulous. 
 
The report to the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henderson632 suggested modified 
directions to the jury, which it is argued more accurately reflect the situation and are 
more nuanced than the current Turnbull directions given above: 
 
You heard testimony that (insert name of witness) expressed his/her 
level of certainty that the person he/she selected is in fact the person 
who committed the crime. As I explained earlier, a witness’s level of 
confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of 
the identification. Although some research has found that highly 
confident witnesses are more likely to make accurate identifications, 
eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of 
accuracy.633 
 
Prior to the changes, the equivalent section with regard to the level of confidence of 
the witness was less specific and, it is argued, not dissimilar to the Turnbull direction in 
being nebulous. The guidance cautioned: 
 
Although nothing may appear more convincing than a witness’s 
categorical identification of a perpetrator, you must critically analyze 
such testimony. Such identifications, even if made in good faith, may be 
mistaken. Therefore, when analyzing such testimony, be advised that a 
 
632 State v Henderson 27 A3d 872 (NJ 2011) 
633 Criminal Practice Committee and the Model Criminal Jury Charge Committee Report of the 
Supreme Court Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges on the Revisions to the 
Identification Model Charges. Approved by the Supreme Court Committee on Model Criminal 
Charges January 9, 2012 [New Jersey] 
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witness’s level of confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication 
of the reliability of the identification.634 
The model jury charge makes no reference to earwitness testimony, which is perhaps 
unsurprising given the remit of the original paper was to examine issues around 
eyewitness testimony, but it can be argued that the wording, and the evidence in the 
direction, are equally as applicable to earwitness testimony. 
A possibility put forward in LC325 was the previously discussed idea of court appointed 
experts (4.2.5). Although the idea was not taken forward, it could be that in particularly 
difficult identification cases there could be an advantage to a judge being able to take 
expert advice to aid in structuring the content of the Turnbull direction. Arguably this 
may be possible under the umbrella of CrimPR r3 as an element of judicial notice after 
investigation. This would be an unconventional approach, Phipson notes that judicial 
notice is usually taken in relation to facts which are obvious and uncontroversial and 
generally in receipt of documentary hearsay rather than enquiry.635 
A further option which could potentially either further inform the Turnbull direction, or 
be accessed more generally, is the use of the primer guides noted in 4.2.4. The Crown 
Court Compendium Part 1 (bench book) notes both DNA636 and forensic gait analysis637 
primers will ‘be of use to all parties’. At this time, there does not appear to be an 
equivalent primer for either eye or earwitness evidence,638 but were such a document 
to be made available, this would ensure that all parties have access to good quality 
research and the current expert opinion in relation to the area of interest for the court. 
 
 
634 Ibid Appendix B  
635 Phipson on Evidence 19th Edition (Sweet and Maxwell, 2017), 29-18 
636 Judicial College Crown Court Compendium Part 1 (July 2019), 15-45 
637 ibid, 15-48 
638 Planned future primers are Statistics and Collision Analysis – The Royal Society ‘Science 
Advice in the Broader Context: Interactions with the Public, Law and Parliament’ (nd) 
https://www.ingsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Science-Advice-and-Law_JMaxton-
compressed.pdf accessed 20/02/19 
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A good example of judge’s directions changing in response to research is the ‘delayed 
complaint direction’ in the case of sexual assault highlighted by Sjolin and Gerry639. This 
addresses the issue of making assumptions about the behaviour of victims of sexual 
assault, in particular the issue that the trauma of rape may inhibit the individual making 
a complaint at the earliest possible opportunity. In R v D640 Latham LJ said: 
 
The judge is entitled to make comments as to the way evidence is to be 
approached particularly in areas where there is a danger of a jury 
coming to an unjustified conclusion without an appropriate warning ... 
We think that cases where the defendant raises the issue of delay as 
undermining the credibility of a complainant fall into a similar category 
save clearly that the need for comment is in this instance to ensure 
fairness to the complainant… the fact that the trauma of rape can cause 
feelings of shame and guilt which might inhibit a woman from making a 
complaint about rape is sufficiently well-known to justify a comment to 
that effect.641 
 
Subsequent case law has supported this position and the Crown Court Compendium 
gives the sample ‘delayed complaint direction’ 642  which ensures that jurors are 
supported in their decision making, by having advice based on current psychological 
theory. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Turner permits expert evidence to be adduced ‘to furnish the court with scientific 
information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or 
jury.’ It can be argued that for both ear- and eyewitness testimony, expert evidence as 
to the fallibilities of that evidence to enable a jury to make a rational judgment as to 
the reliability of the evidence are outside this experience. The common-sense 
 
639 F Gerry and C Sjolin ‘Rape Trauma Direction’ Counsel (nd) 
https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/rape-trauma-direction accessed 28/10/19 
640 R v D [2008] EWCA Crim 2557 
641 ibid [11] 
642 Judicial College Crown Court Compendium Part 1 (July 2019), 20-5 
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understanding of the weight of that evidence does not accord with current research. It 
is argued that this area of evidence clearly highlights that the Turner principle is too 
blunt a tool in some cases. As such, it is argued that by failing to include the Turner test 
in CP190/ LC 325 an opportunity was missed. 
 
Returning to focus on the way in which expert evidence as to eye- and earwitness 
identification evidence could be approached, it is important to again note that the 
courts are organs of the state, and under intense pressure in terms of both time and 
resources. This being the case, the notion that the thousands of cases a year where 
identification evidence is part of the case could all access expert evidence to the effect 
noted above is clearly unsupportable. Therefore there is a need to consider if a suitably 
modified Turnbull direction would suffice. 
 
It is argued that earwitness testimony, being the smaller component, and the more 
problematic form of evidence, and already meeting the requirements for expert 
testimony should access expert testimony in respect of lay and/or jury voice 
identification. 
 
The consensus on the management of identification parades under PACE Code D, 
recognising the findings of psychological research, goes some way to try to ensure that 
the identification evidence which does come before the courts has a degree of 
reliability which may not have been the case a few decades ago. However, the failure of 
the Home Office to mandate the voice parade procedures set out in circular 57/2003, 
and the apparent failure of police forces to adopt these procedures, could be seen to 
represent a dereliction of the duty to ensure that only reliable evidence is bought 
before the courts. The voice identification procedure is demanding of both time and 
resources, and it seems likely that this and the failure to mandate it have given the 
message that it is not a priority. 
 
The Turnbull directions currently are insufficiently nuanced to clearly outline to the jury 
the factors they need to consider when weighing the evidence on both ear and 
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eyewitness testimony. It is suggested that revisions of the type set out by New Jersey 
would go some way to rectifying this by ensuring that the current expert position is laid 
out in front of the jury. 
 
While a primer is not currently on the publication schedule, it seems likely that a joint 
exercise between the judicial college and the Royal Society would enable the judicial 
college to commission a primer addressing the issues concerned with identification 
evidence. 
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Chapter 7 
The Polygraph: Detecting Truth from Lies – A case study 
7.0 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters we have explored and analysed the difficulties experienced 
by jurors in understanding and weighing expert evidence, and the difficulties of both 
lawyers and in some cases the judiciary in presenting and understanding elements of 
expert evidence.  
 
As explored in the previous chapter, the Turner principle precludes expert testimony 
on matters within the normal experience of the jury. The credibility of a witness or the 
accused, unless they have a relevant psychiatric condition, falls very clearly into that 
territory of within the normal experience; after all, it is highly unlikely that any 
member of a jury will never have been lied to.  
 
Throughout the investigation and trial there is a need to distinguish truth from lie. 
Could expert evidence as to polygraph testing support the criminal justice system in 
this search for truth? This chapter does not put forward a proposition that the 
evidence of the polygraph replaces the judgement of the jury as to whether a 
defendant or witness is being, and has been, truthful, but rather will propose that the 
physiological parameters measured by the polygraph may be used as another 
evidential thread in support of the jury arriving at their judgment. 
 
The Offender Management Act 2007 sees the polygraph mandated for use, for the first 
time, in the English criminal justice system. The polygraph has a long and somewhat 
chequered history, with its use being widespread in some jurisdictions and barred in 
others. The polygraph, more commonly but less accurately, known as the ‘lie detector’ 
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has long been controversial, with its use on daytime TV shows643 doing nothing to help  
that controversy.  
 
The accepted position within this jurisdiction was stated in Fennell v Jerome Property 
Management Ltd: 
 
Evidence produced by the administration of a mechanically or chemically or 
hypnotically induced test on a witness so as to show the veracity or 
otherwise of that witness is not admissible in English law.644  
In this chapter, taking this assertion as our starting point, we will undertake an 
examination of mechanically-obtained evidence, asking the question whether the use 
of the polygraph as a licence condition for serious sexual offenders under s30 of the 
Offender Management Act 2007 is the start of a creeping development that may (and 
perhaps should) see the polygraph being used more widely. 
 
The other two techniques identified within Fennell are outwith this thesis as they do 
not address issues of detecting truth or falsity: Hypnosis is seen as an aid to recall and 
truth drugs are intended to ‘force’ the individual to tell the truth. 
 
At its most basic, the purpose of a criminal trial is to determine the guilt or innocence 
of the accused. To do this, a court or jury must usually determine whether accounts 
given by witnesses can be relied upon as true, or (in the case of the accused or other 
defence witnesses) cannot at least be dismissed as clearly false.  
 
 
643 The recent death of a participant on the daytime TV Jeremy Kyle Show after taking a 
polygraph lead to cancellation of the show amid concerns the show that over played the 
reliability of the polygraph. There was widespread media coverage e.g. A Singh ‘Jeremy Kyle 
producers admit lie detector tests may have given the wrong results’ The Telegraph 25 June 
2019 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/25/jeremy-kyle-producers-admit-lie-
detector-tests-may-have-given/ accessed 23/07/19; BBC News online ‘Jeremy Kyle Show: MPs 
criticize ‘irresponsible’ ITV over lie detectors’ (25 June 2019) 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-48756290 accessed 23/07/19 
644 Fennell v Jerome Property Maintenance Ltd, The Times, 26 November 1986, QBD.  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Witnesses may of course be mistaken or confused, or the wrong inferences may be 
drawn from circumstantial evidence, but the task of the court or jury may also be 
complicated by the inconvenient fact that witnesses sometimes resort to wilful lies. In 
some cases, it may be clear that one or more witnesses must be lying, because the 
opposing accounts differ in ways that cannot be attributed to anything else. At a 
criminal trial, we rely upon the court or jury to detect both honest errors and lies, 
having perhaps seen the witness in question wilting under skilful cross-examination; 
but a false witness in court will usually be repeating lies that he has told before, and 
we rely on the police and CPS to weed out manifestly false or untrustworthy 
accusations before they even get to court.  
 
Unfortunately, this reliance may often be misplaced. The available evidence (as we 
shall see) does not suggest that individuals or juries are particularly good at 
distinguishing true accounts from plausible lies. Arguably, courts or juries could benefit 
in some cases from expert guidance. At present, neither the police nor the courts 
make use of available technology, in the form of lie detection equipment. It is 
generally supposed that evidence derived from such technology would necessarily be 
inadmissible. But is it? And if it is, can such a prohibition be justified? 
 
7.1 Theory, Reliability and Admissibility: The Polygraph 
The polygraph is a tool which, it is claimed, can indicate to someone who is an expert 
in its use, and its interpretation, whether an individual is at least attempting to tell the 
truth. It is widely used in the US, primarily by security services645, and is also used in 
the criminal justice systems of some other jurisdictions, notably Japan. 646  It is 
important to note at the outset that even in US jurisdictions that do permit polygraph 
 
645 For example, Department of Defense Directive 5210.48 April 24, 2015. The CIA, FBI and US 
Customs and Border Protection all stipulate the requirement for polygraph testing within their 
application process. See https://www.cia.gov/careers/application-process 
http://www.fbiagentedu.org/fbi-requirements/ https://www.cbp.gov/careers/join-cbp 
accessed 27/02/16 
646 S Hira and I Furumitsu ‘Polygraphic Examinations in Japan: Application of the Guilty 
Knowledge Test in Forensic Investigations’ (2002) 4 International Journal of Police Science and 
Management 16 
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evidence at trial, there is no provision for compelled testing.647 However, polygraph 
usage in other fields may be compulsory. In English law, the prime example is the 
introduction of the polygraph as a licence condition for some serious sexual offenders, 
under the Offender Management Act 2007, s 30,648 which sees its first (albeit very 
limited) use within the criminal justice system. 
 
Does the introduction of testing under this act represent the leading edge of a 
creeping development that may one day lead to polygraph evidence being adduced 
routinely in English criminal trials, or will it remain restricted to this very narrow 
function and remain a ‘step too far’ for the criminal courts? If such evidence were ever 
to come before the courts as expert evidence, a second question must be does such 
evidence meet the requirements of part 19 of the CrimPR? 
 
There are barriers to its wider acceptance which, while closely related, are quite 
distinct. The first of these is the issue of reliability; the second (and ultimately more 
problematic) issue, concerns the role of the expert witness relative to that of the court 
or jury as triers of fact; and the third is whether such evidence could ever be admitted 
under the current rules of evidence. 
 
As with much technology, ‘lie detection’ is constantly evolving with alternative 
approaches such as P300 brain based-lie detection649 and more recently combining the 
polygraph with functional MRI (fMRI) scanning650 claiming ever greater accuracy. 
Although this chapter will focus on the conventional polygraph, the issues being 
discussed are equally applicable to other newer technologies.  
 
 
647 New Mexico which has the most liberal rules for the admission of polygraph evidence states 
in the New Mexico Rules of Evidence at 11-707F that ‘No witness shall be compelled to take a 
polygraph examination.’ 
648 Offender Management Act 2007 (Commencement No 6) Order 2013 SI No. 1963 (C82) 
649 J Danaher ‘The Comparative Advantage of Brain Based Lie Detection: the P300 Concealed 
Information Test and Pre-Trial Bargaining’ (2015) 19 International Journal of Evidence and 
Proof 52 
650 NJ Gordon, FB Mohamed, SM Platek, H Ahmad, J M Williams, SH Faro ‘The Effectiveness 
of fMRI Data When Combined With Polygraph Data’ (2018) 12 European Polygraph 19 
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Whilst the focus is on the ‘conventional’ polygraph it is important to acknowledge 
separately the debate currently taking place in the US with regard to the newer fMRI 
techniques, such evidence having been ruled inadmissible in Federal court. 651 
Moreno652 explores the complex nature of the debate looking to the possible uses of 
neuroimaging by the courts holding out the possibility that ‘one day cognitive 
neuroscientists may perform the magic of accurate mind reading’,653 but that in the 
interim it is necessary that both academics and practitioners understand the limits of 
the research. Noting the current concerns regarding the approach Schauer654 argues 
that the question of when the level of validity and reliability of neuroscientific 
techniques is sufficient for them to be used within the legal system is ultimately a legal 
and not a scientific question. At this time this debate has not featured in this 
jurisdiction but there is no reason to believe it would be any less complex. 
 
7.1.1 What is the Polygraph and does it Work? 
At its most basic, the polygraph measures an individual’s ‘fight or flight response’. 
During times of heightened stress, the sympathetic nervous system will produce 
changes in blood pressure, heart rate, respiratory rate, sweating, and pupil dilatation. 
The polygraph measures changes to the first four of these in response to questions set 
by the examiner.655 
 
Typically, the parameters measured are the galvanic skin response, respiration, heart 
rate, and relative blood pressure. The theory runs that in response to heightened 
stress the respiratory rate will rise; this is measured by two pneumographs, rubber 
tubes typically containing a sensor. One is placed across the chest and the other across 
the upper abdomen to detect changes in the rate and depth of breathing. The galvanic 
skin response, which will change as arousal will cause an increase in sweating, is 
 
651 US v Semrau 693 F. 3d 510 - Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, 2012  
652 J A Moreno, 'The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law' (2009) 42 Akron Law 
Review 717  
653 ibid 737 
654 F Schauer ‘Can Bad Science be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond’ 
(2010) 95 Cornell Law Review 1191 
655 E Pivovarova, J Edersheim, J Baker and B Price ‘A Polygraph Primer: What Litigators Need to 
Know’ (2014) 26 The Jury Expert 1 
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typically detected with probes on the end of the fingers, increased sweating increases 
the skins conductivity. Blood pressure and heart rate should also both rise in response 
to arousal, this being monitored by a cardiosphygmograph, similar to the blood 
pressure cuff used by doctors. It is perhaps worth noting at this point that the 
technology used to obtain the reading during the polygraph is well established and, 
properly maintained, has a good record of reliability.656 
 
The polygraph does not give a direct indication of deceit. Rather, the theory is that 
deceit leads to psychological arousal, which in turn creates physiological arousal. The 
polygraph measures physiological responses that correspond to this arousal. The 
measurements taken by the polygraph are processed and scored to compute an 
overall index, which is used to make a judgment as to whether the subject is being 
truthful or not.657  
 
The most widespread approach is that of the control question test (CQT). This is the 
technique most widely used in the US658 and is also used for examinations under the 
Offender Management Act659 which will be discussed later in the chapter. In this 
technique the subject is asked questions that fall into three categories: 
 
1 – control/comparison questions 
2 – questions relevant to the incident under investigation 
3 – irrelevant questions with no bearing on the incident 
 
The CQT compares the subject’s physiological responses to ‘relevant’ questions (e.g., 
‘Did you stab X?’), with those of ‘control/comparison’ questions. The control questions 
 
656 Both manual and automated machines for monitoring of blood pressure and heart rate are 
used widely in healthcare. The recording of the galvanic skin response and the pneumographs 
are also simple and established technology. 
657 National Research Council: The Polygraph and Lie Detection. Committee to Review the 
Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph. Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. 
(Washington, DC: The National Academies Press 2003) 32 
658 American Psychological Association, ‘The Truth About Lie Detectors (aka Polygraph Tests) 
2004 https://www.apa.org/research/action/polygraph accessed 2/11/19 
659 National Offender Management Service, ‘Polygraph Examinations: Instructions for imposing 
Licence Conditions for the Polygraph on Sexual Offenders’ (2014), 2.6.5 
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are formulated to reflect the generally threatening nature of relevant questions which 
generally concern past misdeeds similar to those being investigated, e.g. ‘Have you 
ever hit someone?’660 
 
The theory is that the physiological response will be greater for an individual being 
deceitful in response to relevant questions than for the control questions; whereas an 
innocent individual will have smaller responses to the relevant questions than the 
control questions.  
 
There are a variety of evaluation techniques for the analysis of the data obtained from 
a polygraph. The technique most favoured currently are numerical scoring systems 
which utilise either 3 or 7 point scales.661 Discussion of the relative merits of each 
scoring system are outwith the scope of this thesis, however, to understand how the 
polygraph results are reached, it is useful to look briefly at one of the scoring formats. 
The empirical scoring system (ESS) is a relatively recent technique662 which claims to 
allow the expert giving evidence to attribute a level of statistical significance to the 
results.663  
 
The ESS works with the CQT technique and comprises a three position scale (+, 0, -). A 
score is attributed whenever there is a visible difference in the response between the 
relevant and the comparison questions. The galvanic skin response is double weighted 
meaning that it scores +2, 0 or -2, and the respiratory and blood pressure/heart rate 
each score +1, 0 or -1.  
 
 
660 American Psychological Association (2004) The Truth about Lie Detectors (aka Polygraph 
Tests) http://www.apa.org/research/action/polygraph.aspx accessed 31/12/15 
661 B Robertson ‘The Use of an Enhanced polygraph Scoring Technique in Homeland Security: 
The Empirical Scoring System – Making a Difference’ (2014) 43 Polygraph 79, 85 
662 The technique was first reported in the following paper, noting in the disclaimer that it was 
“to provide an open source, objective and scientifically defensible method for analysing 
polygraph data” R Nelson, DJ Krapohl and M Handler ‘Brute-Force Comparison: A Monte Carlo 
Study of the Objective Scoring System version3 (OSS-3) and Human Polygraph Scorers’ (2008) 
37 Polygraph 185 
663 R Nelson, M Handler, P Shaw, M Gougler, B Blalock, C Russell, B Cushman and M Oelrich 
‘Using the Empirical Scoring System’ (2011) 40 Polygraph 67 
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The possible results using this scoring system from a polygraph examination are: 
>/=+2 no deceit indicated (pass) 
</=-4 deceit indicated (fail) 
Anything in between is inconclusive. 
 
The alternative and less widely used test is the concealed information test (CIT) (also 
known as the guilty knowledge test (GKT)). In the CIT/GKT the subject is shown items 
or asked questions about matters known only to individuals linked to the crime, to 
determine if these provoke a significant physiological response. Where, for example,664 
the offender is known to have left the scene in a Honda, a polygraph question posed to 
the subject might be: 
The getaway car was a 
• Nissan 
• Honda 
• Toyota 
• Ford 
• Chrysler 
 
The correct detail is contained within a number of distractors or controls. In one form 
of the test, the examinee is instructed to say ‘no’ to all possibilities and the 
physiological response to each is noted, and that elicited in response to the items 
known only by an individual with knowledge of the crime (guilty knowledge) are 
compared to those elicited by the controls. 
 
The issue of polygraph reliability is contentious and will be addressed shortly.  
 
7.1.2 Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence 
In English law, polygraph evidence is generally assumed to be inadmissible. However 
there is little direct authority. Referring to the quote from Fennell v Jerome at the start 
 
664 G Ben-Shakhar, M Bar-Hillel and M Kremnitzer ‘Trial by Polygraph: Reconsidering the Guilty 
Knowledge Technique in Court’ (2002) 26 Law and Human Behavior 527 
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of this chapter, Stockdale and Grubin665 note that this was a first instance decision 
concerning a ‘truth drug’, and that no reported English authorities directly address the 
admissibility of polygraph evidence as an aid to assessing the credibility of witnesses. 
There are some English cases where the question of polygraph admissibility is touched 
upon, but not in any detail, and at best these offer only limited support to the notion 
that such evidence is inadmissible.666 
 
If the issue of admissibility were to be raised in connection with a criminal prosecution, 
it would therefore fall to be determined primarily on the basis of general principles, 
although some assistance may be gleaned from US and Commonwealth cases (and one 
decision from the Judicial Committee of Privy Council) that more directly address the 
use of polygraph evidence. 
 
The issue of polygraph admissibility has been considered by the Supreme Courts of 
Canada, Australia, and the US over the past 30 years and the consistent message has 
been that such evidence is inadmissible.  
In R v Béland, 667 the greatest concern expressed by the Canadian Supreme Court was 
not the reliability of the polygraph, but the more fundamental concern that it would 
usurp the role of the jury: 
 …based upon a consideration of rules of evidence long established…, 
the polygraph has no place in the judicial process where it is employed 
as a tool to determine or to test the credibility of witnesses.668 
Of the issue of polygraph reliability McIntyre J noted: 
…we were not supplied with sufficient evidence to reach a conclusion. 
However it may be said that even the finding of a significant percentage 
 
665 M Stockdale and D Grubin ‘The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in English Criminal 
Proceedings’ (2012) 76 Journal of Criminal Law 232 
666 R v McMahon [2010] EWCA Crim 1953; R v Thornton [2012] EWCA Crim 2461; R v J [2014] 
EWCA Crim 2271; R v McCallion [2016] EWCA Crim 1180 
667 R v Béland [1987] 2 SCR 398 
668 ibid [18] 
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of errors in its results would not, by itself, be sufficient grounds to 
exclude it as an instrument for use in the courts.669 
This was a 3 to 2 decision in which Wilson J (dissenting) argued that polygraph 
evidence should be admissible as it went to the core issue in a case where evidence 
was primarily one person’s word against the other.670 She determined that, in this 
case, the probative value of this evidence outweighed possible prejudicial effect.671 
 
Concerns as to polygraph evidence supplanting the function of the jury and concerns 
regarding the reliability of the tool were subsequently explored in the US case 
Scheffer,672 where in a spilt decision the US Supreme Court ruled polygraph evidence 
inadmissible in proceedings to which Rule 707 of the Military Rules of Evidence 
applied. This rule states: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph 
examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to 
an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, 
shall not be admitted into evidence. 
 
The question for the Supreme Court was whether this unconstitutionally abridged the 
accused’s right to present a defence, given that this relied on the results of a polygraph 
test he had ‘passed’. In a majority opinion, the court concluded that Rule 707 did not 
breach this right. For the majority, Justice Thomas noted that the accused’s right to 
present a defence is not unlimited and that rule 707 serves the following legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process: 
 
• only reliable evidence is admitted; 
 
669 ibid [19] 
670 ibid [30] 
671 ibid [56] 
672United States v Scheffer (1998) No. 96-1133. 523 US 303 
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• the jury makes the determination of credibility ‘A fundamental premise of our 
criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector’;673 and 
• it avoids litigation over matters other than guilt or innocence – allowing 
polygraph evidence would lead to parallel litigation concerning the reliability of 
the technique, the competence of the polygrapher, the formulation of the 
questions etc., all of which would impede the effective function of the courts. 
 
It is perhaps arguable that, as MRE 707 applies only to the military, the ruling does not 
preclude the use of the polygraph in other contexts in the US, but the previously noted 
comment about the ‘fundamental premise’ of the jury as lie detector is equally 
applicable to civilian trials. 
 
Justice Stevens (dissenting) argued that the blanket exclusion of polygraph evidence 
under rule 707 did indeed abridge the right of the accused to mount a defence, thus 
violating sixth amendment rights. Considering the issue of reliability, he noted a 
number of studies which placed the reliability of polygraph tests at between 85% and 
90%674 and that studies cited in the majority opinion as evidence for the poor 
reliability of polygraph evidence, placed the accuracy at 70%.675 He further noted that 
the studies indicate that the polygraph was more likely to find the guilty innocent than 
vice versa.676 
 
 
673 ibid 313  
674 ibid As cited by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion at fn 20 of the opinion–‘D Raskin, C 
Honts and J Kircher, The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case for 
Polygraph Tests, in 1 Modern Scientific Evidence 572 (D Faigman, D Kaye, M Saks, & J Sanders, 
eds. 1997) (hereinafter Faigman) (compiling eight laboratory studies that place mean accuracy 
at approximately 90%); id., at 575 (compiling four field studies, scored by independent 
examiners, that place mean accuracy at 90.5%); Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, A Response to 
Professors Iacono and Lykken, in Faigman 627 (compiling six field studies, scored by original 
examiners, that place mean accuracy at 97.5%); S. Abrams, The Complete Polygraph Handbook 
190-191 (1989) (compiling 13 laboratory studies that, excluding inconclusive results, place 
mean accuracy at 87%).’ 
675 ibid fn 21 of opinion. ‘WG Iacono and DT Lykken, The Scientific Status of Research on 
Polygraph Techniques: The Case against Polygraph Tests, in Faigman 608 (compiling three 
studies that place mean accuracy at 70%).’ 
676 ibid 334 
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He also explained that role of the jury would not be supplanted by the admission of 
polygraph evidence,677 arguing that the jury would be guided by the judge as to the 
weight of the evidence.  
 
As to the issue of collateral proceedings, while supporting a rule prescribing minimum 
standards for admissibility, he clearly argued against the blanket exclusion. 
 
The use of such evidence in the US civilian courts varies, in that some states permit 
polygraph evidence and some do not. Udashen and Knight678 set out the situation in 
each state, noting that while the most ‘liberal’ in terms of polygraph admissibility is 
New Mexico, where polygraph evidence is treated on the same basis as other expert 
evidence, a majority of states now admit polygraph evidence in limited circumstances.  
 
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Mallard v R679 reviewed the 
literature and case law concerning polygraph evidence noting the ‘lengthy and often 
acrimonious debate’ between ‘polygraphers… and certain psychologists, physiologists 
and others who regard polygraphy as lacking any scientific basis…and therefore oppose 
their evidentiary use’.680 This could be viewed as a concern by the court that it is the 
polygraph industry which is behind the push for greater polygraph acceptance, or it 
may simply be a recognition of the level and intensity of the ongoing debate. In a 
lengthy judgment the court concluded that: 
 
…it has not been shown that the polygraph technique is a reliable method 
for determining truth or untruth and nor is there the degree of 
acceptance within the relevant scientific community which would indicate 
that it is being seen as so.681  
 
677 ibid 335 
678 G Udashen & N Knight ‘The Law of Polygraphic Evidence’ Paper presented at the State Bar 
of Texas Advanced Criminal Law Course 2003.n Dallas, Texas on J 
http://www.sualaw.com/Appearances-Articles/The_Law_of_Polygraph_Evidence.pdf   
accessed 31/12/15 
679 Mallard v The Queen [2003] WASCA 296 
680 ibid [306] 
681 ibid [369] 
211 
 
 
A further case which warrants consideration is Bernal v R,682 which was a ruling from 
the Privy Council on appeal from the Jamaican courts. This case is deemed particularly 
relevant given the recent ruling from the UKSC clarifying the degree of persuasiveness 
that should be attributed to such cases.683  
 
The appellant had been refused leave to admit polygraph evidence to bolster his 
credibility. The resident magistrate had ruled polygraph evidence inadmissible. This 
was upheld by Jamaica’s Court of Appeal, but they certified the following questions 
when granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council: 
 
(a) Whether the learned magistrate erred in law in holding that to 
permit an expert to give opinion evidence of polygraph tests which he 
administered on the appellant … would encroach on the learned 
resident magistrate’s judicial function; and 
(b) Whether evidence of the findings of a polygraph examination by a 
competent expert are admissible where such evidence is sought to be 
adduced by a defendant, in particular to rebut an allegation of guilty 
knowledge.684 
 
The Privy Council upheld the decision of the lower court, and addressed the certified 
question thus: 
 
…their lordships do not find it necessary to express any final conclusion 
as to whether or not there may be exceptional cases where the 
evidence of an expert may be admissible to testify as to the results of a 
polygraph test .... Their lordships are satisfied that the resident 
 
682 Bernal v R (Jamaica) [1997] UKPC 18 
683 Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 44 
684 Bernal v R (Jamaica) [1997] UKPC 18 [29] 
212 
 
magistrate was not in error. The evidence before him did not suggest 
that polygraph tests are infallible...685 
 
This is of interest in two respects. On one hand, there is no indication of what such 
exceptional circumstances might be, so arguably this may represent a potential 
‘window’ for adducing polygraph evidence. Equally interesting is the comment that 
there is ‘no evidence polygraphs are infallible’. This suggests that polygraph evidence 
was, in this case at least, being judged against a different yardstick to any other 
evidence. In practice, no evidence is infallible, or immune to misinterpretation, and 
admissible witness testimony (especially eyewitness or earwitness identification) can 
be notoriously unreliable.686 Why then should such a criticism be made in respect of 
polygraph evidence, particularly when it is tendered on behalf of the defence, where 
the only requirement is to introduce an element of reasonable doubt?  
 
7.2 Post Conviction use of the Polygraph  
The Offender Management Act 2007 is the first legislation to make specific provision 
for the use of polygraph evidence in the England and Wales. As such, it is arguable that 
it may provide the first ‘crack in the door’ with regard to polygraph admissibility in this 
jurisdiction. The relevant provisions are contained within part 3 of the Act. Sections 28-
30 provide for polygraph testing to be required as a condition of licence for certain 
sexual offenders.687 
 
 
685 ibid [39] 
686 See fn 475 
687 Key conditions: Over the age of 18 at release; imprisonment for a minimum of 12 months; 
relevant sexual offence means (a) an offence specified in Part 2 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 (specified sexual offences); 
(b) an offence specified in paragraphs 1 to 21 of Schedule 16 to that Act (offences under the 
law of Scotland); or 
(c) an offence specified in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to that Act (offences under the law of 
Northern Ireland). 
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Following a successful pilot across the East and West Midlands probation areas, this 
provision has now rolled out across England and Wales.688 The individuals who 
administer the testing must have completed training and met assessment criteria set 
out in the Polygraph Rules 2009/619. As yet, within this jurisdiction no cases 
concerning polygraph evidence have been ruled admissible, but it seems highly likely 
that were this to occur the polygraph operator would be the expert witness. 
 
When an offender makes clinically significant disclosures in the course of the 
polygraph, these are triggers for further questioning and/or investigation. The 
polygraph findings alone cannot be used as grounds to return the offender to custody, 
and s30 of the Act incorporates a statutory ban on the use of evidence from the 
polygraph in subsequent criminal proceeding against that individual: 
30 (1) Evidence of any matter mentioned in subsection (2) may not be 
used in any proceedings against a released person for an offence. 
(2) The matters so excluded are– 
(a) any statement made by the released person while participating in a 
polygraph session; and 
(b) any physiological reactions of the released person while being 
questioned in the course of a polygraph examination.689 
Perhaps surprisingly, the rationale for s 30(2)(b) is not addressed in the explanatory 
notes associated with the act. Neither did the issue arise, beyond noting its presence, 
in the House of Lords Grand Committee debate.690 However, if one looks back further, 
the question of polygraph results being admitted in evidence was the subject of a 
Commons written answer in 1997 with the then Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, effectively restating the Archbold view of Fennell v Jerome, responding 
that:  
 
 
688 T Gannon, J Wood, A Pina, E Vasquez and I Fraser ‘The Evaluation of the Mandatory 
Polygraph Pilot’ (2012) Ministry of Justice Research series 14/12 
689 Offender Management Act 2007  
690 HL Deb 22 July 2013 Vol 747 col 417-422 
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The courts have held that, as a matter of principle, evidence produced by 
mechanical, chemical or hypnotic truth test on a witness is inadmissible to 
show the veracity or otherwise of that witness. 691 
 
The statutory provisions must be read along with the associated polygraph rules,692 
which are prescriptive and set out how polygraph examinations are to be conducted.  
 
Recent figures indicate that 166 individuals have been returned to custody since the 
use of the polygraph started in August 2014.693 But, although it is clear that polygraph 
cannot be used as the sole indicator for return to custody, what is not clear from this 
information is what additional information contributed to the decision to return the 
offender to custody. 
 
7.2.1 Extending the use of the Polygraph 
If the introduction of polygraph testing in the Offender Management Act 2007 opened 
the first crack in the door,694 its inclusion in the draft Domestic Abuse Bill695 which 
recently came before Parliament suggests that the crack may indeed grow wider. 
Clause 52 of the draft Bill makes provision for the amendment of s 28 of the 2007 Act 
to provide for the application of a polygraph condition to individuals convicted of 
domestic abuse. The intention would be that the National Probation Service pilot the 
use of polygraph testing with high-risk perpetrators.696 
 
Interestingly, the explanatory notes to the Bill, while noting that, as per s30 of the 
Offender Management Act 2007, any statement or physiological reaction may not be 
 
691 HC Deb 24 Jun 1997 Vol 296 col 443W 
692 Polygraph Rules 2009/619 
693 Telegraph Reporters ‘Lie detectors have been used to send 160 sex offenders back to 
prison’ The Telegraph (16 February 2018) 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/02/16/liedetectorshave-used-send-160-sex-
offenders-back-prison/ accessed 10/02/19 
694 J Elton ‘The Polygraph in the English Courts: A Creeping Inevitability or a Step Too Far?’ 
(2017) 81 Journal of Criminal Law 66 
695 Draft Domestic Abuse Bill 2018 
696 Secretary of State for the Home Department ‘Transforming the Response to Domestic 
Abuse: Consultation Response and Draft Bill’ (CP15) January 2019 at 3.4.1 
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used in criminal proceedings in which the person is the defendant, does expressly 
envisage that ‘any statement made by a person in a polygraph session could … be used 
as the basis for recalling the offender to prison for breach of a licence condition.’697  
 
It should be noted that the explanatory notes are only guides to possible 
interpretation issues, and that as neither the 2007 Act nor the amendments proposed 
by the current Bill refer expressly to this, it may be that the suggestion in the current 
notes would be equally persuasive in respect of the 2007 Act as originally enacted. To 
put it another way, it is reasonable to suppose that what s30 does not forbid is 
permissible. Nonetheless the explanatory notes offering this specific possible 
interpretation may be seen as a potential widening of the reach of the polygraph 
evidence.  
 
Considering the argument that this introduction of the polygraph could represent a 
creeping development, or pressure for such development, a recent article from a 
current prisoner/detainee is of interest as it begs the question – if the polygraph is 
now deemed sufficiently accurate by the probation service to send people back to 
prison, what about those who maintain their innocence?698 It seems it is only a matter 
of time before an individual returned to detention on the basis of polygraph evidence 
challenges its use in the courts. 
 
7.3 The Polygraph and Human Rights Legislation 
The interface between polygraph evidence and the European Convention on Human 
Rights has been considered in two Strasbourg cases,699 and once by the English courts. 
 
697 Draft Domestic Abuse Bill Explanatory notes clause 52 at [219] 
698 Current Detainee/ Prisoner HMP Frankland Probation using polygraph insidetime 30th 
January 2019 https://insidetime.org/probation-using-polygraph/ accessed 10/02/19 
699 A search on the website of the European Court of Human Rights using the search term 
‘polygraph’ on 18/06/19 returned a further 22 cases between 2007 and 2018. None of these 
cases analyses the use of polygraph evidence in respect of engagement with or breach of the 
various articles. Listed cases are CAS and CS v Romania [20/03/2012] App no 26692/05; Šečić v 
Croatia [31/05/2007] App no 40116/02; M and C v Romania [27/09/2011] App no 29032/04; 
Fazliyski v Bulgaria [16/04/2013] App 40908/05; IC v Romania [24/05/2016] App no 36934/08; 
Buntov v Russia [5/06/2012] App no 27026/10; Tyagunova v Russia [31/07/2012] App no 
19433/07; Tikhonova v Russia [30/04/2012] App no 13596/05; Beloborodov v Russia 
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The chosen approaches considered polygraph evidence in light of both article 6 and 
article 8. 
 
In A v Germany,700 the accused asserted that his article 6 rights to a fair trial were 
violated by a refusal to allow him to be interviewed with the aid of a polygraph. The 
European Commission on Human Rights did not consider that this refusal had resulted 
in any unfairness. It was pointed out once again that polygraph results are not 100% 
reliable, and the commission also noted that if such evidence were permitted, 
unreasonable inferences might then be drawn as to the guilt of any individuals who 
decline to take one. The issue of the inferences which might be drawn will be 
considered shortly (7.4.3). 
 
Polygraph evidence was further considered in Bragadireanu v Romania701, where the 
accused voluntarily took a polygraph test without legal representation. He was 
subsequently convicted. The court did not find that his article 6 rights had been 
violated, as there was evidence as to guilt other than the polygraph. The judgment 
does not clarify what the outcome of the polygraph was, but does note that it ‘is not 
the court’s role to speculate as to what the outcome of the criminal proceeding would 
have been had the answers to the polygraph been taken into account’702 from which it 
seems reasonable to assume it indicated deceit on the part of the defendant!  
 
In neither of these cases did the commission expressly exclude the possibility of 
polygraph evidence being used, or determine that its use would breach the article 6 
right to a fair trial. This would accord with the previously noted point (4.1.2) that the 
 
[21/10/2010] App no 11342/05; Ianoş v Romania [12/07/2011] App no 8258/05; Potcovă v 
Romania [17/12/2013] App no 27945/07; Jemeļjanovs v Latvia [06/10/2016] App no 37364/05; 
Agarkova v Russia [15/05/2018] App no 29951/09; Marina Alekseyeva v Russia [19/12/2013] 
App no 22490/05; Gerasimenko and Others v Russia [01/12/2016] App no 5821/10 and 
65523/12; Markaryan v Russia [04/04/2013] App no 12102/05; Mađer v Croatia [21/06/2011] 
App no 56185/07; TK v Lithuania [12/06/2018] App no 14000/12; MS v Ukraine [11/07/2017] 
App no 2091/13; Dobriyeva and others v Russia [19/12/2013] App no 18407/10; MP and others 
v Bulgaria [15/11/2011] App no 22457/08; Lisica v Croatia [25/02/2010] App no 20100/06 
700 A v Germany (1984) 6 EHRR CD 360 
701 Bragadireanu v Romania (2008) Application no. 22088/04 
702 ibid [102] 
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ECHR leaves it to the domestic courts to judge if expert testimony is sufficiently 
reliable to be used. 
 
Kocsenda,703 commenting on the decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court which 
categorically excludes both polygraph,704 and more recently hypnotically-retrieved705  
evidence, asks whether the UK courts should follow suit. Commenting on the article 6 
case law, Kocsenda notes that little guidance is likely to be gleaned from that case law, 
given the wide margin of appreciation to national jurisdictions demonstrated.  
 
Although there is currently little European case law in this respect, a possible future 
concern could be that if the polygraph is proven to be sufficiently reliable to be 
admissible, then arguably the article 6 right to a fair trial could be engaged if the 
accused is unable to introduce reliable exculpatory evidence. As will be argued later in 
the chapter there are potential (although highly speculative routes) by which such 
evidence could come before the courts. 
 
If it were to reach the point where there is an acceptance that the polygraph gives an 
accurate indication of deceit (or truth) then arguably the individual wishing to adduce 
that evidence is in a very similar situation to that of the individual seeking to adduce 
exculpatory evidence in relation to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. However, 
a key difference it that in the event the polygraph was deemed admissible it would 
almost certainly be via expert evidence, whereas eyewitness testimony is not. 
 
During the project pilot regarding the use of the polygraph for the post-conviction 
management of serious sexual offenders, the claimant in R (on application of C) v 
Ministry of Justice706 sought to overturn the polygraph requirement of his licence on 
the grounds that it breached his article 8 and article 14 rights.707 The court accepted 
 
703 K Kocsenda ‘Supreme Court of Canada Hypnosis Evidence: Admissibility’ (2007) 71 Journal 
of Criminal Law 497 
704 Phillion v R  [1978] 1 SCR 18  
705 R v Trochym 2007 SCC 6 
706 R (on application of C) v Ministry of Justice [2009] EWHC 2671 (Admin) [2010] HRLR 3 
707 Art 8 Right to respect for private and family life and Art 14 Prohibition of discrimination 
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that the imposition of the polygraph condition did indeed engage article 8, but that the 
seriousness of the offences for which he had been convicted justified the imposition 
for the purposes of article 8(2).708 With regard to article 14, the claimant sought to 
establish that the fact that an individual from a different part of the country would not 
be subject to the polygraph condition was discriminatory. The court determined article 
14 was not engaged, noting that the rationale for the pilot study was fairly set out in 
the guidance note issued by the secretary of state.709 
 
An important point to note with regard to this last case is that it is the only case where 
the consideration relates to a mandatory polygraph condition being imposed on an 
individual who has already been convicted; the other cases both relate to polygraph 
tests willingly undertaken by the accused individuals. 
 
7.4 Objections to the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence 
It may be argued that there are a number of underpinning principles which would 
restrict/prevent the admission of such evidence, these will now be considered. 
 
7.4.1 Polygraph Reliability 
If polygraph evidence were to be adduced in an English court, it would be expert 
opinion and thus have to meet the requirements of part 19 of the CrimPR and 
associated practice directions.710 The revised CrimPR ensure that expert opinion 
evidence both meets the Turner principles, and further that such evidence is reliable. 
The practice directions at 19A.4711 cite R v Dlugosz, noting that ‘it is essential to recall 
the principle which must be applicable, namely in determining the issue of 
admissibility, the court must be satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific 
basis for the evidence to be admitted…’ This perhaps goes to the heart of the 
polygraph debate. The polygraph, in its various forms, has been around since the 
 
708 R (on application of C) v Ministry of Justice [2009] EWHC 2671 (Admin) [2010] HRLR 3 
 [31] 
709 ibid [32] 
710 CrimPR, Part 19, October 2015 
711 Crim Practice Directions, October 2015, 19A.4 
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1920s and, as previously noted, there is still extensive debate as to whether polygraph 
evidence is reliable, and as to whether it has a sound scientific basis. 
 
The influential 2003 report by the US National Academy of Sciences712 while critical of 
much of the research available at the time, and of the accuracy levels claimed by the 
proponents of the polygraph, concluded that: 
 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the quality of the empirical research 
and the limited ability to generalise to real-world settings, we conclude 
that in populations of examinees such as those represented in the 
polygraph research literature, untrained in countermeasures, specific-
incident polygraph tests for event-specific investigations can 
discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though 
well below perfection.713 
 
A later meta-analysis of 38 studies undertaken by the American Polygraph Association 
(APA) reported accuracy of 89% (confidence interval 83-95%) for single-issue tests. 714 
Such a substantial meta-analysis, covering as it does some 3,723 examinations, is 
welcome, but the source should be noted as it is arguable that it is in the interests of 
the APA to demonstrate the effectiveness of the polygraph. 
 
Ben-Shakhar and Elaad715 conducted a meta-analysis of 80 laboratory studies to 
estimate the validity of the CIT/GKT approach using electrodermal measures. There 
was an average correlation coefficient of 0.79 between the detection measure and the 
 
712 National Research Council: The Polygraph and Lie Detection. Committee to Review the 
Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press 2003) 
713 ibid 214 
714 M Gougler, R Nelson, M Handler, D Krapohl, P Shaw and L Bierman ‘Meta-Analytic Survey of 
Criterion Accuracy of Validated Polygraph Techniques Report Prepared for American Polygraph 
Association Board of Directors’ (2011) 40 Polygraph 193, 203  
715 G Ben-Shakhar  and E Elaad ‘The Validity of Psychophysiological Detection of Information 
with the Guilty Knowledge Test: a Meta-Analytic Review’ (2003) 88 Applied Psychology 131 
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criterion of guilt v innocence. While noting the strongly positive results, the authors 
recommended further study.  
 
One of the criticisms of the polygraph is that it can ‘be beaten’ and is thus an 
unreliable tool. Ben-Shakhar716 reviewing the experimental literature concerning the 
effectiveness of both psychological and physical countermeasures concludes that ‘it is 
possible and in fact quite easy to train people to produce or enhance their 
physiological responses…, and thus distort the outcomes of both the CQT and the 
CIT.’717 It was noted that the detection of physical countermeasures was easier than 
the detection of psychological countermeasures. 
 
It may be arguable that if the test were to be used as a ‘one off’ single issue test, such 
as might be the case during an investigation, then there is little time to learn the 
techniques. Perhaps more concerning is its use in longer term post-conviction 
management of sex offenders, where multiple polygraphs will be conducted over an 
extended period of time. 
 
A more fundamental criticism of the polygraph, particularly in relation to the CQT, is 
that the basic underpinning theory is flawed in that it assumes that an innocent 
examinee will respond more strongly to the comparison question than the relevant 
questions.718 The dilemma created was captured well by The British Psychology 
Association: 
 
This premise is somewhat naive as truth tellers may also be more 
aroused when answering the relevant questions, particularly: (i) when 
these relevant questions are emotion evoking questions (e.g. when an 
innocent man, suspected of murdering his beloved wife, is asked 
 
716 G Ben-Shakhar ‘Countermeasures’  in B. Verschuere, G. Ben-Shakhar, & E. Meijer 
(Eds.), Memory detection: Theory and application of the Concealed Information Test 
(Cambridge University Press New York 2011) 
717 Ibid 213 
718 WG Iacono ‘Effective Policing: Understanding How Polygraph Tests Work and are Used 
Criminal (2008) 35 Justice and Behavior 1295 
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questions about his wife in a polygraph test, the memory of his late 
wife might re-awaken his strong feelings about her); and (ii) when the 
innocent examinee experiences fear, which may occur, for example, 
when the person is afraid that his or her honest answers will not be 
believed by the polygraph examiner.719  
 
The counterargument is that a skilled polygrapher should be capable of phrasing 
questions and establishing an environment which will compensate for such an 
effect.720  
 
Conducting a polygraph is not a simple ‘plug in and press play’ operation, in that to 
conduct the polygraph examination the examiner needs firstly to undertake a pre-test 
interview with the examinee, and on the basis of this formulate both the relevant 
questions to be asked and also the comparison questions. This need to individualise 
each examination raises a concern as to the subjectivity of such an examination. 
Reviewing the available literature, Synnott et al.721 note that all three stages of the 
CQT examination (pre-test interview, examination, and post-test evaluation) can be 
criticised as lacking objectivity and standardisation. It is arguable that with proper 
training many of these concerns can be addressed. 
 
However, even with the considerable reservations that exist, a number of academics 
have examined whether, correctly administered, a polygraph could meet the 
Daubert 722  criteria for admissibility of expert evidence. There are four criteria 
 
719 The British Psychology Society A review of the current scientific status and fields of 
application of Polygraphic Deception Detection. Final report from the BPS Working Party 
(British Psychological Society 2004), 10 
720 J Synnott, D Dietzel and M Ioannou ‘A Review of the Polygraph: History, Methodology and 
Current Status’ (2015) 1 Crime Psychology Review 59, 69 
721 ibid 67-69 
722 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc [1993] 113 S. Ct 2786. Prior to this case the Frye 
Standard (Frye v US 293 F1013(1923)) generally applied to expert evidence, which was only 
admissible if it was ‘sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it 
belongs’. Daubert standard requires that scientific evidence admitted is sufficiently reliable 
and was the principle underpinning the proposed changed set out by the Law Commission in 
LC 325  
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identified within Daubert, which if met would potentially make the evidence 
admissible. These are: 
1. Testability 
2. Known error rate 
3. Peer review 
4. Publication  
Vrij723 expresses the opinion that while CQT may meet criteria 2 and 3, it does not meet 
criteria 4 and is unclear on criteria 1. In contrast, Ben-Shakhar et al.724 conclude that, 
properly administered, the CIT/GKT is capable of meeting all four criteria. The CIT/GKT 
has been used in Japan since the 1950s725 and since 1970 more than 5,000 polygraph 
examinations per year have been undertaken by the police agencies with the accuracy 
rate for detection of deceit reported to be 90%.726  
 
Revisiting the finding of the NAS report some 15 years later, Iacono and Ben-Shakhar727 
conclude that 2003 reservations regarding the weak scientific basis, and the lack of 
known error rate for the CQT test, remain essentially unchanged. 
 
Noting such reservations and concerns, is expert testimony relating to a polygraph 
examination able to meet the requirements of part 19 of the CrimPR? It is argued that 
the technique is capable of meeting the requirements of the rules, as although there 
are considerable reservations in some quarters as to whether the underpinning 
 
723 A Vrij Detecting Lies and Deceit Pitfalls and Opportunities 2nd edn (Wiley Chichester 2008), 
335-337 
724 G Ben-Shakhar  and E Elaad ‘The Validity of Psychophysiological Detection of Information 
with the Guilty Knowledge Test: a Meta-Analytic Review’ (2003) 88 Applied Psychology 131 
725 S Hira and I Furumitsu ‘Polygraphic Examinations in Japan: Application of the Guilty 
Knowledge Test in Forensic Investigations’ (2002) 4 International Journal of Police Science and 
Management 16 
726 T Yamamura and Y Miyata ‘Development of the Polygraph Technique in Japan for the 
Detection of Deception’ (1990) 44 Forensic Science International 257. Unfortunately lack of 
access to translated primary source material has limited further exploration of the situation in 
Japan 
727 WG Iacono and G Ben-Shakhar ‘Current Status of Forensic Lie Detection With the 
Comparison Question Technique: An Update of the 2003 National Academy of Sciences Report 
on Polygraph Testing’ (2019) 43 Law and Human Behavior 86 
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principle is valid, this is something that would have to be highlighted within the expert 
report. It is, in effect, the issue noted at 19A.6 of the practice directions: 
19A.6 In addition, in considering reliability, and especially the reliability 
of expert scientific opinion, the court should be astute to identify 
potential flaws in such opinion which detract from its reliability, …  
Were such evidence permitted before the English courts, the body of literature which 
raises concerns as to the possible flaws in the theoretical basis of the technique would 
be part of the expert testimony. This would again return the question of whether the 
probative or prejudicial weight of such evidence was seen as being greater.  
 
7.4.2 The Role of the Jury as Lie Detector 
Key to much of the reasoning concerning the inadmissibility of polygraph evidence is 
that it would serve the same function as the jury, in that it would be determining the 
credibility of the witness. Further, as the operators are rarely medically qualified, they 
would be unable to give evidence as to state of mind as per Turner.728 For this thesis 
the question must be, ‘could polygraph evidence support the jury in their search for 
the truth by better enabling them to determine if a witness is being truthful, or would 
such evidence simply replicate what the jury already does?’ 
 
It is important to be clear that although the question is ‘could the polygraph assist the 
jury’, there is no question that the polygraph could, or would, replace the jury making 
an assessment of the totality of the evidence being given from the witness box, but 
what it may do is aid by providing an additional element of evidence regarding 
statements given out of court as part of the investigatory process. 
 
Since any presentation of polygraph test results would involve expert opinion 
evidence, it is helpful to consider the role of expert evidence in establishing credibility. 
R v Robinson729 remains the leading English decision.730 The complainant was a 15-
 
728 R v Turner [1975] QB 834 
729R v Robinson [1994] 3 All E.R. 346 (CA) 
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year-old girl with learning difficulties and the mental capacity of a seven- or eight-year-
old. Following a voire dire the judge ruled she was competent to be a witness. 
 
In cross-examination, the defence sought to establish that false ideas had been ‘put 
into her head’ by others. At the conclusion of the prosecution case, the Crown made 
an application which was granted, to call an educational psychologist who gave 
evidence that the complainant ‘could not adopt ideas from someone else. She would 
have difficulties taking them on board and relating them … She is not suggestible…’731  
 
The court held that while it may be acceptable to call expert evidence that a witness or 
a confession is unreliable,732 it was not permissible to call evidence as to why the 
witness should be regarded as reliable.733 This evidence was ruled inadmissible on the 
basis it usurped the function of the jury by, in effect, telling them that this witness 
should be believed. The conviction was quashed.  
 
The limits of this rule were clarified in R v W where Judge LJ held that: 
 
There is a distinction between evidence that a condition has been 
identified by experts, which may explain that the memory of an 
apparently truthful witness may, in fact, be false (which we describe as 
the syndrome) and evidence from an expert witness based on a study 
of identical or virtually identical material to that available to the jury 
which directly (or indirectly) informs the jury of the expert’s opinion 
whether the witness in question was or was not to be believed.734 
 
730 T Ward ‘Usurping the Role of the Jury? Expert Evidence and Witness Credibility in English 
Criminal Trials’ (2009) 13 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 83 
731 R v Robinson [1994] 3 All E.R. 346 (CA), 373 
732 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1965) 49 Cr App R 148; R v Raghip The Times, 
December 9, 1991      
733 The court did leave open the possibility that if the defence were to call expert evidence that 
the witness was unreliable because of a mental abnormality outside the jury’s experience then 
the Crown may call an expert in rebuttal. 
734 R v W(Richard)[2003] EWCA Crim 3490, cited and approved in R v Bernard [2003] EWCA 
Crim 3917 [28] 
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A case which initially appears similar, but with a different outcome, was R v S(VJ).735 
Here, S appealed conviction for sexual misconduct against a 13-year-old autistic girl. 
Expert evidence was adduced that an individual suffering from autism would find it 
difficult to invent a story and then retain the details for any time. The case was 
appealed on the ground that this evidence had the effect of bolstering the credibility 
of the victim, and thus amounted to ‘oath helping’, in much the same way as the 
evidence that was held inadmissible in Robinson. The appeal was rejected. It was held 
that the disputed evidence was of general application, or background, and considered 
the usual characteristics of people with autism, rather than being a comment on the 
credibility of the individual. However, Ward argues that the difference between the 
two cases was: 
  
…not that the expert evidence was ‘general’ in one and ‘specific’ in the 
other, but that the evidence in VJS both involved a lesser risk of 
unjustified deference by the jury than that in Robinson, and had greater 
probative value.736 
 
Ward further notes that it was the source of the evidence that gave rise to this 
difference, in that it relates to the body of knowledge the experts utilised. In VJS the 
expert was talking about the body of evidence about autism, and as such this would 
probably meet the Bonython test of ‘being sufficiently organized to be accepted as a 
reliable body of knowledge’, whereas the personal knowledge of the expert in 
Robinson was unlikely to pass the same test. 
 
In S(VJ), the Court of Appeal determined that judge’s summing up in the trial of first 
instance attributed appropriate weight to the expert testimony:  
 
 
735 R v S(VJ) [2006] EWCA Crim 2389 
736 T Ward ‘Usurping the Role of the Jury? Expert Evidence and Witness Credibility in English 
Criminal Trials’ (2009) 13 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 83 
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That is not to say that she is incapable of lying and in no way is that 
evidence … intended to usurp your function in assessing her evidence 
and deciding on its reliability.737 
 
The relevance of this case perhaps lies in the fact that, on occasion, the courts have 
permitted evidence regarding credibility providing its probative value is sufficient and 
it does not supplant the jury as the lie detector. 
 
This leaves open the question of what application, if any, does this line of reasoning 
have for polygraph evidence? It is suggested that while an expert presenting evidence 
from a polygraph would never say ‘in my opinion the defendant was telling the truth’, 
they might instead say:  
 
When the test was administered, the witness reacted in [… way]. The 
expectation is that if lying a witness would react in […. other way]. The 
lack of any such reaction here is considered consistent with that of a 
witness who is not stressed by the question…etc. Although such a 
reaction can sometimes be found in witnesses who are indeed lying and 
the test is not therefore guaranteed to be accurate…. 
 
This degree of caution in the phrasing of the evidence would, it is argued, minimise the 
risk of the prejudicial effect outweighing the probative value. The jury would be in 
receipt of not only what the polygraph evidence may mean, but also the limitations of 
that opinion. 
 
7.4.2.1 Demeanour as an Indicator of Deceit? 
One of the key arguments against admitting polygraph evidence is that it usurps the 
function of the jury, but does the average jury need the help of experts or technology 
when deciding who is to be believed? 
 
 
737 R v S(VJ) [2006] EWCA Crim 2389 [11] 
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It goes without saying that all jurors will have had experience of being lied to, but what 
is less clear is how good they are at detecting such lies. Arguably any competent jury 
can be relied upon to detect an implausible lie, or one that has been exposed by cross-
examination or by calling other evidence to disprove it. But can a jury spot a plausible 
lie that cannot otherwise be disproved? 
 
There is increasing recognition, both academically and judicially, that establishing lies 
from truth by observation is generally unreliable.738 In the civil case Liverpool Victoria 
Insurance Co Ltd v Yavuz the High Court noted ‘reliance on witness demeanour is 
notoriously unreliable’.739 Noting this, for the courts, demeanour740 is still regarded as 
a form of real evidence that may be relevant in establishing the weight that should be 
attached to a witness’ evidence,741 the current Crown Court Compendium for example 
includes the following optional jury direction: 
The jury may take such notes as they find helpful. However, it would be 
better not to take so many notes that they are unable to observe the 
manner/demeanour of the witnesses as they give their evidence.742  
The notion that demeanour may be taken as an indication of credibility was recently 
reaffirmed in an upper tribunal immigration case which determined that special 
arrangements should be considered to allow a witness who wore a full face veil to give 
evidence without veil to allow the panel to evaluate credibility.743 This echoes the 
findings of HHJ Peter Murphy, in a 2014 criminal case, ruling that while a defendant 
could attend court in a full niqab, the face veil must be removed if she elected to give 
evidence.744 Baroness Hale, speaking extra judicially, also said that judges must be able 
 
738 A Roberts ‘Case Comment Evidence: R v Daley (Carlyle)’ (2018) 5 Criminal Law Review 403 
739 Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Yavuz [2017] EWHC 3088 (QB) [121] 
740 T Bingham The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches (Oxford University Press 
Oxford 2000), 6 
741 Blackstones 2019 Behaviour, Appearance and Demeanour F8.47 
742 Judicial College Crown Court Compendium Part 1 (July 2019) at 3.1 pt23 
743 AAN (Veil: Afghanistan) [2014] UKHT 102 (IAC) 
744 M Dejevsky ‘Beyond the veil: What happened after Rebekah Dawson refused to take her 
niqab off in court’ The Independent (07/04/14)  
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to insist the veil is removed when giving evidence,745 although it should be noted that 
more recently Lord Neuberger has called this into question.746 
 
As yet there is no appellate decision regarding the removal (or otherwise) of the veil, 
and the current guidance from the Judicial College,747 while noting the fallibility of 
evaluating credibility from demeanour, does little to clarify the situation. In the case of 
criminal trials the guidance notes: 
As for those giving evidence, justification for removal of the veil requires 
close scrutiny. Judges should be particularly careful to point out that its 
wearing might impair the court’s ability to evaluate the reliability and 
credibility of the wearer’s evidence; jurors might assess what is said in ways 
that include looking at an individual’s face and demeanour. 748 
While noting for non-criminal cases (thus without a jury): 
A judge can ask anyone giving evidence to take off her veil whilst she gives 
that evidence, but only if a fair trial requires it... It should be done only if 
the judge reasonably believes it necessary in the interests of justice and 
only after reflection on whether, in the context, effective evidence could be 
given without removal.749  
 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/beyond-the-veil-what-happened-after-
rebekah-dawson-refused-to-take-her-niqab-off-in-court-9244409.htmlaccessed 02/01/16 
745 D Barratt ‘Remove Muslim veil when giving evidence in court, says top woman judge’ The 
Telegraph (12/12/14) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/11290365/Remove-Muslim-veil-when-giving-evidence-in-court-says-top-woman-
judge.html accessed 2/01/16 
746 The Guardian ‘Respect women's right to wear veil in court, says Britain's most senior judge’ 
(17/04/15) 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/apr/17/respect-womens-right-to-weir-veil-in-court-
says-britains-most-senior-judge accessed 2/01/16 
747 Judicial College Equal Treatment Bench Book February 2018 
748 ibid at 9.6 para 22 
749 ibid at 9.6 at para 15 
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Robson750 commenting on the disparity between the directions suggests that a better 
option may be to permit the wearing of the veil where it has been requested and to 
direct the jury that this is not to affect their assessment of the evidence. A final 
observation with regard to the effect of the veil on judgment of truth telling, is a study 
by Leach et al.751 which indicates that lie detection performance was improved in the 
presence of the niqab. The authors note that this is only an initial study, but, were such 
findings to be replicated, they would cast further doubt on the role of demeanour. 
 
Although the preceding analysis indicates the recognition of the English courts that 
demeanor is no longer a reliable indicator (if it ever was) of deception the change is 
not universal with a recent judgment from the Canadian Supreme Court752 that 
‘[c]overing a witness’s face may also impede credibility assessment by the trier of 
fact…’,753 and ‘On the record before us, I conclude that there is a strong connection 
between the ability to see the face of the witness and a fair trial.’754  
 
There are many factors the jury use to assess the credibility of the individual giving 
evidence, including demeanour. However, there is a substantial body of research 
which indicates that people are quite poor judges of whether an individual is truthful 
or not.  
 
A substantial portion of communication is non-verbal, 755  and there are clear 
differences in the non-verbal cues between different cultures. 756 A US study 757 
 
750 J Robson ‘Women should be allowed to wear the niquab in court – here’s why’ The 
Conversation (9 March 2018) https://theconversation.com/women-should-be-allowed-to-
wear-the-niqab-in-court-heres-why-92975 accessed 07/02/19 
751 AM Leach, N Ammar, ND England, LM Remigio, B Kleinburg and BJ Verschuere ‘Less is 
More? Detecting Lies in Veiled Witnesses’ (2016) 40 Law and Human Behavior 401 
752 R v NS [2012] 3 SCR 726  
753 ibid [25] 
754 ibid [27] 
755 M Argyle, V Salter, H Nicholson, M Williams and P Burgess ‘The Communication of Inferior 
and Superior Attitudes by Verbal and Non-Verbal Signals’ (1970) 9 British Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology 201 
756  M LaFrance and C Mayo ‘Cultural Aspects of Nonverbal Communication’ (1978) 2 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations 71 
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highlighted this when evaluating the impact of race on non-verbal behaviours in 
encounters with the police. Logically, this could be seen to present difficulties to a jury 
of one ethnic group judging the demeanour of an individual from another ethnic 
background.  
 
Looking more broadly, Vrij analysed 132 studies published in English and concluded 
that ‘a cue akin to Pinocchio’s growing nose does not exist’.758 This finding echoes the 
earlier conclusion of Kraut 759 considering pre-1980 research that there are few 
behaviours consistently associated with deception – for example avoiding eye contact, 
fidgeting etc. – do not consistently indicate lying.  
 
Vrij760 also reviewed 79 studies, considering all aspects of communication, published in 
English since 1980, which concerned the ability of laypeople to discriminate between 
truth and lies being told by people they did not know. Excluding three studies (which 
Vrij defined as being outliers) the remaining ones indicated accuracy rates between 42-
65% with the majority of the studies (62 of 79) indicating between 50-60%. The 
average accuracy across all 79 studies was 54.27%. This is comparable with the earlier 
paper where the average accuracy rate was 57%.761  
 
It is important to note that these are not studies of juries in trials. They are typically 
academic studies conducted within universities, but what seems clear is that the ability 
of individuals to detect if another individual is truthful or not (in the absence of 
extraneous evidence) is little better than chance.  
 
 
757 R Johnson ‘Race and Police Reliance on Suspicious Non-Verbal Cues’ (2007) 30 Policing: An 
International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 277  
758  A Vrij Detecting Lies and Deceit Pitfalls and Opportunities 2nd edn (Wiley Chichester 2008), 
335 
759 R Kraut ‘Humans as Lie Detectors: Some Second Thoughts’ (1980) 30 Journal of 
Communication 209, 209 
760 A Vrij Detecting Lies and Deceit Pitfalls and Opportunities 2nd edn (Wiley Chichester 2008) 
761 R Kraut ‘Humans as Lie Detectors: Some Second Thoughts’ (1980) 30 Journal of 
Communication 209 
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Academic comment in legal journals has reflected the concerns raised by such papers. 
As far back as the 1990s, Stone762 noted that there is ‘no sound basis for assessing 
credibility from demeanour’, and this was echoed by Blumenthal.763 Coming up to 
date, Snook et al.764 reviewed a number of meta-analyses and concluded that ‘most 
cues to deception are too faint for reliable detection, most facial expressions and other 
non-verbal cues are unrelated to deception, legal professionals (and others) are unable 
to accurately detect deception beyond chance levels.’ 
 
Thus, there is clear evidence going back many decades indicating that human beings, 
and thus members of the jury, are generally poor at determining truth from lies in the 
absence of other supporting information. As such, it seems there may logically be a 
role for the polygraph which – even on the poorest reliability estimate – is 
substantially better than chance at determining truth from lie. 
 
7.4.3 Implications of Refusal to Undertake a Polygraph 
If the use of the polygraph were to become widespread, even if not compulsory, a jury 
might be tempted to draw the inference that ‘if D is innocent, as he claims, he would 
then be willing to take a polygraph test; but he has refused to take one, so he must be 
guilty’. This concern was recognised in the previously discussed case A v Germany765 
(see 7.3). 
 
For obvious reasons there is no English case law as to the inferences that may be 
drawn from such a refusal. There are, however, a number of arguably analogous 
situations which may serve as a guide as to the likely response of the courts to such a 
refusal should polygraph evidence become admissible. Those areas are: 
 
 
762 M Stone ‘Instant Lie Detection. Demeanour and Credibility in Criminal Trials’ (1991) Criminal 
Law Review 821 
763 J Blumenthal ‘A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in 
Assessing Witness Credibility’(1993) 72 Nebraska Law Review 1158 
764 B Snook, MI McCardle W Fahmy and JC House ‘Assessing Truthfulness on the Witness 
Stand: Eradicating Deeply Rooted Pseudoscientific Beliefs about Credibility Assessment by 
Triers of Fact’ (2017) 22 Canadian Criminal Law Review 297 
765 A v Germany (1984) 6 EHRR CD 360 
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a) The right to silence 
b) Refusal to provide intimate samples; and 
c) Refusal to take part in an identity parade 
 
7.4.3.1 Right to Silence 
The common law right to silence generally allowed no inferences766 to be drawn from 
the accused exercising that right.767 This has been seriously eroded by ss 34-37 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA) which allow such inferences to be 
drawn in many such cases, although the need for a prima facie case to be established 
means that silence cannot convert ‘a case which is too weak to call for an answer into 
one which justifies a conviction’.768  
 
The key provisions for this thesis are s34 (pre-trial silence) and s35. 
 
Under s34(1) if the individual either under questioning or on being charged fails to 
mention something which they later rely on in court then ‘the court or jury …may draw 
such inferences from the failure as appear proper’. The Court of Appeal in R v Brizzalari 
noted clearly the primary function of s34: 
 
…the mischief at which the provision was primarily directed was the 
positive defence following a “no comment” interview and/or the 
“ambush” defence.769 
 
A particular concern for the courts has been to determine how to direct the jury when 
the defendant has remained silent following advice from a solicitor. The approach to 
be taken was affirmed by Woolf CJ in R v Beckles: 
 
 
766 R v Sparrow (1973) 57 Cr App R 352 – the trial judge commented strongly and adversely on 
the defendants decision to exercise the right to silence. The conviction was upheld at appeal, 
but noted that the judge had overstepped the limits of justifiable comment 
767 Blackstones Criminal Practice 2019 The Right to Silence F20.2 
768 R v Murray [1994] 99 Cr App R 396, 400 
769 R v Brizzalari [2004] EWCA Crim 310 
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… in a case where a solicitor’s advice is relied upon by the defendant, 
the ultimate question for the jury remains under section 34 whether 
the facts relied on at the trial were facts which the defendant could 
reasonably have been expected to mention at interview. If they were 
not, that is the end of the matter. If the jury consider that the 
defendant genuinely relied on the advice, that is not necessarily the 
end of the matter. It may still not have been reasonable for him to rely 
on the advice, or the advice may not have been the true explanation for 
his silence.770 
 
Section 35 deals with the defendant being silent at trial and was examined in R v 
Cowan 771  which addressed the question as to the proper interpretation and 
implementation of s35 of the CJPO. The appellant argued that, by permitting adverse 
inferences to be drawn from the failure to testify, this in effect reversed the burden of 
proof. The Court of Appeal firmly rejected that argument, and reiterated that s38(3) of 
the 1994 Act prohibits conviction solely on the basis of an inference drawn from the 
defendant’s silence.  
 
It is the role of the judge to inform the jury when they may and may not draw 
inferences from that silence, but, as noted by Zander and Henderson,772 jurors are 
likely in practice to draw adverse inferences ‘whether they are instructed to do so or 
not’ if they become aware that the defendant was silent in interview or if they have 
witnessed his failure to give evidence at trial. 
 
7.4.3.2  Refusal to Provide Intimate Sample  
The statutory framework set out in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in 
s54 addresses the provision of intimate samples as part of an investigation. 
 
770 R v Beckles [2004] EWCA Crim 2766 
771 R v Cowan [1996] QB 373 
772 M Zander and P Henderson (1993) Crown Court Study. Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice Research Study No 19 London HMSO cited in T Bucke, R Street and D Brown (2000) The 
Right to Silence: The impact of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) Home Office 
Research Study 199 
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The leading case on the subject R v Smith773 confirmed that inference could be drawn 
from the failure to provide a sample (in this case hair to be compared with that found 
at the scene of the offence). Smith is now confirmed in statute in PACE where the need 
for the police to advise a suspect of the possibility of adverse inference being drawn at 
trial in the event of refusal to provide the specimen is noted,774 and in the event the 
case goes to trial PACE s 62(10) allows that: 
 
Where the appropriate consent to the taking of an intimate sample…was 
refused without good cause…(b) the court or jury, in determining whether 
that person is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences 
from the refusal as appear proper. 
 
7.4.3.3 Refusal to Take Part in Identification Procedures 
Code D of PACE sets the parameters for identification procedures, and the effect of 
refusal to consent to take part in one are clearly set out: 
…the following shall be explained to the suspect…(v)that if they do not 
consent to, and co-operate in, a procedure, their refusal may be given 
in evidence in any subsequent trial and police may proceed covertly 
without their consent or make other arrangements to test whether an 
eye-witness can identify them.775  
However, the situation with regard to refusal to take part in an identification parade is 
different to either the right to silent or refusal of intimate samples, in that limits are set 
on any inference that may be drawn. In R v Karime776 the appellant had refused to 
participate in an identity parade, and the appeal was on the grounds that the trial 
judge had advised the jury that although the refusal to participate in the identification 
 
773 R v Smith (1985) 81 Cr App R 286 
774 Police Station Adviser’s Index 4th Edition Chapter 23, Section 3 – Intimate Samples - practical 
guidance 
775 PACE Code D 3.17(v) 
776 R v Karime [2004] EWCA Crim 512 
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parade did not in and of itself establish guilt, the jury was entitled to hold the refusal 
against the defendant, thus supporting the prosecution case. The Court of Appeal ruled 
that while the jury may be informed of the refusal, this cannot be held against the 
defendant. Their Lordships observing that: 
Had the intention been that the jury should be entitled to draw adverse 
inferences from a failure to cooperate in the identification process, we 
have no doubt that Parliament would have spelt out that consequence 
and that procedures would have been introduced to ensure that the 
defendant fully understood the implications of any non co-operation.777 
Thus, there appears to be a marked difference in the type of inference that can be 
drawn by failure to provide an intimate specimen as against refusing to consent to an 
identity parade.  
Considering each of the above, what is worth noting that while every defendant has a 
choice whether to comment and answer questions in court or when first interviewed, 
defendants (and complainants or witnesses) would only exceptionally qualify for 
possible polygraph examination (as per Bernal778), so the absence of it might not be 
considered remarkable. But cases could still arise in which a polygraph might have 
been used, but the option was declined. It is arguable that should this situation arise 
and become public knowledge, there could be concerns as to the so-called CSI 
effect.779 Members of the public are highly likely to have seen the polygraph being 
used on both daytime TV780 and in numerous (predominantly US) TV shows781 where 
the veracity of the technique is assumed.  
 
 
777 ibid [15] 
778 Bernal v R (Jamaica)[1997] UKPC 18 [39] 
779 “The ‘CSI effect’ is a term that legal authorities and the mass media have coined to describe 
a supposed influence that watching the television show CSI: Crime Scene Investigation has on 
juror behavior. Some have claimed that jurors who see the high-quality forensic evidence 
presented on CSI raise their standards in real trials, in which actual evidence is typically more 
flawed and uncertain” TR Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and 
Justice in Reality and Fiction (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1050, 1050  
780 e.g. The Jeremy Kyle Show ITV talk show where participants undertake a lie detector test 
781 e.g. Homeland episode The Good solider Season 1; Quantico episode Run Season 1 
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Although likely to be far from simple, both the concern that declining the polygraph 
indicates guilt and the CSI effect could be avoided if we were to follow the position of 
the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Gutierrez782 where no reference would or could 
be made to the fact that the defendant had declined the polygraph, thus the jury 
would not be aware of the declined polygraph. 
 
7.4.4 Evidential Weight of Lies 
If a situation were to arise in which expert testimony was being given to the effect that 
the polygraph indicated deceit, could any evidential weight be attributed to this 
finding? In any criminal case, the possibility exists that either the accused or witnesses 
are lying. If that lie is connected to the offence, there may be, intuitively, a belief that 
this lie is relevant to the issue of guilt. However, there are many reasons that an 
individual may lie and extensive case law as to the evidential weight that can be 
attributed to lies.  
 
In the leading case R v Lucas783 the Court of Appeal held that the jury should be given a 
specific warning as to the use that could be made of lying on the part of the accused, 
this including the fact that people may lie for reasons which are innocent. The ruling 
was delivered at the time that the law often required corroborating evidence and 
corroborations were commonplace. The court ruled that, to amount to corroboration, 
a false assertion by the accused: 
 
… must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material 
issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a 
fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that 
people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just 
 
782 State v Gutierrez 2007 –NMSC-033, 142 NM. 1, 162 P3d 156 The New Mexico Supreme 
Court held that: ‘…prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s refusal to submit to a polygraph 
test is impermissible comment on a defendant’s right to silence in violation of the fifth 
amendment.’ 
783 R v Lucas (1981) 73 Cr App R 159 
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cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour 
from their family.784  
Arguably, this reasoning is somewhat circular. Subsequent cases listed the situations 
where a Lucas direction would generally be required have been identified,785 and 
Phipson identifies the following as being the current circumstances under which a 
direction would be required: 
1. where the defence relies on an alibi; 
2. where a direction is given about the value of looking for evidence supporting 
a particular witness’s testimony and the accused’s lies or evasive behaviour 
might be treated as such supporting evidence; 
3. where the prosecution seeks to rely on the lies in relation to a separate and 
distinct issue as evidence of guilt; and 
4. where it is reasonably envisaged that the jury may treat the lies in relation to 
a separate and distinct issue as evidence of guilt even if the prosecution did 
not introduce them into evidence for this purpose.786 
 
Thus a Lucas direction is not required in every case and in R v Burge787 the Court of 
Appeal said: 
 
… a Lucas direction is not required in every case in which a defendant gives 
evidence, even if he gives evidence about a number of matters, and the jury 
may conclude in relation to some matters at least that he has been telling 
lies. The warning is only required if there is a danger that they may regard 
that conclusion as probative of his guilt of the offence which they are 
considering.788 
 
 
784 ibid 162-163 
785 R v Adel Abdulwaheb Sunella [2014] EWCA Crim 1870 is a recent case where the failure to 
deliver a Lucas direction resulted in the conviction being quashed 
786Phipson on Evidence 19th Edition (Sweet and Maxwell, 2017), 16-09 
787 R v Burge [1996] 1 Cr App R 163 
788 ibid 172-173 
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The court also ruled that if possible a Lucas direction should be tailored to the 
circumstances of the individual case, but that in order for the jury to treat the lie as 
evidence of guilt they must be satisfied: 
1. that the lie must be admitted or proved beyond reasonable doubt, and 
2. that the mere fact that the defendant lied is not in itself evidence of guilt 
since defendants may lie for innocent reasons, so only if the jury is sure that 
the defendant did not lie for an innocent reason can a lie support the 
prosecution case.789 
 
For the polygraph, the instrument will give readings that the expert opinion will 
interpret as: 
 
Consistent with deceit (lying); 
Consistent with truth; or 
Not indicative either way. 
 
If the result were indicative of deceit, it is argued a Lucas direction would certainly be 
required. The danger of a jury jumping to a premature conclusion about the 
significance of a failed polygraph test may in itself be a reason for insisting upon a 
Lucas direction – or possibly a modified version thereof. The mere fact that D fails a 
polygraph test cannot on its own be sufficient proof of the lie, but it may be seen as 
such in conjunction with other evidence. The need to ensure that excessive weight is 
not placed on the polygraph failure by the jury again links to the concern that public 
perception exaggerates the reliability of the results. 
 
The primary potential use for the polygraph within this chapter has been argued as 
voluntary. This makes it intuitively more likely that the polygraph would be selected by 
those who believed they were innocent (or believed they could fool the polygraph) 
and the same argument applies. As such, while there is clear evidential weight to ‘a lie’ 
the polygraph will not provide meaningful support to that argument. 
 
789 ibid 174 
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7.4.5 The Laws of Evidence 
While it has been argued to this point that issues of reliability of polygraph evidence 
and the primacy of the jury are the main obstacles to expert opinion relating to 
polygraph evidence being admissible in the English courts, there is also the issue of the 
law of evidence which may be applicable. Should the point be reached where expert 
testimony regarding polygraph evidence was determined to be sufficiently reliable and 
probative the issues of admissibility under the rules of evidence would require 
consideration. Of particular relevance are: 
• Hearsay 
• Previous consistent statements 
• Disclosure 
• Right to silence/against self-incrimination 
 
7.4.5.1 Hearsay 
Considering first the situation with regard to the CJA, concerns that polygraph 
evidence would be inadmissible under the hearsay rule, it is argued, can be dismissed. 
There are many circumstances in which pre-trial statements by defendants, witnesses 
or ‘absent witnesses’ are already admissible under the provisions of the CJA 2003, 
s114(1)(a) to (c), and under s114(1)(d) a court also has a broad discretion to admit any 
other hearsay evidence, if it is in the interests of justice to do so. Roberts and 
Zuckerman, commenting on the changes to the law on hearsay under the CJA 2003, 
observe that the Act: 
 
…entrusts trial judges with ample discretion to regulate the admissibility 
of hearsay evidence in broad compliance with the dictates of common 
sense and justice790  
 
In the case of the polygraph itself, the analysis will either indicate that the individual 
was being deceitful, or it will not. It would focus not on the story told by the individual 
under test, but on the measured physiological reactions when s/he gave them. That 
 
790 P Roberts and A Zuckerman Criminal Evidence (second Edition Oxford University Press 
2010), 9.7 
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can be a subtle distinction, but it is a relevant one. No further level of hearsay is being 
added.  
 
7.4.5.2 Previous Consistent Statements 
As a general principle a witness called to give evidence is deemed to be a witness 
worthy of belief, as such the examiner in chief is not generally permitted to call 
evidence relating solely to their credibility.791 A witness may seek to bolster their 
evidence by stating that they have previously made a similar statement but prior 
consistent statements are generally ruled inadmissible under the rule against 
narrative, which in the CJA 2003 has now been subsumed within the hearsay rule. This 
rule states: 
 
(The) evidence of a witness cannot be corroborated by proving 
statements to the same effect made by him; nor will the fact that his 
testimony is impeached in cross-examination render such evidence 
admissible.792 
 
Dennis793 identifies two rules at common law which prevent the admission of such 
evidence: First the hearsay rule and, secondly, and of particular relevance to this 
section, is that such a rule prevents the admission of such evidence to show the 
witness’s consistency. As with other forms of hearsay, however, there are various 
exceptions to the general rule, and a broad discretion to admit such evidence under 
s114(1)(d) if the interests of justice so demand. 
 
If, as is argued within this chapter, the polygraph is no longer to be regarded as 
inherently inadmissible, it is possible to envisage cases in which both defendants and 
witnesses have undertaken a polygraph examination, the results from these 
examinations would then potentially have evidential status at trial. 
 
791 I Dennis The Law of Evidence (Sixth Edition Sweet and Maxwell 2017), 14-005 
792 R v Coll (1889) 24 Ir 522 at [541] cited in May On Criminal evidence 6th edition Mainwork 
Part 6 20-02 
793 I Dennis The Law of Evidence (sixth edition Sweet and Maxwell 2017), 14-005 
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The standard rule is illustrated by the court’s response to narrative evidence in R v 
Roberts. 794  Roberts was charged with murder having allegedly shot his former 
girlfriend. The defence was one of accident, and the defence sought to adduce 
evidence from Roberts’ father to the effect that after his arrest he had told his father 
that the shooting had been an accident.  
 
Evidence from his father as to whether the shooting was accidental would be hearsay 
evidence and thus inadmissible. The rejected defence argument was that he should 
still be allowed to give evidence of R’s consistency, and indeed he would have been 
allowed to do that if the Crown had argued that the ‘accident’ claim was something R 
had invented only at some later stage. The common law rule then in force is now set 
out in s 120(2) of the CJA 2003.795  
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction with Humphreys J stating that ‘the 
evidential value of such testimony is nil’.796 This general rule was affirmed in R v 
Oyesiku.797 
 
Roberts and Zuckerman note that difficulties can exist in identifying exceptions to the 
rule against narrative due to its entanglement with the law of hearsay.798 They go on 
to note that: 
 
The underlying principle … was that previous consistent statements 
should exceptionally be admissible only in order to support the witness’s 
credibility where, for some identifiable circumstantial reason, proof of 
 
794 R v Roberts [1943] 28 Cr App R 102 
795 Section 120(2). If a previous statement by the witness is admitted as evidence to rebut a 
suggestion that his oral evidence has been fabricated, that statement is admissible as evidence 
of any matter stated of which oral evidence by the witness would be admissible. 
796 R v Roberts [1943] 28 Cr App R 102, 106 
797 R v Oyesiku [1972] 56 CR App R 240, 245-247 
798 P Roberts and A Zuckerman Criminal Evidence (Second Edition Oxford University Press 
2010) 8.3 
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consistency was not merely (almost) irrelevant narrative, but had 
genuine probative value in determining disputed questions of fact.799 
 
It is worthy of note that there is some recent indication are that the Court of Appeal 
may no longer treat the rule against narrative with the gravity it was formerly 
accorded. In R v Avery 800 the Court of Appeal ruled that an objection that a 
complainant’s previous statement failed to meet the requirements of s120 was 
‘technically good’. However a previous consistent statement is more indicative of the 
weight of the other evidence in the case rather than a view on the admissibility of the 
evidence, despite the jury having been incorrectly directed that they could rely on the 
out of court complaints as evidence of their truth.801 
 
The existing common law exceptions to the rule were amended by s120 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003. The statutory exceptions contained within this section do not open 
an obvious route for the admission of polygraph evidence.  
 
If, however, a previous consistent statement is ruled admissible, polygraph evidence 
relating to it adds no further element of narrative or hearsay. It is a separate form of 
evidence dealing with physiological responses. In the dissenting judgment in the 
previously noted case Béland Wilson J argued that polygraph evidence was not simply 
a repetition of statements made by the accused at trial. On the notion of oath helping 
she stated: 
 
The connection between oath-helping and the admissibility of polygraph 
evidence seems to me to be very tenuous … The polygraph operator,…, 
has subjected the accused to a number of tests. He reports on the results 
of these tests and gives his expert opinion as to whether the physiological 
reactions of the accused are similar to those of someone telling the truth. 
He is open to cross-examination … His evidence is only one of the many 
 
799 ibid 8.3 
800 R v Avery [2007] EWCA Crim 1830 
801 ibid [15] 
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factors the jury will consider when assessing the credibility of the 
accused.802 
 
And on the topic of prior consistent statements: 
 
It is expert evidence on how closely his physiological responses during the 
test correspond to those of someone telling the truth.803  
 
Considering this judgment, Chandler804 argues that physiological responses which 
underpin polygraph evidence go beyond simply repeating previous statements and 
that as such this is not a ground for excluding polygraph evidence.  
 
7.4.5.3 Disclosure 
With the use of the polygraph now part of licence conditions under s30 of the 
Offender Management Act 2007, an interesting potential question arises in relation to 
disclosure. Spriun et al.,805evaluating the experiences of sexual offenders who have 
this element as one of their licence conditions, note that ‘nearly half of the offenders 
undergoing polygraph testing talked about making more risk-relevant disclosures (e.g. 
increased access to children and contact with other sexual offenders), during 
polygraph sessions [author italics].’806  
 
What then happens if, during a polygraph session, the offender identifies/implicates 
another individual such that a police investigation is triggered which leads to charges 
and proceedings against that individual? Could that individual (D2) expect information 
as to the polygraph which was the trigger event in the investigation being disclosed so 
that s/he could challenge the reliability? 
 
802 R v Béland  [1987] 2 SCR 398 [26] 
803 ibid [34] 
804 J Chandler ‘Reading the Judicial Mind: Predicting the Courts’ Reaction To The Use Of 
Neuroscientific Evidence for Lie Detection’ (2010) 33 Dalhousie Law Journal 85 
805 E Spruin, J L Wood, TA Gannon and N Tyler ‘Sexual Offender’s Experiences of Polygraph 
Testing: a Thematic Study in Three Probation Trusts’ (2017) 3 Journal of Sexual Aggression 1 
806 ibid, 10-11 
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It is useful to first examine the statutory framework for disclosure of evidence. This is 
contained within the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (the CPIA) and 
the CPIA Code of Practice. Within s3 of the CPIA the prosecutor must: 
 
1(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not 
previously been disclosed to the accused and which might reasonably be 
considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against 
the accused or of assisting the case for the accused, or 
(b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material of a 
description mentioned in paragraph (a).807 
 
For the accused, the disclosure required under the act stipulates that a written 
defence statement ‘setting out the nature of the accused’s defence…’808 is disclosed to 
the prosecution. Thus, while the disclosure requirements are much greater on the part 
of the Crown the aim of the CPIA is: 
 
[To] ensure that criminal investigations are conducted in a fair, objective 
and thorough manner, and requires prosecutors to disclose to the 
defence material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused 
and which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the 
case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for 
the accused.809  
The rules for disclosure are addressed in Part 15 of the CrimPR, and more specifically in 
relation to expert testimony disclosure, CrimPR 19.3(3)(c) which ‘requires a party who 
introduces expert evidence to give notice of anything of which that party is aware 
 
807 Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996 s3(1) 
808 CPIA 6A(1)(a) Contents of Defence statement 
809 Attorney General’s Office. Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure December 2013, 4 
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which might reasonably be thought capable of undermining the reliability of the 
expert’s opinion, or detracting from the credibility or impartiality of the expert...’810 
Returning to the hypothetical disclosure within the polygraph examination, there are 
two primary scenarios to consider: 
 
1. Working on the assumption that the crime which is disclosed is a sexual offence, 
there would be a requirement to locate the victim. If the victim gave a statement, that 
would become the main evidence against D2. The first defendant may give evidence 
which corroborates it. If they have previously ‘passed’ a lie detector test when giving 
that account, the prosecution would not be able to rely on that fact. If the first 
defendant had failed that test, that would almost certainly fall to be disclosed under s3 
of the CPIA. However, in those circumstances it would be unlikely the prosecution 
would call the first defendant as a witness if the victim was credible enough.  
  
2. If a victim was not located, and it was effectively the word of one defendant against 
another, regardless of the result of the polygraph, the prosecution would be very 
unlikely to charge D2. Given the current (presumed) inadmissibility of polygraph 
evidence, if this were in effect the only evidence, the likelihood of the case reaching 
either the threshold or full code test as per the Code for Crown Prosecutors811 is highly 
unlikely. If such an unlikely situation arose whereby the Crown called that convicted 
offender as their key witness to give live evidence at trial, it would arguably be unfair 
not to let the jury know that he failed the polygraph test when first implicating the 
current accused. 
 
In such a situation where it is effectively one person’s word against another (even at 
the investigatory stage) it is perhaps worth revisiting Lamer and Wilson JJ’s dissent in 
the Canadian case Béland (7.1.2) arguing that: 
 
 
810 Crim PD 19A.7 
811 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 4.1 – 5.11 Published 26 October 2018 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors#section4 accessed 19/07/19 
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The central issue was whom to believe ... There was no other evidence 
implicating the respondents in the alleged conspiracy. It would be 
unjust, in these circumstances, to prevent the respondents from calling 
any evidence of probative value indicating they were telling the 
truth.812 
 
In the unlikely event of such a case reaching the courts if D1 had passed the polygraph 
the prosecution would not be able to refer to this in court as it would offend the rule 
against oath-helping. If the fact of the polygraph was disclosed to the defence, it 
seems likely they would not want the jury to know there was a positive test in the first 
place.  
 
If the test was failed then the results would potentially be disclosable.  
 
Currently, it seems likely that the CPS would only charge a defendant in these 
circumstances if there was the most overwhelming corroborative evidence to show 
that the polygraph result could be discounted. If there was evidence of this quality, 
they would proceed without using D1’s evidence. 
 
7.4.5.4 Section 129 CJA – Representations other than by a person 
If polygraph evidence were to be adduced it would be evidence obtained from a 
mechanism and thus ‘other than a person’ as per s129 of the CJA. Implicit within s129 
is the issue of reliability. This relevant section stipulates that: 
 
 (1)Where a representation of any fact— 
(a) is made otherwise than by a person, but 
(b) depends for its accuracy on information supplied (directly or 
indirectly) by a person, 
 
812 R v Béland [1987] 2 SCR 398, 400 
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(c) the representation is not admissible in criminal proceedings as 
evidence of the fact unless it is proved that the information was 
accurate.  
(2)Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of the presumption that a 
mechanical device has been properly set or calibrated. 
 
The devices used to measure the physiological changes which take place in the course 
of the polygraph utilise well established technology which is widely used in both 
healthcare and research.813 It is argued that the requirement for the information to be 
supplied being accurate as per s129 (1)(b) is readily met with the usual servicing and 
calibration requirements that are scheduled for items of medical and research 
equipment.  
 
Pattenden814 notes that despite the widespread use of digital technology, there has 
been little case law or commentary with regard to s129. Although Pattenden was 
writing nine years ago, the current situation is little different. The leading case815 with 
regard to this section of the CJA is Public Prosecution Service v McGowan816 in which 
an element within the prosecution case was that a till roll seized by the police showed 
that a sale of alcoholic liquor had been made some 40 minutes after the time of day 
when it was lawful to sell intoxicating liquor.  
 
The court considering art.33 of the Criminal Justice (Evidence)(Northern Ireland) Order 
2004/ 1501817 noted that: 
 
813 Sphygmomanometers measuring blood pressure have been in widespread use since early in 
the last century, with the equipment used to make the measurements constantly being 
upgraded (J Booth A Short History of Blood Pressure Measurement Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of Medicine 70(Nov 1977), 793 
814 R Pattenden ‘Machinespeak: Section 129 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003’ (2010) 8 Criminal 
Law Review 623 
815 This was the only case that could be located via Westlaw UK or Lexis, and Pattenden above 
also identifies it as the leading case 
816 Public Prosecution Service v McGowan [2008] NICA 13 – Westlaw database records two 
other cases where this case was applied, neither of these were with regard to art 33. Cases are 
Public Prosecution Service v Duddy [2008] NICA 18 and DPP v Smylie [2012] NICA 45 
817 The wording of art.33 is identical to the wording of s129 of the CJA 2003 as given above 
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In the modern world the presumption of equipment being properly 
constructed and operating correctly must be strong. It is a particularly 
strong presumption in the case of equipment within the control of the 
defendant who alone would know if there was evidence of incorrect 
operation or incorrect setting.818 
 
Although the case concerned a till roll, the judgment talks about equipment in the 
broader sense with the presumptions that equipment is operating correctly.819 This 
being the case, although the questions as to the accuracy of the reading indicating 
what the expert states they do remains, it is argued that accuracy of the equipment 
used to obtain the measurements in the polygraph would be difficult to challenge, 
although one assumes there would be a requirement on the part of the polygrapher to 
produce evidence as to the correct maintenance and calibration of the equipment 
 
7.4.6 Practical Concerns  
As has been demonstrated in some jurisdictions, such as the US, the use of the 
polygraph is widespread. Its use in recruitment to federal agencies and within the 
criminal justice systems is some states extends to it being admissible in court. 
Extensive use is also made of the polygraph, in some states, within the investigation.  
 
Could a similar approach be taken in England and Wales? If one is to look broadly at 
the pre-trial or investigative section of a criminal case, the notion that the police could 
use the polygraph for investigation is deemed inadvisable by the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO). In a 2014 position paper820 they deemed the use of the 
polygraph inappropriate, citing concerns as to the integrity of the investigative 
process, and expressing the opinion that the use of a polygraph during the 
 
818 Public Prosecution Service v McGowan [2008] NICA 13 [20] 
819 A similar presumption was evidenced in the earlier case Cracknell v Willis [1988] AC 450 at 
468 noting ‘the presumption of law is that the [police station breath testing] machine is 
reliable.’ 
820 Association of Chief Police Officers National Policing Position Statement: The Use of the 
Polygraph in Investigations (May 2014) 
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investigation would have to be shared with the CPS, and probably be disclosed to the 
defence, thus potentially giving rise to challenge as to reliability within the trial 
process. The position paper concludes that ‘at best the polygraph will not get the 
investigation any further forward and at worse it could discredit it leading to a 
situation in which victims of crime are needlessly denied justice.’ 
 
The courts are an organ of the state; they are publicly funded and as such there is a 
need to be as effective and cost efficient as possible. The Law Commission notes its 
function is to ‘seek to ensure that the law is as simple, accessible, fair modern and cost 
effective as possible’.821 As such even if an argument can be made legally that the 
polygraph should or could be admissible would practical concerns inhibit such a move? 
 
As noted earlier in this chapter Danaher considers the use of P300 brain-based lie 
detection and argues that the place for such evidence should not be within the trial, 
but rather in pre-trial plea bargaining.822 The practice of plea bargaining, whereby the 
accused pleads guilty to a lesser offence rather than go before the jury is prevalent in 
the US. Danaher argues that the approach better enables innocent defendants to 
argue their innocence at the plea bargaining stage, thus potentially making their claim 
of innocence more credible, rather than an innocent person pleading guilty to a lesser 
offence to avoid the possibility of a much longer sentence if they go to trial and are 
found guilty. 
 
Such an approach could presumably save both court costs if avoiding a trial and 
imprisonment and wider social costs of miscarriages of justice.  
 
The situation in the UK is different, in that there is not a system of plea bargaining 
comparable to that in the US. However, there are conditions under which an individual 
 
821 Law Commission Annual Report 2014-15, 9 
822 J Danaher ‘The Comparative Advantage of Brain Based Lie Detection: the P300 Concealed 
Information Test and Pre-Trial Bargaining’ (2015) 19 International Journal of Evidence and 
Proof 52  
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can plead guilty to a lesser offence,823 or possibly, and more speculatively, where the 
CPS may feel that if the evidence is weak, coupled with a suspect passing a polygraph- 
could the decision be made that the evidence no longer reaches the threshold for 
charging?824 The reverse of this argument could be where the evidence is sufficient to 
meet the threshold test, and the accused then passes a polygraph indicating no deceit. 
Could the prosecutor then determine that this weakens the overall case against the 
accused and thus not charge? This becomes something of a circular argument, the best 
figures of polygraph reliability are less than 100%, so while the polygraph may 
strengthen or weaken a case, it is never possible to be sure that, whatever the 
outcome, the polygraph is right. 
 
Such points are obviously speculative at best, and considering the requirement under 
the code825 that the prosecutors assure themselves of the reliability of any evidence, it 
seems probable that the concerns regarding the reliability of the technique may 
preclude its consideration. 
 
It is perhaps helpful at this point to remind oneself, that while the prosecution has to 
prove the case on the totality of the evidence ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ the defence 
needs only to introduce an element of ‘reasonable doubt’ and it may well be that the 
polygraph could achieve precisely that.  
 
As the courts have no power to exclude defence evidence under s78 of PACE, if the 
polygraph were to become admissible there could be a concern about partial pro-
defence polygraph evidence. However, it is argued that the need to control the quality 
of any polygraph expert evidence coming before the courts would most appropriately 
 
823 Blackstones Criminal Practice 2019 D12.79 Where the indictment contains a count on 
which, if the accused were to plead not guilty, the jury could find him not guilty as charged but 
guilty of an alternative (hereafter referred to as ‘lesser’) offence, he may enter a plea to the 
same effect, namely not guilty to the offence charged but guilty only of the lesser offence (CLA 
1967, s. 6(1)(b)). 
824 The Code for Crown Prosecutors – The Threshold Test- 26 October 2018 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors accessed 05/08/19 
825 Crown Prosecution Service ‘The Code for Crown Prosecutors’ 2018, 4.8 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors#section4 accessed 19/07/19 
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be managed by way of training and accreditation of the polygrapher operators, and 
also by way of the CrimPR. As with any expert giving testimony, the polygraph 
operator will be bound by the rules. The issue of training and accreditation is 
addressed shortly in section 7.5 of this thesis. 
 
The argument that the polygraph is ‘impractical’ is a further concern. Referring back to 
Justice Thomas’s comment in Scheffer – that rule 707 serves a legitimate interest in 
‘avoiding litigation over matters other than guilt or innocence’ – the additional costs 
and delays that such evidence could introduce become a real concern. 
 
Evidence from the US clearly illustrates this. Following the re-introduction and 
reconsideration of polygraph evidence followed the overturning of the per se ban 
(following Frye) by the Supreme Court judgment in Daubert, a number of states 
permitted, but then ceased to allow, polygraph evidence. Interestingly, both Wisconsin 
and North Carolina appear to have re-instated the bar on polygraph evidence because 
of the burdens placed on the courts. In State v Grier the court concluded that: 
 
[W]e are forced to conclude that the administration of justice simply 
cannot, and should not, tolerate the incredible burdens involved in the 
process of ensuring that a polygraph examination has been properly 
administered. If a trial court were to adequately police the reliability of 
stipulated results the time required to explore the innumerable factors 
which could affect the accuracy of the particular test would be 
incalculable.826 
 
Although this clearly indicates concerns regarding reliability, it also seems to echo 
Justice Thomas’s previously noted concern in Scheffer that courts could end up 
litigating about matters other than guilt or innocence. 
 
 
826 State v Grier 307 NC 628, 643, 300 SE2d 351 (1983) 
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Arguably even more practical than the concern of ‘clogging up the courts’ is that if one 
returns to some of the techniques which claim ever greater accuracy, such as 
combining fMRI with the polygraph, 827  an obvious limiting factor becomes the 
availability of the equipment. MRI scanners currently are large expensive machines 
with running costs of hundreds of thousand pounds per year. Such machines are 
typically used for research and clinical indications, the likelihood of such equipment 
being made available and the question of how it would be paid for, seem likely to 
make the adoption of such techniques, at best, extremely unlikely.  
 
7.5 Evolution or Legislation: Introducing Polygraph Evidence into the English Courts? 
The analysis within this chapter, it is argued, indicates that there is a clear argument in 
logic supporting the admissibility of polygraph evidence, and further that the rules of 
evidence which could be presumed to block such evidence are navigable. It is however 
argued that a more deliberate effort than simply ‘working round’ the existing rules is 
required. 
 
Given the many subsidiary issues identified which accompany such a proposal, and 
polygraph evidence more generally, the question which must arise is would any court 
ever take up the challenge of admitting such evidence? It may be that if such evidence 
were ever to be considered the more appropriate route would be via legislation. 
 
While there is no requirement for a Law Commission review prior to legislative change, 
such a review has the advantage of being seen as open and inclusive by virtue of 
seeking views from interested parties, and also, as with recent consultations, 
evaluating the situation in other jurisdictions. Thus it is argued that the introduction of 
the polygraph would be sufficiently controversial and polarising as to require a Law 
Commission review potentially leading to a draft bill, much as with CP190/LC325. 
 
I would argue that any possible polygraph consultation/legislation would need at a 
minimum to address the following points: 
 
827 NJ Gordon, FB Mohamed, SM Platek, H Ahmad, J M Williams, SH Faro ‘The Effectiveness 
of fMRI Data when Combined with Polygraph Data’ (2018) 12 European Polygraph 19 
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a) In what situations could a polygraph be appropriate? 
b) Who could be offered a polygraph, and what are the implications of refusal?  
c) Implications of pass and fail at trial 
d) Training and accreditation of the polygrapher 
 
a) In What Situations Could a Polygraph be Appropriate? 
The polygraph is a time consuming procedure. The BPA indicate a properly conducted 
polygraph examination will take at least two to three hours.828 As such it would seem 
undesirable to have legislation which allows every suspect, defendant or witness to be 
offered a polygraph. Access to appropriately qualified examiners and appropriate 
devices would become hugely problematic and the cost implications would be severe.  
 
It is more likely that any such legislation would restrict polygraph evidence to a 
narrowly defined category of cases. If we revisit Lamarr and Wilson JJ’s dissent in the 
Canadian case Béland (see 7.1.2 and 7.4.5.3) the argument made was that the 
polygraph was potentially useful where the case was one person’s word against 
another. This being the case, a possible category where this could be relevant is where 
the case concerns rape or sexual assault, be that historic or current. In such cases 
there is often little or no other evidence available beyond the testimony of the 
complainant and the denials of the accused,829 one of whom must be lying. 
 
It is suggested that a threshold would need to be established, and that offence type 
may well be a suitable starting point.  
 
b) Who Could be Offered a Polygraph, and What are the Implications of Refusal? 
It would seem logical that the polygraph could be offered to the accused, and key 
witnesses, including the complainant. 
 
 
828 The British Polygraph Association ‘The Polygraph Test’ 
https://www.britishpolygraphassociation.org/test.html accessed 6/10/19 
829 R Buxton ‘Victims as Witnesses in Trials of Sexual Offences: Towards Equality of Arms’ 
(2015) 9 Criminal Law Review 679 
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The Accused 
Under any such legislation it would be anticipated that the polygraph examination 
would almost certainly be optional, not mandatory. As noted in the majority of areas 
examined the polygraph is inadmissible, as such compulsory use does not even 
feature. Interestingly Selvi v State of Karnataka, a case from the Indian Supreme Court, 
did consider the issue of compelled polygraph testing within the investigatory 
phase/pre-trial and held that it would be unconstitutional830 citing Article 20(3) of the 
Indian Constitution:831  
 
No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against 
himself. 
 
If we accept that any polygraph examination covered by such legislation will require 
the subject’s consent, the next issue is what inferences, if any, may be drawn from a 
refusal to take such a test. In analogous situations involving a defendant’s failure or 
refusal to answer questions or disclose his defence at interview, to give evidence at 
trial, to provide an intimate sample or to take part in an identity procedure, the force 
of the inference (if any) that can be drawn varies considerably. 
 
Any legislation would have to determine what level of inference could be drawn from 
refusal. I would suggest that the most closely aligned refusal is perhaps that of refusal 
to provide an intimate sample as examined previously (7.4.3.2). The intimate sample 
being refused is the refusal to permit the analysis of a physiological response. 
 
It is suggested that a permutation which would require further consideration is if the 
defendant were to decline the polygraph offered by the police, but then have a 
polygraph undertaken at the behest of the defence. Under s78 of PACE this is likely to 
be admissible, but then arguably the defendant’s actions may fall under s34 of the 
CJPOA in that he would be relying on something he failed to mention and then later 
relied on in court, and thus again inferences may be drawn. 
 
830 Selvi & Ors v State of Karnataka [2010] 5 LRC 137 [221]-[223] 
831 The Constitution of India 
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Witnesses 
In the case of witnesses, the Ministry of Justice Guidance on Achieving Best Evidence 
(ABE) sets out the general position very clearly: 
 
2.10 Where a witness is competent to give evidence they are usually 
also compellable. This means that they can be legally required to attend 
trial. In general, however, the fact that a witness is compellable does 
not mean that they can be legally required to give any kind of 
preliminary statement to the police – even the sort of statement that is 
made under this guidance.832  
 
In the event that a witness has been interviewed and then refuses to make a 
statement, the guidance is that the CPS should be advised.833 
 
Thus as the accepted position is that a pre-trial/investigatory polygraph cannot be 
mandated, the situation possibly would be that the CPS be advised that the witness 
turned down the option of the polygraph.  
 
A point which needs to be acknowledged is that if the victims of alleged sexual assault 
were asked if they were prepared to take a polygraph it is probable that considerable 
adverse comment would arise (however well or poorly informed) in wider society and 
the media. One has only to look at the furore that arose over the concern that the 
police would not pursue rape allegations unless complainants handed over their 
mobile phones.834 In this case, efforts by the CPS835 to clarify the situation and correct 
 
832 Ministry of Justice  Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings (March 2011)  
833 College of Policing (2018) Working with victims and witnesses – 3.9 Witness refusal to make 
a statement https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/victims-and-
witnesses/#witness-refusal-to-make-a-statement accessed 19/09/19 
834 C Barr ‘People who report rape face ‘routine’ demands for their mobile data’ The Guardian 
(21/09/19) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/sep/21/people-report-rape-routine-
demands-mobile-data accessed 26/09/19; BBC News ‘Rape cases dropped over police phone 
search demand’ (23/07/19) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-49072302 accessed 26/09/19 
835 Crown Prosecution Service ‘Handing over mobile phone data in rape prosecutions’ 
(13/05/19) https://www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/handing-over-mobile-phone-data-rape-
prosecutions accessed 26/09/19 
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inaccuracies in the coverage were arguably not that effective, as adverse media 
coverage continues to appear some months later. It seems likely that the furore over 
mobile phones would be minor compared to the likely narrative of press coverage that 
rape victims are being ‘forced’ to undergo a lie detector test. 
 
c) Implications of Pass and Fail 
If the polygraph were to be used as suggested in the case of alleged rape or sexual 
abuse then it is arguable that its greatest impact could be in those cases where the 
overall evidence is weak and, aside from circumstantial evidence, it is in effect one 
person’s word against the other. In such a case it could be that a passed polygraph (on 
the part of the accuser) and a failed one on the part of the accused would be seen as 
sufficient to bolster an otherwise weak case to meet the threshold test for charging.  
 
By the same count it may be that a passed polygraph on the part of the accused 
and/or a failed one on the part of the accuser would be sufficient for the case to fail to 
meet the threshold test. 
 
If expert evidence relating to the physiological changes in response to questions was to 
be presented as simply another element of evidence, with the expert highlighting 
relevant information with regard to reliability rates, then it is argued that pass or fail is 
in some senses irrelevant. It will be for the jury to attribute the appropriate weight to 
that evidence.  
 
The expert presenting the evidence will point out the issues around the reliability of 
the technique as per the requirements of r19.4, however the public profile and 
understanding of the technique is such that it is likely that the polygraph equivalent of 
a Turnbull direction may be required to make absolutely clear to the jury what weight 
could be attributed to such evidence. 
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d) Training and Accreditation 
This would arguably be the most straightforward element. The current polygraph rules 
which are applicable to polygraph testing under the Offender Management Act 2007 
stipulate that: 
 
3.—(1) A polygraph operator will be suitably qualified if the polygraph operator 
has— 
(a)completed the following courses— 
(i)a polygraph training programme accredited by the American 
Polygraph Association; and 
(ii)a post-conviction sex offender testing training programme accredited 
by the American Polygraph Association; and 
(b)carried out a minimum of 20 post conviction sex offender testing polygraph 
examinations under the supervision of an American Polygraph Association 
examiner.836 
The British Polygraph Association (BPA) notes that all its members have graduated 
from schools accredited by the American Polygraph Association (APA). 837 The British 
and European Polygraph Association (BEPA) while not stipulating all members will have 
qualified via a training facility accredited by the APA do state that this is preferable.838  
 
If the standards set by the APA are deemed sufficient to meet the requirements of 
statute within the polygraph rules it would seem both logical and pragmatic that this 
could carry over into any proposed legislation.  
 
Rigorous policing of these standards would be required if one is to avoid the risks 
noted within Scheffer of litigation over matters other than guilt or innocence (7.1.2). 
Whether this could be attributed to a regulatory body such as the BPA is uncertain. 
 
836 The Polygraph Rules 2009/619 s3 
837 The British Polygraph Association The Constitution and Articles of Association of the British 
Polygraph Association April 2015 
838 ibid 
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While there is an intuitive appeal to such a programme being centrally managed to 
ensure standards, if one notes the demise of the FSS, this does not appear to be a 
direction of travel currently in favour with the legislature. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Should an occasion arise wherein a party sought to adduce expert evidence from a 
polygraph test, as the preceding chapter has shown the obstacles to admitting that 
evidence are considerable. 
 
The first question as per Turner must be would such evidence be helpful/necessary? 
The evidence would seem to indicate that the ability of a jury to assess if an individual 
is untruthful is often little better than chance. Even the most critical studies as to the 
reliability of the polygraph seem to indicate that it can deliver results that are 
considerably better than chance. How then do we argue to continue to exclude the 
more reliable indicator of truthfulness and prefer the less reliable one? 
 
If the evidence is determined to meet the threshold of the Turner test, the question 
then becomes one of does the evidence meet the requirements of the rules of 
evidence? The preceding analysis indicates that any concern that it could fail on the 
basis of being information other than by a person (s129) is addressed by current case 
law and should not be problematic. The issue of such evidence being hearsay and thus 
inadmissible is also addressed by careful presentation of the evidence and the 
application of the ‘safety valve’ of s114d. The rule against prior consistent statements 
is problematic, but both the minor flexibility shown by the Court in Avery (7.4.5.2) and 
the argument that, rather than a prior consistent statement, the evidence is around a 
physiological response may provide a route through. 
 
Moving then to the guidance within Rule 19 of the CrimPR, as noted within 7.4.1 there 
is no reason to believe that expert testimony as to the technical details of and 
outcome of the polygraph would not meet the requirements of the rule, with the 
weight to be attributed to such evidence to be determined by the jury. 
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This logically also brings the discussion to the fundamental concern as to the reliability 
of the technique. As noted previously, McIntyre J in R v Béland 839 did not accept that a 
finding of significant errors would by itself be enough to exclude polygraph evidence 
from the courts. Thus while the bulk of judicial opinion seems averse to the 
introduction of the polygraph, I would argue that while the rationale given seems to 
relate most clearly the reliability of the instrument, this is actually secondary to the 
greater objection, that of supplanting the function of the jury. 
 
The assumption that polygraph evidence is inadmissible has been drawn from 
judgments in other common law jurisdictions. Even amongst these rulings there is 
some judicial support for the notion that the polygraph could under some 
circumstances be admissible. Bernal is of particular interest, being a Privy Council case 
in which UK justices do not exclude the possibility of such evidence being admissible in 
exceptional circumstances.  
 
However, even if a route has been determined which would permit such evidence the 
question then becomes just because we can, should we? The issue of public 
perception and understanding of the polygraph would seem to be a clear concern in 
the prejudicial v probative debate which has to be applied. 
 
Challenges to the admissibility and reliability of the technique would arise, further 
expert opinion may be adduced. This is likely to have the result of slowing the court 
processes further, and funding for this would likely come via the public purse either 
from the CPS or via legal aid. With the recent and ongoing cuts the legal aid budget840 
it may be that the public policy decisions of the courts will continue to weigh against 
the admissibility of such evidence, however robust (or otherwise) any argument may 
be for admission. 
 
 
839R v Béland [1987] 2 SCR 398 [19] 
840 e.g. J Robins ‘Dark Days for Legal Aid’ (2018) 168 (7786) New Law Journal 7 
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It is at least in part to address this issue of subsidiary litigation that the possibility of 
legislation should be considered. While it may in theory be possible to ‘work around ‘ 
the rules of evidence, if a detailed review as per CP190 were to be undertaken then 
issues around reliability, admissibility, technique and weighting would already have 
been addressed and set within a statutory framework before the evidence was 
adduced. 
 
So the question remains will the polygraph ever reach the English courts? With the 
perhaps, slightly ironic, exception of serious sexual offenders there is no statutory bar 
to the admission of polygraph evidence in the English and Welsh courts.  
 
Considering the statutory ban under s30, the ban applies only to the use of the 
polygraph in criminal proceedings against that individual. In a New Mexico case, 
Baca841 the defendant sought (successfully) to adduce the outcome of the polygraph 
taken by his co-defendant. It is not difficult to picture an analogous situation here, 
where serious sexual offenders may seek to adduce the polygraph results of a partner 
in offending. If this approach were taken it could ‘side step’ the statutory ban and as 
per PACE s78 if evidence is admissible then the judge has no discretion to exclude it if 
it is being adduced by the defence. 
 
As with the concerns regarding ‘trial by expert it is possible that underlying the 
reluctance to accept polygraph evidence is the fear, so beloved of dystopian sci-fi, of 
‘trial by technology’,842 of losing the common sense of the 12 good men and true.  
 
The role of the judge and jury is to analyse the many discrete items of evidence to 
reach a final decision. Expert evidence, such as the polygraph, forms just one of those 
elements, that as with any expert evidence a jury is free to accept or disregard. The 
Court of Appeal in R v Stockwell,843 considering the decision of the trial judge to admit 
 
841 State v Baca 120 NM 383, 902 P.2d 65 (1995) 
842 e.g. Demolition Man (Film-1993); Blake’s 7 pilot episode (TV Series-1978); Star Trek court 
martial episode (TV Series-1967)  
843R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260 
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evidence of a facial mapping expert, held that not only was the evidence admissible, 
but highlighted the importance of the jury being told they are not bound by the 
opinion of the expert and that the issue is for the jury alone to decide. This being the 
case, it is difficult to see how the opinion of the expert, where the testimony is 
admissible, can be said to usurp the opinion of the jury. 
 
The courts are unequivocal that the law should be open to changes in scientific 
practice and new and novel ideas844 and it may be that, in the final analysis, the 
acceptance of polygraph evidence in the criminal courts is as much about a shift in 
legal culture as it is about a change in the law, but as is oft noted one of the great 
strengths of the common law is its adaptability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
844R v Clarke (1995) 2 Cr App R 425 430 
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Chapter 8 
Evaluation, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
8.0 Introduction 
In this thesis I argue that we should be moving towards a more rational use of expert 
evidence to better aid the jury in reaching a just and rational outcome. Both the case 
studies and the wider consideration of the rules, and the application of the rules 
relating to expert evidence demonstrate that in a number of areas this rationality is 
lacking. 
 
The case studies within indicate that there are areas where expert evidence is 
currently inadmissible, where the criminal justice system and the search for truth 
would be better served by their admission. The review of the underpinning law and 
how such evidence is presented to and addressed by the courts also indicates that 
there are both procedural and broader legislative changes which would better serve 
the process of truth seeking. 
 
The three stages where the possibility of elements of reform have been identified by 
these case studies are: 
 
1. Admissibility and concerns around the function of the CrimPR. 
2. How the evidence is presented and heard within the trial process 
3. Specific techniques which may serve the process of truth seeking. 
 
8.1 Admissibility and Concerns around the Function of the CrimPR 
The first section considers the effective use of expert evidence by the courts, reviewing 
the Law Commission proposals and the subsequent revision of the CrimPR and 
consideration of the likely effectiveness of the move to regulation by procedural rules 
rather than statute. The conclusion is that there were indeed missed opportunities 
within the review, but also the development of what is likely to be an effective 
framework to better manage the expert evidence that comes before the courts, this 
263 
 
being done by ensuring that expert testimony that is admitted will have it limits and its 
reliability clearly mapped for the jury. 
 
With regard to the revised CrimPR it is argued that two clear finding emerge: 
 
1. That within the limits of the available science, the CrimPR and associated practice 
directions should ensure that expert evidence placed before the courts is set out such 
that its limits are recognised. 
 
2. The failure to review the Turner principle means that there is expert evidence, such 
as that discussed in relation to eyewitness identification evidence, and arguably the 
polygraph, which is potentially helpful to the jury, but remains inadmissible. 
 
8.1.1 The Turner Principle 
The Turner principle was not reviewed as part of the Law Commission consultation and 
is captured in 19A.1 of the criminal practice directions which states that expert 
evidence is admissible if: 
 
(ii) it is needed to provide the court with information likely to be outside 
the court’s own knowledge and experience;… 
 
As Archbold notes ‘the principle set out in Turner is clear, but its application continues 
to cause difficulty.’845 A Criminal Law Review editorial846 at the time of the Law 
Commission consultation described the decision not to discuss the necessity criterion 
as ‘somewhat facile’, noting the difficulty in determining what the limits of normality 
are with respect to psychological and psychiatric evidence. 
 
For this principle, the issues could be seen as twofold: One is that of determining what 
is within the knowledge of the jury; the other is that as the boundaries of science 
advance, there may be areas of knowledge in respect of which current scientific 
 
845 Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice 2019 Ed 4-395 
846 Editorial (2009) Examining expert evidence Criminal Law Review, 6, 387-388 
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thinking is no longer within the experience of the court, but the risk is that binding 
precedent may ensure that the situation remains fixed. It should however be noted 
that some limited flexibility in application has been shown, for example in R v O’Brien 
(as discussed in 6.0) 
 
One example of where the movement of science has led to expert evidence becoming 
admissible is that of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), which was almost 
unheard of outside very limited circles 30 years ago.847 It was not a formal diagnosis at 
that time, and is likely to have been viewed as part of normal, but poor behaviour in 
the event that an individual displaying what we now know to be ADHD came before the 
courts. ADHD is now a recognised medical condition and can be subject to expert 
testimony.848  
 
Revisiting the consideration given to eyewitness testimony in Chapter 6, both the 
evolving scientific evidence and the Scottish case law, the difficulty presented by the 
Turner test and determining what is outside the courts’ own knowledge and expertise 
becomes painfully apparent. As noted in the earlier discussion, there is wide disparity 
between the understanding of experts and non-experts on the function of memory 
and how this applies to eyewitness identification evidence, the split between the 
‘common sense memory belief system‘, and the ‘scientific memory belief system’.849 
 
The Turnbull test and the directions given to the jury both serve to caution the jury as 
to the limits placed on eyewitness testimony, but concerns with regard to the ability of 
jurors to comprehend and follow the directions of judges have been repeatedly 
highlighted within this thesis. 
 
 
847 Searching PubMed using the term ‘ADHD Children’ the number of papers accessible has 
increased rapidly since 1970, 1970 – 11, 1980 -84, 1990- 189, 2000 – 507, 2010 – 1141, 2016 -
16496.  
848 e.g. R v Conroy [2017] EWCA Crim 81 
849 S Akhtar, LV Justice, L Knott, F Kibowski and MA Conway ‘The ‘Common Sense’ Memory 
Belief System and its Implications’ (2018) 22 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 289 
265 
 
In his seminal work, Redmayne, considering Turner, notes that ‘…it is possible that the 
blunt application of the credibility and jury competence limbs of the rule leads to the 
exclusion of evidence that could help the courts...’850 and cautions against being too 
dismissive of what expert evidence has to offer in a number of fields including 
eyewitness testimony. Psychologists are trained and educated to have a better 
understanding of human behaviour, thought, and perception than the ordinary lay 
person and it seems somewhat illogical to be automatically dismissive of such 
expertise. 
 
This would seem to beg the question of whether consideration should be given to an 
addition to the jury competence leg of Turner. Redmayne expresses doubt that an 
explicit reformulation of Turner would be ‘wise’. Noting this comment from such an 
academic authority, it is nonetheless respectfully suggested that such a partial 
reformulation or add-on may ask ‘is there is a substantial body of opinion, which 
accords with the reliability standard within the CrimPR, and indicates that the common 
sense understanding of an issue and the expert opinion relating to the same matter 
are disparate?’ 
 
• A recommendation from this study is that the Turner test be reviewed. 
 
8.2 How the Evidence is Presented and Heard within the Trial Process 
It is argued that beyond the notion of specific areas of expert evidence there are 
organisational or procedural techniques which may assist a court in understanding and 
better utilising the expert evidence before it. 
 
8.2.1 Failure to Adhere to the CrimPR: Could or Should There be any Sanction? 
The previously noted miscarriages of justice where expert testimony was a central 
component in the miscarriage, either as a consequence of that evidence being 
unreliable, badly presented, or subject to bias, emphasises the need for expert 
evidence to be correctly managed both prior to and within the trial process. 
 
850 M Redmayne Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2001), 196 
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The failure to follow the CrimPR by both some experts and the courts themselves was 
identified within Chapter 4. The sanctions for non-compliance with the rules, are set 
out in r3.5(6): 
 
(6) If a party fails to comply with a rule or a direction, the court may-  
    (a) fix, postpone, bring forward, extend, cancel, or adjourn a hearing; 
    (b) exercise its powers to make a costs order; and 
    (c) impose such other sanction as may be appropriate.  
 
However, what this does not address is the issue of the court itself failing to adhere to 
the rules. Although this relates to one of the parties failing to adhere to the rules, the 
Court of Appeal in R v LR stated: 
 
The starting point is simple. Orders made by Crown Court judges must be 
obeyed. The normal consequence of disobedience by the prosecution to an 
order made by the judge in the interests of a fair trial is either the exclusion 
of any evidence to which the order relates, or … the stay ordered by the 
judge. The cases are likely to be very few and far between where his order 
is so inimical to the interests of justice that no judge could reasonably have 
made it, so that the Crown can properly refuse, courteously, to comply, and 
then challenge the consequent stay by appeal to this court. 851 
 
Perrins852 suggests that such a stay for abuse of process would be highly unlikely 
unless there was any specific prejudice caused by the non-compliance. Could this 
mean that if the failure to adhere to the rule by the court resulted in specific prejudice 
to the defendant it may be grounds for appeal? 
 
851 R v LR [2010] EWCA Crim 924 [16] 
852 G Perrins ‘Criminal Procedure Rules Insight’ updated 20/04/16 
https://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?&srguid=i0ad832f200000167665f3e423
bd1ec78&docguid=I634B1620C2C411E29C44964D524E4788&hitguid=I634B1620C2C411E29C4
4964D524E4788&rank=1&spos=1&epos=1&td=49&crumb-
action=append&context=21&resolvein=true accessed 30/11/18 
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Would the failure to adhere to the CrimPR be grounds for appeal against conviction? 
Clearly in the event of an appeal arising, the wider question would be whether the 
failure was of such significance (alone or in conjunction with other issues) to put the 
safety of the conviction in doubt. However, the comments made by some members of 
the judiciary to the Lord Chief Justices review that they did not even know where to 
find the CrimPR, 853  is not only disturbing, but does raise the question (sadly 
unanswerable) of how many, if any, of the cases heard by those unidentified judges 
were appealed.  
 
The Court of Appeal has been clear that procedural irregularities in and of themselves 
are not grounds to withdraw an issue from the jury. In R v Ashton,854 a case concerning 
an application for leave to appeal the court stated: 
 
[The] prevailing approach to litigation is to avoid determining cases on 
technicalities (when they do not result in real prejudice and injustice) but 
instead to ensure that they are decided fairly on their merits. This approach 
is reflected in the Criminal Procedure Rules and, in particular, the overriding 
objective. Accordingly, …, absent a clear indication that Parliament 
intended jurisdiction automatically to be removed following procedural 
failure, the decision of the court should be based on a wide assessment of 
the interests of justice, with particular focus on whether there was a real 
possibility that the prosecution or the defendant may suffer prejudice. If 
that risk is present, the court should then decide whether it is just to permit 
the proceedings to continue.855 
 
Leave to appeal was refused, and this would seem to clearly indicate that any concern 
regarding failure to adhere to the CrimPR would have to take the route of identifying 
either new evidence, or evidencing that the failure to follow the CrimPR had resulted 
 
853 see 4.3 
854 R v Ashton (John) [2006] EWCA Crim 794 
855 ibid [8] 
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in prejudice or injustice. Ormerod856 observes that this allows a more flexible approach 
than was formerly the case, with the only limitations placed on the court’s ability to 
address procedural errors being a consideration of the actual intent of the legislature, 
and the need to identify where there is a real risk of prejudice.  
 
However, it is arguable that limits have been set on the applicability of Ashton. 
Hungerford-Welch857 commenting on the case, noted that the starting point for the 
court would be Parliament’s intentions, as in the case R (on the application of 
Rahmdezfouli) v Woodgreen Crown Court858 where the issue was one of statutory 
interpretation. In that case, the procedural irregularity concerned the alleged failure to 
explain the accused’s options appropriately. Section 17A(4) of the Magistrates Court 
Act 1980, stipulates that the court ‘shall then explain to the accused in ordinary 
language…’ thus the phrasing and the intention is mandatory.  
 
In terms of the effect this may have on the ability to appeal in the event of non-
compliance with the CrimPR, it is argued the situation is as per Ashton, in that the 
CrimPR are not an Act of Parliament, and as such there is no intention of the 
legislature to consider.  
 
Arguably, if substantial prejudice had been introduced either by the admission of 
expert evidence which should not have been ruled admissible, because of a failure to 
adhere to the CrimPR, then this may be rectified on appeal. However, this is a slow and 
costly process to both the state and the individual, therefore the call by the LCJ to 
adhere to the CrimPR seems the more timely and logical route.   
 
It seems to be unclear if there is any route beyond pressure from the LCJ, and one 
assumes a desire by the judiciary not to have their judgments successfully appealed, 
coupled with ongoing education of the judiciary and Bar to drive this compliance. 
 
856 DC Ormerod ‘Procedure: Procedural failures – jurisdiction’ (2006) 11 Criminal Law Review 
1004 
857 P Hungerford-Welch ‘R(on the application of Rahmdezfouli) v Woodgreen Crown Court: 
Taking guilty plea (Case Comment)’ (2014) 2 Criminal Law Review 158 
858 R (on the application of [2013] EWHC 2998 (Admin) 
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Running throughout this concern as to adherence to the CrimPR is the need for culture 
change as discussed in 4.3. Have the modified CrimPR been incorporated in to the 
everyday thinking and practice of the courts? It would seem one way to ascertain this 
would be to undertake a follow-up study to Sir Brian Levesons 2015 Review of 
Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings.  
 
• A recommendation from this study is that compliance with the CrimPR part 
19 and its associated practice directions is more strictly enforced 
• A recommendation is that there is a need for a follow-up study of the Lord 
Chief Justices 2015 review of the first 10 years of the CrimPR to ascertain if 
compliance has improved with the revisions to the CrimPR 
 
8.2.2 Judge Alone Trials 
In Chapter 5, the idea of judge-only trials was considered. While the conclusion within 
that section was that the current thinking from within this legislature would preclude 
the use of such an approach, the question which perhaps needs to be asked is, does 
the refusal to consider the option already followed, apparently successfully, in some 
common law jurisdictions have more to do with ideology than rationality? Australia 
has legislated for and utilises judge-only criminal trials. There seems little evidence 
that the change has adversely impacted the administration of justice in that 
jurisdiction. 
 
It is clearly difficult on the basis of such a limited project to make recommendations 
for wholesale change on something as fundamental as a change to the system of jury 
trial, and based on the previously discussed debate which surrounded s43 of the CJA 
2003, it is seems clear that such a change is a distant prospect, arguably so distant as 
to have no chance of ever occurring politically. 
 
However, it is respectfully noted that the Law Commission has never reviewed the 
evidence for judge alone trials and, as such, it may be that such a review is now 
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overdue, as such a review would take account of both the legal and wider social and 
financial implications of such a change. 
 
• This study recommends a Law Commission review into Judge only trials in 
cases where complex expert evidence is the primary or only evidence. 
 
8.2.3 Concurrent Evidence 
The evidence for the effectiveness or otherwise of concurrent evidence in criminal 
trials, could most generously be described as lacking. The author has been unable to 
locate any academic analysis of such an approach. However, there is solid evidence 
from both this jurisdiction, and from others, notably Australia, in relation to the use of 
concurrent evidence in the civil setting, and as noted in chapter 5 that evaluation is 
generally positive. 
 
While it has not been possible to locate any specific evaluations relating to concurrent 
evidence in criminal trials, part of the Freckleton study sought views from study 
participants regarding utilising this approach in criminal trials. The views were mixed, 
with Freckleton et al. noting that whether they had utilised this approach or not, 
judges and prosecutors were more enthusiastic or interested in the approach than 
defence lawyers. One of the concerns raised by a number of defence lawyers was that 
this approach could disadvantage their clients because, while experts for the 
prosecution tend to be more mainstream, those for the defence can be more ‘fringe’, 
and as such may not hold up well in comparison to the more mainstream expert.859 
 
However, it was also noted that some defence barristers were both open to the idea 
and enthusiastic having seen it in action in other domains. For example one defence 
barrister, commenting on its use in a coronial inquest stated: 
 
[It] gave experts an opportunity to express their view. I actually thought it 
was a better way of assessing the reliability, honesty, and credibility of the 
 
859Freckleton I, Goodman J, Horan J and McKimmie B, Expert Evidence and Criminal Jury Trials 
(Oxford University Press New York, 2016), 3.56 
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expert because they were immediately confronted by their colleagues, who 
were able to comment specifically on an answer that one of them had 
given, and I felt there was a greater capacity to expose an answer as being 
unreliable in that forum. So I thought the experts bouncing off each other … 
  really exposed some of the flaws of one of the experts’ evidence.860 
 
Some of the reservations highlighted by the study included factors such as the less 
confident expert being overwhelmed by the more confident or more garrulous expert. 
However, it could be argued that this is little different to the experience of the jury 
determining if an expert is confident, and if he appears credible when the experts 
appear separately, noting that any such expert already faces cross examination by 
counsel. 
 
As noted previously, there was no specific rule permitting concurrent evidence in the 
civil courts prior to the pilot being undertaken, but the pilot was nonetheless 
undertaken. There is also nothing within the CrimPR either explicitly excluding or 
permitting concurrent evidence. Given the positive responses to such evidence in 
Australia, and the potential to better enable the jury to build their story, it would seem 
inappropriate to say ‘never’ without first reviewing the possibility of piloting such an 
approach if a suitable case were identified where the courts believed it would be in the 
interest of justice to do so.  
 
• This study recommends that such an approach is considered in any future 
Law Commission review concerning the presentation of expert evidence in 
court 
 
8.3 Specific Techniques which may Serve the Process of Truth Seeking. 
8.3.1 Eye and Earwitness Identification  
Eyewitness identification evidence is one of the forms of evidence most frequently 
implicated in miscarriages of justice. Research indicates that in a number of areas 
 
860 Ibid 3.59 
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there is a marked discrepancy between what lay people and psychologists working in 
the field believe to be true in respect of how people remember and present what they 
have seen. In some areas, this discrepancy is so marked that it is argued expert 
testimony either in the form of a modified Turnbull direction or presence in court 
would better serve the function of attributing the relevant weight to this evidence.  
 
With regard to earwitness testimony, the same argument applies in the case of lay 
identification. In the case of expert testimony by auditory analysis, it seems that the 
lack of reliability in terms of it compliance with the indicators set out in the practice 
directions 861  support the notion that this jurisdiction should take the lead of 
O’Doherty 862  and mandate the use of acoustic techniques as a supplementary 
technique. 
 
• This study recommends that the Law Commission review the use of expert 
evidence in respect of identification evidence 
 
8.3.2 The Polygraph 
Despite the assertion made in Fennell that evidence produced by polygraph is 
inadmissible, it is argued that the analysis in Chapter 7 clearly demonstrates that there 
is a sound argument in both logic and law that this need not be the case. 
 
The Privy Council in Bernal appeared to leave open the possibility that in exceptional 
cases polygraph evidence may be admissible. It is respectfully suggested that such a 
case may be one as per the Canadian case of Béland, where in her dissent Wilson J 
argued that such evidence should be admissible where the evidence in the case was 
essentially one person’s word against another. As with Béland, the question that the 
court would have to address would be whether the prejudicial effect of such evidence 
outweighed the probative value. 
 
 
861 Criminal Practice Directions October 2015, most recent amended April 2019 at 19A.5 and 
19A.6 
862 R v O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 5CA (Crim Div) (NI) 
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It is further argued that the polygraph has the requisite degree of reliability to meet 
the criteria set out in r19 of the CrimPR. 
 
• This study recommends that the Law Commission undertake a review of the 
evidence relating to the polygraph to explore the possibility of its 
introduction in the criminal justice system via possible legislative change 
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